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ABSTRACT 
 
Erin L. Ashworth-King:  The Ethics of Satire in Early Modern English Literature 
(under the direction of Reid Barbour) 
 
This dissertation argues for a critical re-examination of the satiric literature 
circulating in print and manuscript in the years prior to the bishops’ ban of 1599, an order 
that called in numerous texts and prohibited the continued publication of satires.  Drawing 
upon a variety of genres, from religious pamphlets and prose satire to allegorical epic and 
verse satire, I argue that the authors writing satire at the threshold of the seventeenth century 
challenge the ethos of the state by affirming their authority to scourge vice and admonish 
sinners.  In their attempt to reconcile the contradictory aims of reformation and bitter personal 
attack, early modern satirists authorize themselves with the libertas to rail at a their targets 
while simultaneously asserting the godliness of their means.  Underwriting this examination of 
the early modern satiric persona is the belief that satire is not a fixed genre or a single form but 
a plastic mode of literature, infiltrating multiple generic categories and poetic structures at 
once. 
Beginning with a satiric persona freed from the constraints of biography, my first 
chapter argues that the creator of the Martin Marprelate tracts revises his authorial personae 
repeatedly to manufacture himself as a godly admonisher of the anti-Christian bishops of the 
Church of England.  Turning in the next chapter to a satirist who embraces the lowness of 
satire, I examine the literary career of Thomas Nashe, focusing upon the authorial figures of 
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An Anatomie of Absurditie, Pierce Penilesse His Supplication to the Divell, and The 
Unfortunate Traveller.   
In the next two chapters, my inquiry shifts outward to examine the ambiguous effect 
of satiric speech upon the audience in and of the works.  My third chapter engages Edmund 
Spenser’s conflicted portrayal of satire in book five of The Faerie Queene.  In Mercilla’s 
court, Spenser positions scornful speech as both a criminal act and a legitimate tool of 
justice.  Lastly, I interrogate John Donne’s anxious consideration of his audience in his 
Satires, where he repeatedly weighs the benefits of the reclusive but uncharitable life of 
contemplation against the possible infection he risks by participating fully in society.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Truly, this dissertation would not have been possible without the kindness, devotion 
and support of many.  First, I must thank Reid Barbour, whose love and intellectual curiosity 
for early modern literature and culture first brought me to the field.  He has been a rare 
mentor, his own excitement motivating me to work harder to open up the literature of the 
ancients and early moderns not only for myself but also for my students.  Megan Matchinske 
generously gave of herself, spending hours of her time providing essential feedback and 
support on my teaching and my scholarship.  Jessica Wolfe was always ready with fantastic 
advice for a young scholar, urging me to pursue satire and providing constructive ways to 
transform my disparate observations into something greater.  Darryl Gless, who offered me 
the opportunity to teach and research in London, provided an ear when I was homesick and 
doubting and engaging conversation and Thai food when I was hungry for both.  Thank you 
all so very much. 
 I am grateful to my family.  Cheering me on in softball, dance recitals, graduations 
and job searches, my father, mother and brother have been loving fixtures in my life.  Their 
sacrifices and encouragement have enabled me to do more than I ever thought possible and 
their love consistently motivated me to be the best version of myself.  My brother’s love and 
support gave me the strength to fight bullies and dissertations.  My father taught me to ride a 
two-wheeler and throw a softball—that I still cannot throw one is not a reflection on his 
teaching—but most importantly, he taught me to stand up for what I wanted and what I 
believed through his example and love.  He came into our lives after the death of my father, 
vi 
 
Daddy Jim, whose memory urges me to never rest on my laurels, but to push myself to 
pursue still greater accomplishments.  In particular, I would like to thank my mother, who 
always believed that I could do anything.  Without fail and sometimes without sleep, she 
supported me when I stumbled and led the entire brass section when I succeeded.  I love you. 
 The compassion, encouragement and love of my husband, Mark Jackson, has been a 
source of more joy and comfort than I could have ever hoped.  From his quest for the perfect 
hamburger and milkshake to his unflinching devotion to teaching the literature of the past, 
his passion for excellence routinely inspires me.  “Because it was you. Because it was I.”  I 
will love you forever. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Introduction:  The Bishops’ Ban of 1599:  Satire, Malicious Speech and Authority ..…….... 1 
 
  Renaissance Theories of Satire ……………………………………………… 9  
 
The Whipper Pamphlets: The Satirist and His Critics ……………………... 12 
 
  Chapter Summaries ………………………………………………………… 18 
 
Chapter One:  “Raylers shall not in herit the Kingdome of God”: ………………………… 22 
Martin Marprelate and the Negotiation of Godly Rebuke.  
 
  The Incendiary Arrival of Martin Marprelate ……………………………… 27 
 
  Martin Marprelate, Gentleman ……………………………………………... 31 
 
  “The Puritans only excepted” ……………………………………………… 38 
 
  Martin Marprelate’s Refashioning of Thomas Cartwright ………………… 45 
 
  Pauline Rebuke …………………………………………………………….. 49 
   
  “A Martin in Every Parish” ………………………………………………… 58 
 
  The Revolutionary Martin ………………………………………………….. 67 
 
Chapter Two:  “In those vaines here-to-fore have I mispent my spirite”: …………………. 75 
Nashe’s Prodigal Satire  
  
The Prodigal Motif in the Renaissance …………………………………...…76 
   
Nashe’s Satiric Career ……………………………………………………… 80 
 
  An Anatomie of Absurditie …………….………....……………..…….…..... 86 
 
  Pierce Penilesse His Supplication to the Divell ………………………….. 101 
 
  The Unfortunate Traveller …………………….………………...…………119 
 
 
viii 
 
Chapter Three:  Spenser’s Scorn and Mercy:  A Study of The Faerie Queene, ……..…… 146 
Book V, Canto IX, Stanzas 22-50  
 
Malfont: Spenser’s Rayling Rymer ………………………………………. 151 
 
The Didactic Power of Scorn ……….…………………………………….. 162 
 
Mercilla’s Emblems of Justice ……………….…………………………… 172 
 
The Trial of Scorn and Mercy ……….……………………………………. 185 
 
Chapter Four: “Shall I leave all this constant company / And follow headlong, wild ....… 205 
uncertain thee?”:  Images of Participation and Retirement in  
Donne’s Satires 
 
Satires II, III, and V ………………………………………….…………… 212 
 
  Images of Privacy and Participation in Satires I and IV …………………. 218 
 
  “Away thou fondling motley humorist” ………………………………….. 220 
 
  “it enough shall bee / To wash the staines away” ………………………… 236 
 
  “I would have no such Readers as I can teach” …………………………... 260 
 
Epilogue …………………………………………………………………………………... 267 
 
Bibliography ……………………………………………………………………………… 270 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Bishops’ Ban of 1599:  Satire, Malicious Speech and Authority 
 
On June 1, 1599, the Archbishop of Canterbury John Whitgift and the Bishop of 
London Richard Bancroft prohibited the publication and sale of certain books, calling in all 
extant copies for burning.  What unifies these books is hard to say; the text of the ban 
exhibits a rather flexible rule: 
Satyres tearmed HALLes Satyres viz. virgidemiarum or his 
tootheles or bitinge Satyres 
PIGMALION with certaine other Satyres 
The scourge of villanye 
The Shadowe of truthe in Epigrams and Satyres 
Snarlinge Satyres 
Caltha Poetarum 
DAVYES Epigrams, with MARLOWes Elegyes 
The booke againste woemen viz.  of marriage and wyvinge 
The xv joyes of marriage 
 
That noe Satyres or Epigrams be printed hereafter 
 
That noe Englishe histories be printed excepte they bee 
allowed by some of her maiesties privie Counsell 
 
That noe playes be printed excepte they bee allowed by suche 
as have aucthorytie 
 
That all NASSHes bookes and Doctor Harvyes bookes be 
taken Wheresoever they maye be found and that none of theire 
bookes bee ever printed hereafter 
 
That thoughe any booke of the nature of theise heretofore 
expressed shalbe broughte unto yow under the hands of the 
Lord Archbisshop of CANTERBURYE or the Lord Bishop of 
LONDON  yet the said booke shall not bee printed until the 
master or wardens have acquainted the said Lord Archbishop, 
or the Lord Bishop with the same to knowe whether it be theire 
hand or no 
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Jo[hn Whitgift] Cantur 
Rich[hard Bancroft] London 
 
Such bookes as can be found or are already taken of the 
Argumentes aforesaid or any of the bookes above expressed 
lett them bee presentlye broughte to the Bishop of London to 
be burnte.1  
 
Four days later, the bishops activated their threat, throwing to the fire several of the texts they 
had collected, sparing only a few.  The decree of June 4, 1599 gives modern scholars little 
additional understanding of the bishops’ motives, for it comprises no more than a list of 
printers to which the ban was sent and lists of texts “burnte” and “staid”: 
The foresaid Commandmentes were published at Stacyoners 
hall to the Companye and especially to the printers. viz. John 
wyndett, Gabriell Simpson, Richard Braddocke, ffelixe 
Kingston William whyte, Raphe Blower, Thomas Judson 
Peeter Shorte Adam Islipe, Richard ffeild Edmond Bolifante 
Thomas Creed, Edward Aldee [and] valentyne Symes, 
 
  Theis bookes presently thereupon were burnte in the hall 
 
  PYGMALION 
  The scourge of vilany 
  the shadowe of truthe 
  Snarlinge Satires 
  DAVIES Epigrames 
  Marriage and wyvinge 
  15 Joyes of marriage 
 
  Theis staid 
 
  Caltha Poetarum 
  HALLS Satires 
  Willobies Adviso to be Called in.2 
 
The vagueness of the ban has spurred much of the modern scholarship that has endeavored to 
piece out the bishops’ motivations and targets.  Generally, three different opinions have 
                                                 
1
 Edward Arber, ed. Transcript of the Registers of the Company of Stationers of London 1554-1640, Vol. 3 
(London, 1876), 677-678. 
  
2
 Ibid., III: 678. 
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emerged. One holds that the bishops aimed to edify their flock and thereby condemned lurid 
verse and prose.  The most recent expositor of this view is Lynda Boose, who has asserted 
that the bishops attempted to preserve public morality by regulating standards of decency.3  
Boose, however, rehashes the opinion of John Peter, who in Complaint and Satire in Early 
English Literature claims with certainty the bishops’ intentions: “there can surely be no 
doubt whatever” that the bishops were concerned “very largely with obscenity.”4  Peter, in 
turn, follows Charles Gillett, who asserts that the ban acted righteously to quell 
licentiousness: he states that “in the years 1599 and 1600, a number of writings were burned 
because of their offense against morality.”5  In contrast to these scholars, Annabel Patterson 
and Richard McCabe interpret the ban not as a spiritual tonic but as a political weapon used 
to defend the government from the sabotage of political dissent.  In her seminal study 
Censorship and Interpretation, Patterson anchors the bishops’ suppression of texts in a fear 
that criticism of the government will tear apart the state’s already fraying dominion; her 
focus falls upon the histories that the ban proscribed because they overtly criticized moral, 
social or political institutions.6  McCabe concentrates on satire instead, but to the same effect:  
                                                 
3
 Lynda E. Boose, “The 1599 Bishops’ Ban, Elizabethan Pornography, and the Sexualization of the Jacobean 
Stage,” in Enclosure Acts: Sexuality, Property and Culture in Early Modern England, eds. Richard Burt and 
John Michael Archer (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1994), 185-200. 
 
4
 Peter grounds his argument for the bishops’ regulation of decency in a distinction he sees between 
“complaint,” which he defines as legitimate religious rebuke, and “satire,” a rebuke which he deems of a more 
illicit secular nature.  See John Peter, Complaint and Satire in Early English Literature (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1956), 150. 
 
5
 Gillett devotes a chapter to satires, referencing the ban.  See Charles Gillett, Burned Books, Vol. 1 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1932), 90.  
 
6
 Patterson describes the regulation of the printing press in England as consistently thriving from a “functional 
ambiguity” that encouraged all criticisms of the state to be veiled in vague and obscure language (8).  
According to Patterson, if the authors seeking publication complied with this implicit request, the censors, in 
turn, would look the other way.  For Patterson, this symbiotic relationship breaks down with the bishops’ ban.  
See Annabel Patterson, Censorship and Interpretation: The Conditions of Writing and Reading in Early 
Modern England (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1984).  
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according to his study, the ban aimed to quash the rapid publication of prose and verse satire 
that threatened to undermine the government of the commonwealth.7  Differing from all of 
the above, Cyndia Clegg posits that the bishops’ ban was occasioned specifically by the 
mounting criticisms of the government and the Earl of Essex’s disastrous mission to Ireland.8  
She conjectures that Whitgift, a friend and supporter of Essex before and during his Irish 
campaign, issued the ban in order to quell the presses’ topical satire of his friend.9   
 What all of these interpretations have in common is that they suppose the target of the 
bishops’ ban to be some literary genre or mode that is narrower than what the words of the 
ban actually indicate, either obscenity (Boose, Peter, Gillett), history (Patterson), or satire 
(McCabe). While Clegg differs from the rest by reading the target of the ban not as a genre, 
but as a subject, she falls into the same trap of viewing the ban through equally narrow terms. 
While falling out with one another over what the ban proscribes, these scholars fail to address 
the ambiguity written into the ban itself.10  At its core, the bishops’ order of conflagration is a 
                                                 
7
 See Richard A. McCabe,  “Elizabethan Censorship and the Bishops’ Ban of 1599” Yearbook of English 
Studies 11 (1981), 188-193; McCabe responds to the criticisms of Boose in “‘Right Puisante and Terrible 
Priests’: the Role of the Anglican Church in Elizabethan State Censorship” in Literature and Censorship in 
Renaissance England, ed. Andrew Hadfield (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 75-94. 
 
8
 She argues that the bishops’ ban “was motivated less by prevailing attitudes than by particular interest in 
deflecting criticism of the government during the crisis of 1599—the Earl of Essex’s ill-fated war effort in 
Ireland.”   See Cyndia Susan Clegg, Press Censorship in Elizabethan England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 202.   
 
9
 Clegg overstates her case. She builds her argument from Whitgift’s intervention—which she sees occurring at 
the behest of Essex—in his previous censorship of Hayward’s Henry IV:  “Sitting on the Privy Council, 
Whitgift certainly knew that Essex’s enemies would welcome any further opportunity to think ill of him…If 
Essex had called upon his friend once before to take advantage of whatever authority he exercised over the 
press and use it on his behalf, would not Whitgift, unbidden, exercise such authority to help his absent friend?” 
(Clegg, Press Censorship, 208).   
 
10
 Debora Shuger acknowledges the ambiguous and ambitious nature of the ban.  She claims that the order was 
“the single most sweeping act of censorship during the entire period from 1558 to 1641” (76).  Despite the ban’s 
obvious importance to her argument, however, Shuger brings it up rarely. When she does, she confines her 
discussions of it to the commentary provided by the three anonymous poems written in response to it, The 
Whipper Pamphlets.  See Debora Shuger, Censorship & Cultural Sensibility: The Regulation of Language in 
Tudor-Stuart England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). 
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bifurcated proclamation.  Most obviously, it is a narrow statement of explicit textual 
censorship, represented by the bishops’ revocation of specific texts such as Marston’s 
Pygmalion or Edward Guilpin’s Skialetheia.  The attempt by modern scholarship to unify the 
disparate texts under a category or genre has resulted in arguments of narrow scope which 
have attempted to look through a glass darkly, guessing at the motivation of the bishops and 
the specific target of their antipathy. However, such a view of the bishops’ proclamation is 
incomplete.  More subtly, yet more simply, the ban serves as a broad yet historically specific 
attempt by the bishops to regulate malicious speech.  Reinforcing the authority of the 
Archbishop and Bishop of London as official licensers of the press, the vagueness of the ban 
grants the ecclesiastical hierarchy unlimited reach as censors.11  The proclamation sums up 
the breadth of the bishops’ power with the all-encompassing claim that “any booke of the 
nature of theise heretofore” warrants censorship.  The ambitious yet indeterminate nature of 
their demand fixes the bishops’ authority as the arbitrators of legitimate and illegitimate 
speech.   According to the ban, it is the bishops alone who are authorized to decide the 
“nature” of texts.  Condemning specific texts of satire and misogyny and increasing their 
regulation of whole generic categories, the bishops cast a wide net.  By listing texts without 
the reasons for their censure, they are able to cloak their claim of authority even as they 
                                                 
11
 The bishops’ ban was not the first measure taken by the ecclesiastical hierarchy to censure and regulate 
speech in early modern London.  On June 23, 1586, the Star Chamber Decrees for Order in Printing, executed 
by Archbishop Whitgift, consolidated the authority to license and censor in the High Commission, re-affirmed 
the privilege of the Stationers’ Company members as the only authorized London printers, and expanded 
punitive measures for operators of illegal presses.  The text of the Star Chamber Decree reads as follows:  “No 
person or persons shall ymnprynt or cawse to by ymprinted … any booke, work, coppye, matter, or thinge 
whatsoever, Except the same book, work, coppye, matter, or any other thinge, hath been heretofore allowed, or 
hereafter shall be allowed before the ymprintinge thereof, accordinge to th order appoynted by the Queenes 
maiesties Iniunctyons, And been first seen and perused by the Archbishop of CANTERBURY and Bishop of 
LONDON…Nor shall ymprynt or cause to by ymprinted any book, work, or coppie against the fourme and 
meaninge of any Restraynt or ordannaunce conteyned or to be conteyned in any statute or lawes of this Realme, 
or in any Iniunctyon made, or sett foorth by her maiestie, or her highness pryvye Councell, or against the true 
intent and meaninge of any Letters patentes, Commissions or prohibicons under the great seale of England, or 
contray to any allowed ordynaunce sett Downe for the good governaunce of the Cumpany of Staconers within 
the Cyttie of London.”  See Arber, A Transcript of the Registers, II: 810.   
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reassert it.  That the bishops needed to reinforce their status as the authorizers of legitimate 
and criminal utterance signals their anxiety regarding the usurpation of such authority by 
authors popular in the last decade of the sixteenth century.    
 While all the texts and genres detailed by the bishops in their proclamation—epigram, 
history, satire and anti-feminist texts—potentially threaten public order and the authority of 
the Elizabethan government, satiric texts receive pride of place in the ban.  The first five texts 
mentioned by title in the ban are verse satires (four of which were burned three days later).  
These texts opposed the satirist’s own sense of authority to that of the ecclesiastical 
establishment, threatening to overturn established moral, social, and political order.12  
Likewise, the texts of the Harvey-Nashe quarrel also posed a threat to the ecclesiastical order.  
These ad hominem attacks supplanted conventional rules of decorum, order and civility 
through the authors’ ribaldry.  While the rest of the works discussed in the ban are outside the 
scope of this study, they too challenge the bishops’ status as arbitrators of morality:  the anti-
feminist works appeal to an independent morality, one very much at odds with the interests 
of the crown, while nostalgic or revisionist English history plays demonstrate the 
employment of history as a mutable weapon against the current government.  The anxiety 
expressed in the bishops’ ban serves as a powerful reminder that satiric literature advanced a 
very real challenge to ecclesiastical and political authority in the last years of the sixteenth 
century.13  It is to this decade, the high-point of satire’s popularity in early modern England, 
that I shall devote this study. 
                                                 
12
 As Richard McCabe argues, satire threatens public order: “Satirists have traditionally claimed not merely a 
talent but a privilege to abuse” (“Right Puisante and Terrible Priest,” 90).  
 
13
 To protect the monarch’s authority, Elizabethan Parliaments not only continued the strict Marian statutes 
protecting the queen from slander and malicious rumor, but also increased the penalty for first offenders.  
Previously, one found guilty of authoring “false matter, clause, or sentence of slander, reproach and dishonour 
of the king and Queenes Majesties” would “have his or their right hand stricken off” in a public venue. In 1581, 
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This dissertation argues for a re-examination of early modern satiric literature in the 
years leading up to the bishops ban of 1599.  Until recently, modern scholarship has tended to 
treat early modern satire as a tight formal or generic category. Viewed formally, satire is 
defined by its “roughness” of rhythm and meter, which can occur in either verse or prose. Such 
satiric roughness is quintessentially English, taken from William Langland and John Skelton’s 
adoption of the voice of the honest, plain-speaking plowman, sermonizing upon the world’s 
sinfulness.  Viewed generically, satire is discussed as a kind of lyric comparable to other verse 
forms such as the epigram, sonnet and elegy, but distinguished by its irregular meter, elisions, 
severe enjambments and forced rhymes.   This type of scholarship has tended to view the early 
modern verse satirist as a reflection of its classical antecedent.  The early modern satiric 
persona is classified as either Horace, Juvenal, or Persius: “the satirist’s emotional state 
determines his aim or approach to vice: Juvenal’s anger and saeva indignatio erupt in an 
equally strong rebuke and bitter indignation; Horace’s calmer, more pleasant personality leads 
to a gentler mockery and ridicule; and Persius’ high seriousness avoid[s] the extremes of 
amusement and anger.”14  
Obviously, these two views, formal and generic, overlap.  Scholarly opinions of early 
modern satire have been born from the idea, common in the Renaissance, that satire derived 
from “satyr,” and that therefore “satire” should exhibit the characteristics of the cranky, flute-
playing, half-goat, woodland god.   Alvin Kernan’s influential study of the persona of the early 
                                                                                                                                                       
under pressure from the mounting criticisms of Elizabeth’s policies, Parliament extended the punishment from 
dismemberment to death for first time offenders. See Clegg, Press Censorship in Elizabethan England, 32. 
 
14
 James S. Baumlin, “Generic Contexts of Elizabethan Satire: Rhetoric, Poetic Theory, and Imitation,” in 
Renaissance Genres: Essays on Theory, History, and Interpretation, ed. Barbara Lewalski (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986), 445.  
8 
 
modern satirist has been key in perpetuating this approach. 15  Indeed, Kernan’s view is not 
wrong.  He avoids the problem of many other scholars, who focus separately upon verse and 
prose satire, manufacturing a distinction between forms that the primary material does not 
support. For early moderns, satire is not bound by form or genre.16  It is a flexible, 
amorphous, and self-conscious style of rebuke.   
Given its protean nature, it is more accurate to refer to satire as a literary mode rather 
than a genre.  Modes, Alastair Fowler argues, contain “a selection only of the corresponding 
kind’s features, and one from which overall external structure is absent.”17  Such terminology 
allows for the inherent slipperiness of satire:  according to Fowler, “[d]iversity of form is 
paradoxically the ‘fixed’ form of satire.”18  To early modern audiences, satire could be, and 
was, found anywhere.  Common to both verse and prose, satire infused lyric, epic, romance, 
and drama.  Within such genres, satire works as admonition, polemic and complaint, on one 
hand, and invective, slander and libel on the other.   
Spanning the literature of the “long 1590s,” this dissertation takes as its focus a 
variety of meta-critical moments culled from both conventional satires and texts that treat 
                                                 
15
 Originally published fifty years ago, Alvin Kernan’s seminal study The Cankered Muse still stands as the 
foremost authority regarding the early modern satiric persona. Alvin Kernan, The Cankered Muse (New Haven, 
Connecticut:  Yale University Press, 1959). 
 
16
 Outside the Renaissance, modern scholarship has more overtly embraced the amorphous nature of satire: 
Northrop Frye insists that only “Two things, then, are essential to satire; one is wit or humor,…the other is an 
object of attack” (224). Ronald Paulson questions whether or not “satire is anything more than a tone attached 
to certain forms and subject matters” (4); Fredric Bogel has pointed out the limits of formalist studies, which 
have not satisfactorily fixed satire. Alastair Fowler’s Kinds of Literature insists upon the continual flux of 
generic categories (45).  See Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1957); Ronald Paulson, The Fictions of Satire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1967); Fredric Bogel, The Difference Satire Makes: Rhetoric and Reading from Jonson to 
Byron (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2001); Alastair Fowler, Kinds of Literature (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts:  Harvard University Press, 1982). 
 
17
 Fowler, Kinds of Literature, 107. 
 
18
 Ibid., 110.  
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satire more tangentially.  Drawing upon religious pamphlets, prose satire, allegorical epic, 
and verse satire, I argue in this dissertation that the authors writing satirically at the threshold 
of the seventeenth century challenge the ethos of the state by affirming their own authority to 
scourge vice and admonish sinners.  In their attempt to reconcile the often contradictory aims 
of reformation and bitter personal attack, early modern satirists authorize themselves with the 
liberty to rail at a variety of personages and institutions.  Embodying the tension of his 
discourse, the satirist aims to scourge humanity for its sins, employing what the bishops 
considered malicious speech in the goal of admonition:  to urge society’s transformation from 
sin to virtue, the satirist has recourse to such weapons as ad hominem attack, name-calling, and 
mud-slinging.  The satirist justifies his violent instruments by citing his goal of moral reform. 
By doing so, the satirist reinvigorates and challenges early modern debates regarding the moral 
authority of rebuke, the nature of godly religious speech and the criminality of slander.  A 
dynamic and incendiary mode of literature, satire is never stagnant, nor is it isolated from the 
larger issues of interest to scholars studying the literature of early modern England, such as 
identity formation and the ways in which authority is construed and challenged in religious and 
political discourse. 
 
Renaissance Theories of Satire 
 In his discussion of the history of poetry in The Arte of English Poesie (1589), George 
Puttenham honors satire as essential to the maintenance of the commonwealth and second in 
importance only to hymns praising the gods, but defines the mode of literature as 
fundamentally fallen.  Privileging the apprehension of wide-spread vice over the praise of 
rare virtue, Puttenham empowers satirists with the libertas to castigate and reprove bitterly 
10 
 
the corrupt of society.  For Puttenham, the satirists’ rebuke of “most offensive” public and 
private vice makes up the deficit left by the lack of “good civility and wholesome doctrines” 
in society, likening satire implicitly to law and satirists to lawmakers.19  But, while he 
recognizes that the satirist’s admonitions of society may be godly assertions of his authority, 
he admits that the satirist will be hated by those he attempts to reform:  
Poets used for that purpose three kinds of poems reprehensive, to 
wit, the Satyre, the Comedie, and the Tragedie.  And the first and 
most bitter invective against vice and vicious men was the Satyre: 
which, to th’intent their bitternesse should breede none ill will, 
either to the Poets, or to the recitours (which could not have bene 
chosen if thy have bene openly knowen), and besides to make their 
admonitions and reproofs seeme graver and of more efficacie, they 
made wise as if the gods of the woods, whom thy call Satyres.20 
 
The satirist is licensed to employ “reprehensive” speech in order to urge the reformation of 
his audience; however, Puttenham acknowledges that his license will not endear him to the 
people he castigates.  Here, Puttenham demonstrates the paradox of satire:  while it claims to 
be born of love and a sense of godly charity, satire inevitably will breed “ill will” in its 
audience.   
 Rooted in its compulsion to name names, satire’s tendency to breed such “ill will” is 
not new to the Renaissance.  Linking satire’s reprehension of vice with vetus comeodia like 
Aelius Donatus before him, Puttenham derives his account of early modern satire from 
“satyr,” a false etymology of the word widely believed until the publication of Issac 
Casubon’s De satyrica graecorum poesi et romanorum satira in 1605.21  Donatus imagines 
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 George Puttenham, The Arte of English Poesie, in Elizabethan Critical Essays, Vol. 2. ed. G. Gregory Smith 
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 Ibid.  
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 For an excellent summary of the chronologies of Satire, Old and New Comedy, see Oscar James Campbell, 
Comicall Satyre and Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida (San Marino, California: Huntington Library Press, 
1959), 24-40. 
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that the vitriolic Old Comedy was suppressed because its writers “abused their freedom so 
scandalously that they had to be restrained” from condemning specific individuals for their 
private vices.22  While for Donatus, satyre was created from the ashes of Old Comedy, 
Puttenham reverses Donatus’s chronology, attributing the transformation of the more 
dogmatic Satyre to the more festive Old Comedy.  According to Puttenham’s version of 
events, the format changed from satire’s preference for the grave sermon to comedy’s lively 
and jocular dialogue, but the author’s employment of malicious speech largely carried over to 
the new form.  As before, the actors remained disguised, “for feare of quarrel & blame,” 
while they violently reproved their audience members for their sins.23  Thomas Lodge, 
writing before Puttenham, likewise insists upon the obscurity of the actor’s and author’s 
persons and the malice of their speech: “they presented the lives of Satyers, so that they 
might wiselye, under the abuse of that name, discover the follies of many theyr foolish fellow 
citesens.”24 While Puttenham and Lodge insisted that the first satirists demonstrated their 
godliness physically, donning disguises to assure their audiences of their authority—“they 
made wise as if the gods of the woods”—early modern satirists did not have the recourse to 
such obvious physical indicators.  Rather, they attempted to justify repeatedly their art’s 
godliness through demonstrations of their moral character.25    
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admitted of zeale to discypher the abuses of the worlde in the person of notorious offenders, I knowe we should 
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 As early modern satirists attempted to underscore the righteousness of such vehement 
rebuke of sin, the ethics of employing malicious speech in a godly cause remained unclear, 
depending largely upon the particulars of the situation.  Nowhere is this clearer than in the 
case of John Donne.  Looking back on his own satiric career several years later as the Dean 
of Saint Pauls, Donne articulates his own ambivalent relationship with satire.  For Donne, the 
efficacy of the satiric enterprise largely hinges upon the righteousness of the satiric persona.  
While “a malicious man will turne a Sermon to a Satyre, and a Panegyricke to a Libel,” a 
holy man, filled with the gentleness and love of the holy spirit “makes a Satyr, and Slander, 
and Libell against me, a Panegyrique, and an Elogy in my praise.”26  Godliness transforms 
slander to praise; conversely, a lack of godliness debases sober speech to the status of 
libelous trash.27  Indeed, the ethics of satire in early modern England would seem to be 
highly negotiable. 
 
The Whipper Pamphlets: The Satirist and His Critics 
 Immediately after the bishops had announced their prohibition on malicious speech 
and rounded up the works of some of the offenders for burning, a pamphlet emerged from the 
printing press championing the bishops’ rejection of satire.  Attributed now almost 
universally to John Weever, The Whipping of the Satyre criticizes satire as a seditious, 
unchristian and ineffective usurpation of the authority of the bishops, magistrates and even 
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the times ill” (Ibid., VII: 408). 
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the Queen herself.  Coming at the end the century, Weever’s condemnation of the satirists is 
largely representative of the arguments used against satire in the decade leading up to the 
bishop’s proclamation.  The Whipping of the Satyre, as well as the replies it elicited, serves as 
a good example of the difficulty of defining, and therefore criticizing satire.   
 Weever’s text represents the problem inherent in the polemical rebuke of satire.  Like 
the critics of satire before him, Weever builds his case against unlawful speech by attacking 
the satirists’ lack of moral authority, calling upon both religious and civil arguments to 
champion the bishops’ actions.28  His methods, however, do not differ markedly from those 
he castigates. Weever appears less interested in reforming the English population than in 
attacking satire with satire.  He demonstrates his relish for poetic flyting, matching the satirist 
low-blow for low-blow.29  Throughout his condemnation, Weever attempts to balance his 
general criticism of abusive speech with his particular topical satire of his literary enemies. 
Positioning his targets as straw-men, Weever’s choices are not without personal motivation: 
he blasts all malicious speech, but in particular, he picks out John Marston, England’s 
Juvenal,30 as his representative satirist, Edward Guilpin as the ungodly epigrammatist, and 
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 It is uncertain whether Weever ran afoul of the very censures who had previously condemned satire to the 
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satyrick vaine /  Shall muzzled be … No gloomie Juvenall, / Through to thy fortunes I disastrous fall” (III, 191-
196).  See Arnold Davenport, ed., The Poems of John Marston (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1961). 
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lastly, Ben Jonson as the inappropriate and licentious humorist.31  The two responses to 
Weever’s pamphlet, Nicholas Breton’s No Whippinge, nor trippinge, but a kinde and friendly 
Snippinge and Edward Guilpin’s The Whipper of the Satyre his Pennance in a white Sheete, 
represent the two options available for poets attempting to counter such polemic. No 
Whippinge, issued two months before Guilpin’s reply, earnestly calls for peace, whereas The 
Whipper of the Satyre vehemently calls for violence.       
 Taken collectively, The Whipper Pamphlets present a conflicted portrayal of the 
satirist’s motivation and the righteousness of his means.   Writing first, Weever attacks the 
malicious language of the satirist, epigrammatist and humorist on religious and civil grounds 
(distinguishing his three targets only by the form in which they write: verse satire, short 
epigram, and satiric drama, respectively).  Writing next, Breton calls out Weever and the 
satirists, epigrammatists and other authors more interested in perpetuating literary feuds than 
in mending England’s sinfulness.  Writing last, Edward Guilpin insists upon the morality of 
his satiric art, condemning Weever for his ungodly acceptance of the follies and corruptions 
of the world. 
 In The Whipping of the Satyre, Weever attacks the godliness of the satirist, 
contradicting the conventional protestation that satire is motivated by Christian duty by 
accusing the satirist of vindictively spewing choler onto his targets.  According to Weever, 
the satirist abuses the power of admonition.  Opposing the satirist’s typical scriptural 
justification that he “hates the sin, but loves the sinner,” Weever posits that the satirist’s 
anger and hatred of men makes him worse than his targets: 
The world growes old, & age growes froward stil, 
With gentlest speech it therefore should be won, 
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It’s sore with sinne, and sinne swell sorer will: 
Yet stead of balme, he powers out blame thereon: 
With filthie rancour still he vomits out 
The poisoned malice of his spitefull thought. 32 
 
Amid the moral decay of the world around him, the satirist’s tools are not medicinal, but 
rather spiteful:  instead of healing his target’s sin with the balm of reformation, the satirist 
offers blame, filth, anger, vomit, poison and malice.   According to Weever, the satirist rails 
against offenders, his true motive arising not from charity, but from malicious anger: “Malice 
did twist what discontent had sponne, / (For malice always doubles discontent) / Anger drew 
out what malice double twonne, (For anger still unfoldeth bad intent)” (I: 565-568). The 
satirist suffers from discontent twisted by malice to a sinful anger.  Weever’s condemnation 
of satiric anger cannot be taken as gospel, however.  Beyond the simple fact that he employs 
the very methods he admonishes here—as Nicholas Breton would admonish later, “he that is 
possessed with despight, / Shewes but a wicked kinde of instigation”—the godliness of 
satiric speech was not then, nor is it now, monolithic.33 While Breton would urge his poetic 
audience to err on the side of charity, to “Winke at each faulte & wish it were amended” (II: 
146), Edward Guilpin, the author of the satiric answer to Weever’s The Whipper of the Satyre 
his Pennance, affirms the charity and godliness of even violent rebuke: 
[Preachers] may command as God commandeth them 
  But we will do our willes: Why? we are men. […] 
  Is this our life? then whip each other well, 
  Better to be whipt on Earth, then scourg’d in Hell. 34 
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For Guilpin, the innate sinfulness of humanity justifies even brutal satire.  Breton, 
conversely, dismisses the value of satiric language in reformation, arguing “It is a course of 
little charitie, / To finde out faults and fall upon them so” (II: 281-282).  While one argues for 
the permissiveness and even charity of satire in a godly cause, the other dismisses it as 
unchristian.   
Not content to disavow satire as only unchristian, Weever also denounces it as 
seditious. In The Whipping of the Satyre, Weever accuses the satirist, epigrammatist, and 
humorist of undermining the authority of the state through their slander.  Once he is able to 
divorce satire from its goal of reformation, Weever is able to relegate it to mere defamation, 
making satire synonymous with slander and libel.  Admonishing his targets for their railing 
satires, Weever likens the crime of the satirists with that of libeling the state:  
Was not one hang’d of late for libeling?  
… you deserve the same:  
For you before whole volumes foorth did bring, 
And whome you pleas’d, did liberally defame. 
  For shall we his by right a Libell call, 
  That toutcht but some?  not yours, that aym’d at all? (I: 331-336) 
 
Satire is positioned in this passage not as a measure of correction, but as a criminal speech 
act punished by hanging.35  Etymologically speaking, Weever is not wrong to associate satire 
with slander.  Like satire, slander is difficult to codify.36  Linked etymologically with 
“scandal,” slander is defined by the OED in a way that makes it almost synonymous with 
satire:  “Discredit, disgrace, or shame, incurred by or falling upon a person or persons, esp. 
on account of some transgression of the moral law, unworthy action, or misdemeanour.”  At 
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their core, slander and satire both intend to injure a person or institutions’ ethical credibility, 
either in the cause of reform or for the sake of mere defamation.    
 Here more than anywhere else in the work, Weever replicates the voice of the 
bishops’ ban, installing himself, as they did, as the judge of legitimate and illegitimate 
speech.  He accuses the satirist, epigrammatist and humorist of usurping the moral authority 
of the magistrates, bishops and even Queen Elizabeth, herself.   Weever’s sustained portrait 
of the satirist’s lack of moral authority indicates the danger posed by such a challenge and the 
perceived righteousness of the bishops’ actions.  He admonishes the satirist for overstepping 
his reach: 
  Our noble Princesse (Lord preserve her Grace) 
  Made godly lawes to guide this Common-weale, 
  And hath appointed Officers in place, 
  By those her Lawes with each offence to deale: 
  Well looke the rowles, no office overskippe, 
  And see if you can finde the Satyrshippe. 
  If not, dare you usurpe an office then, 
  Without the licence of her Majestie, 
  To punish all her Subjects with the pen, 
  Against the Law of all Civilitie?  (I: 577-586) 
 
On a simple narrative level, Weever poses a jurisdictional argument, appealing to the uses of 
licenses and royal privileges that must be in place before an Elizabethan citizen could be 
appointed as a magistrate or officer.  On a deeper level, the satirist’s offense is more of a 
threat than a simple jurisdictional crime would dictate: the satirist violates public order by 
usurping “an office” with his satire.  Weever’s opposition of the panegyric to Queen 
Elizabeth in the opening lines of his portrait and his criticism of the satirist that immediately 
follows demonstrates the flimsy nature of such constructed authority.   For Weever, as well 
as for the bishops, the satirist’s very existence threatens the order and peace of the realm.  
Weever continues, elaborating upon the specific crimes of the satirist: 
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  I have him up, tis pettie treason all, 
  And therefore feare to breake his necke this fall. … 
 
  Thinking (O heavens) his vild injurious speech 
  Will Princes lawes, lawes Justice over-reach. … 
   
  As though the vapour of his windfull words, 
  Would blow up vices of their own accord. (I: 589-590, 593-594, 599-600) 
 
Returning to the image of the punished body of the satirist, Weever associates the satirist’s 
usurpation of the moral laws of the land with treason and injustice.  Moving beyond his 
initial jurisdictional argument, Weever indicts the satirist first for his “injurious speech” that 
dares to “over-reach” the Princes’ laws, and then for his prideful assumption that he will 
succeed where the laws of the land failed.  Weever portrays the regulation of legitimate and 
illegitimate speech as essential to the maintenance of the peace of the commonwealth.  
Oddly, both Breton and Guilpin are silent against this charge.  Guilpin answers the broader 
indictment of treason by repeatedly asserting his compulsion to satirize, attempting to build 
his moral authority through his discovery of vice while affirming his loyalty to Queen 
Elizabeth. 
 
Chapter Summaries 
 This dissertation examines the various strategies of satiric speech produced in the 
years leading to the bishops’ ban of 1599, beginning with the Marprelate controversy (1588-
1589).  The span of the “long 1590s” offers an important synecdoche from which to analyze 
the plasticity of early modern satire and the satirist. Scanning various literary genres, I have 
organized this project with an eye toward the changing locus of contradiction. In my initial 
chapters, I analyze the authorial constructions of the satiric persona in the tracts of Martin 
Marprelate and Thomas Nashe, examining the ways in which these authors construct moral 
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authority. Then, in the second half of the dissertation, I turn outward to interrogate the 
satirist’s effect on society.  Within chapter three, I study the state’s responses to and adoption 
of the satiric voice in Spenser’s The Faerie Queene, and in chapter four, I explore John 
Donne’s conflicted investment in his readers’ salvation.  As the satirist both shapes his 
discourse and is shaped by it, this dissertation speaks to larger issues involving how meaning 
is construed—and potentially misconstrued—and how such interpretation forms authorial 
and satiric identity. 
My first chapter analyzes the fictional persona of “Martin Marprelate,” the 
anonymous Puritan satirist who scourged the ecclesiastical order of the Church of England.  
In this chapter, I argue that the constructed fiction of “Martin Marprelate”—at once a 
reformer akin to Martin Luther and a satirist threatening to “mar-a-prelate”—highlights the 
essential duality of satire’s goals: reformation and attack.  Attempting to put satire in the 
direct service of religion, the authorial construction of “Martin Marprelate” challenges the 
strictures imposed upon religious discourse through his mixture of secular ad hominem attack 
and scriptural rebuke. Over the series of his seven satires, Marprelate self-consciously 
attempts to defend himself against the charge of immodest jest that characterized his first, ill-
received publication, gradually revising his satiric persona to accommodate a scriptural 
model of Pauline rebuke. These ever-changing and self-correcting satires serve as a sharp 
reminder that we cannot speak of Elizabethan orthodoxy in belief and discourse as though it 
were monolithic; like satire, the grounds of orthodoxy are unstable and contested.   
Turning to a satiric mask that embraces the “lowness of satire,” I argue in my second 
chapter that Thomas Nashe adapts the pose of the prodigal son throughout his career in order 
to interrogate the profit of his critical task.  Although Nashe begins his career confident in the 
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ability of admonition to elicit reformation, publishing the heavily didactic Anatomie of 
Absurditie to chastise Londoners for their licentious ways, he soon abandons this voice of 
authority.  In Pierce Penniless His Supplication to the Devil, Nashe assumes the very pose he 
had previously condemned, refusing to justify his satiric supplication or his lack of moral 
authority as a satirist.  Through the mask of Pierce, Nashe defends prodigality as a means of 
achieving Aristotelian discretion: “Omne ignotum pro magnifico est: that villainy we have 
made no assaies in, we admire.”37  This constructed persona enables Nashe to advise his 
readers to indulge in vice, but, in turn, questions the effectiveness of the rebuke he would 
administer.  In The Unfortunate Traveller, Nashe pushes the flexibility of satire to a breaking 
point, adopting the mask of the prodigal in order to divorce satire from its undeliverable 
promises of reformation.  As Jack Wilton, Nashe mocks satire’s ability to cleanse the world 
of sin, conceiving of his own text as a narration of knavery, with little profit or edification. 
Next, I examine book five of Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene, focusing my 
sights on the Malfont episode immediately preceding the trial of Duessa. In this chapter, the 
locus of contradiction moves from the constructed mask of the satirist to the state’s responses 
to satire.  Here, I argue that Spenser portrays Malfont—the only self-titled poet in The Faerie 
Queene—as a satirist who publishes “rayling rymes” against the monarch Mercilla, a queen 
who nails the poet’s tongue to a post for his crime.  A decidedly negative example of the 
satirist, Malfont is not the only character linked with satire in canto nine, however. Like a 
satirist, the prosecutor Zele hunts out and reveals the hidden vices of the state, closing the 
gap between himself and Malfont.  A common characteristic of the early modern satirist, zeal 
operates in the liminal space between righteous indignation and uncharitable scorn.  The 
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close proximity of two such seemingly opposite allegories questions the righteousness of 
employing satire in the service of secular justice, specifically problematizing the state’s co-
option of the “dissident” mode. 
I argue in my fourth chapter that while three of the most well-known lyric satirists—
Joseph Hall, John Marston and John Donne—all view satire as the most utilitarian literary 
mode, only Donne attempts to recuperate the mode to put it to work.  Demonstrating in his 
Satires his spiritual responsibility as a Christian poet to help cleanse a corrupt society of sin, 
Donne applies satire in order to urge his readers to seek truth and reformation.  He recognizes 
that his choice of cure may result in his soul’s contamination, however.  Throughout his 
satires, Donne struggles to reconcile the need for charity with his desire to preserve his soul 
by retreating from such moral infection.  In his attempt to balance the active life of 
participation and the contemplative life of meditation, Donne must limit the effectiveness of 
satire.  Restricting the availability of his satires to his manuscript coterie, and later, to an 
even more intimate correspondence with close friends, Donne circumscribes his goal of 
reformation to include only those wise readers who “esteem [his] writs Canonicall.”38  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38
 John Donne, Satire IV, in John Donne, Satires, Epigrams and Verse Letters, ed. W. Milgate (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1967), 244. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
“Raylers shall not in herit the Kingdome of God” : Martin Marprelate  
and the Negotiation of Godly Rebuke 39 
 
Most broadly, the seven texts of Martin Marprelate tackle the politically dangerous 
topic of the power and biblical authority of the Church of England’s episcopal hierarchy in 
1588 and 1589.  In October 1588, a tract with the cumbersome title Oh read over D. John 
Bridges / for it is a worthy worke: or An epitome of the fyrste Booke of that right Worshipfull 
volume / written against the Puritanes in the defence of the Noble cleargie…Compiled for the 
Behoofe and overthrow of the Parsons / Fyckers / and Currats / that have lernt their 
Catechismes and are past grace: by the reverend and worthie Martin Marprelate gentleman 
and dedicated to the Confocationhouse appeared in London, and promised to mock the 
bishops into a serious consideration of reformation.40  A month later, The Epitome appeared, 
with an identical title page and a similarly mocking oration to John Bridges, the Dean of 
Sarum.  Through the author’s use of ridicule and ad hominem attack, the two tracts claim that 
the hierarchy of the Church of England has no root in Scripture and is detrimental to England 
as a whole.  Martin Marprelate continues to denounce the bishops’ government with five 
more tracts, namely, the broadside The Mineral and Metaphysical School-points (March 
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1589), his largest tract Hay Any Worke for Cooper (March 1589) and then, in quick 
succession, Theses Martinianae (July 1589), The Just Censure and Reproof of Martin Junior 
(July 1589), and finally, The Protestatyon (September 1589). 
The scholarly debates surrounding the seven satiric tracts penned under the name 
“Martin Marprelate” are numerous, offering more questions than answers, more 
complications than easy solutions.  The most obvious questions relate to the history of the 
controversy itself:  who was the elusive polemicist who taunted the bishops under the witty 
pseudonym? Why did the author claiming to be Marprelate appear so quickly after the 
victory over the Spanish Armada and then, just as inexplicably, disappear from sight less 
than a year later, only to be reinvented in the years leading to the English Civil War? These 
questions have riveted scholars of history, religious studies and literature alike, tempting 
would-be sleuths into seductive theories of authorship and suppositions involving the highest 
members of Elizabeth’s court and well-known Puritan reformers.41  As seductive as the 
questions of authorship may be, the four-hundred year mystery has not been conclusively 
solved, despite the work of many capable scholars.      
Equally puzzling to the biographical identity of the tracts author(s) is the authorial 
fiction fashioned by the mysterious pamphleteer.  This chapter intends to argue that the 
polemicist claiming to be Martin Marprelate constantly revises his dynamic authorial fiction 
throughout his tracts, refiguring his voice and persona to fit his ends of attack and 
reformation.  With each tract issued, Marprelate’s authorial fiction evolves.  He slowly exerts 
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more control over his voice and arguments, managing to balance more appropriately the 
sometimes contradictory goals of his polemic.  He negotiates the tensions of satire first by 
incorporating the work of previous reformers, then by increasing his citations from scriptural 
authority, and later by manufacturing filial support, that of his sons “Martin Junior” and 
“Martin Senior.”  Over the course of his seven satires, Martin Marprelate self-consciously 
defends himself against the charge of immodest jest that characterized his first, ill-received 
publication, transforming his voice and his arguments to accommodate a scriptural model of 
Pauline rebuke.  At the close of the Martin Marprelate controversy—occurring only a short 
year after the first tract appeared—Marprelate has learned to put satire in the direct service of 
religion.   
In his first tract, The Epistle, Marprelate relies almost exclusively upon secular ad 
hominem attack and ridicule to damage the reputation of Archbishop Whitgift and his 
churchmen.  Justifying his satire of the bishops through precedent, Marprelate fashions 
himself according to the model of religious polemic outlined by the tracts of the Admonition 
controversy fought a decade earlier:  he styles himself the legitimate heir of the epistolary 
skirmish between the “upstart” Puritans and the “unyielding” bishops, co-opting the language 
of rebuke found in the anonymous First and Second Admonitions to the Parliament and 
Thomas Cartwright’s Replyes to John Whitgift.  Unfortunately for Marprelate, this first tract 
was received with bitter antipathy by the very people he aimed to champion.  Chastising 
Martin Marprelate’s use of satire and ad hominem attack, several Puritan leaders distanced 
themselves from the polemicist, who, they believed, had compromised the dignity of the 
reformation with his vitriolic means. 
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In his next tracts, The Epitome and Hay Any Worke for Cooper, Marprelate responds 
to the criticisms levied against him by revising his persona to portray a more godly model of 
rebuke.  Marprelate adapts his voice to the example of admonition outlined by the Apostle 
Paul in his Epistles. However, Marprelate does not merely parrot Pauline doctrine; rather, he 
transforms Paul to accommodate his contemporary need for ecclesiastical reformation, 
ousting the bishops from power through Paul’s descriptions of the ideal ecclesiastical 
officers.  He adjusts Paul’s imperative to Timothy in the Second Epistle, “Preach the worde: 
be instant, in season and out of season: improve, rebuke, exhorte with all long suffering and 
doctrine” to make room for even violent moral correction.    
In his later tracts, Theses Martinianae and The Just Censure and Reproofe, the author 
of the Marprelate tracts constructs two additional voices to embody dramatically the tension 
between the purveyors of satiric attack and the supporters of religious circumspection.  
Through these new, independent personae, the author more fully interrogates the legitimacy 
of satiric means in the urging of reformation. Fleshing out his authorial fiction into separate 
individuals, the author of the tracts positions Marprelate’s two sons “Martin Junior” and 
“Martin Senior” as embodiments of contention and sobriety, respectively.  While Martin 
Junior is portrayed as the more froward youth, immature and contentious, Martin Senior is 
constructed as a more temperate voice, castigating his younger brother for his riotous 
behavior and urging caution.  The author’s utilization of such epistolary dialogue in order to 
puzzle out the proper means of reformation demonstrates his dynamic engagement in the 
tensions of satire but also functions to distance Martin Marprelate himself from the very 
charges cast at the presumptuous youth, Martin Junior.  Thus the authorial fiction of Martin 
Marprelate proves dynamic, inwardly conflicted, and in some measure, self-regulating. 
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In his final tract, The Protestatyon of Martin Marprelate, Martin Marprelate himself 
re-emerges, but in a more sober form than his previous incarnation in Hay Any Worke for 
Cooper.  While the frontispiece of the tract promises the return of Martin Marprelate’s satiric 
ribaldry—the author proclaims that he fears neither “proud priest, Antichristian pope, 
tiranous prellate, nor godlesse catercap”—such satiric promises remain undelivered in the 
text of the work.  The tone of the last tract is decidedly more urgent than his earlier 
pamphlets, marking a turn away from the satiric means of reformation after the advertisement 
of the title.  In the place of his previous scourgings of the bishops, Marprelate offers 
disputation, and failing that, resistance.  Throughout the tract, he is preoccupied with 
questions of his own salvation and what he feels is his moral imperative to resist 
governments contrary to the will and Word of God.  Although he still has occasion to 
castigate the bishops for their moral corruption in his last tract, The Protestatyon is 
characterized by the author’s confidence in his moral duty, marking “Martin Marprelate’s” 
valediction and his maturation as a godly admonisher.   
The authorial fiction developed by “Martin Marprelate” throughout his tracts serves 
as a complex but sharp reminder that we cannot speak of Elizabethan orthodoxy in belief and 
discourse as though it were monolithic; in contrast, the grounds of orthodoxy are themselves 
unstable and contested. While Martin Marprelate’s dynamic and inventive fiction 
undoubtedly belongs with contemporary figures such as Pierce Penniless and Jack Wilton, 
his fictions’ burdens are greater than those of other personae. The author(s) claiming to be 
Martin Marprelate negotiates his way through the complex strictures of religious controversy 
by assuming and refashioning the authorities of the Apostle Paul and Thomas Cartwright to 
suit his own ends. 
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The Incendiary Arrival of Martin Marprelate 
Martin Marprelate certainly was not the first polemicist to employ vitriolic attack in 
religious discourse.  Prior to his incendiary arrival, the Puritans and bishops had been 
engaged in various literary skirmishes, most notably, the Admonition controversy.  These 
pamphlet exchanges are characterized by their participants’ struggle to reconcile the 
uncharitable means of vitriol and ad hominem attack to the dignified ends of religious 
reformation. Beginning in 1572, the Admonition controversy was sparked by Archbishop 
Parker’s new, stricter enforcement of Elizabeth’s Act of Uniformity (1559), which 
necessitated the suspension and deprivation of nonconforming ministers who refused either 
to don the cap and surplice, to use the Book of Common Prayer in their ministry, or to 
subscribe to the Articles of Religion.  Two ministers, John Field and Thomas Wilcox, voiced 
their displeasure in the anonymous An Admonition to the Parliament.  The tract presented a 
series of complaints through the lawful channels of Parliament, strongly urging the 
ecclesiastical reformation of the Church of England.  In their tract, Field and Wilcox declaim 
the Popish “rags” left in the Church of England and promote a Presbyterian model 
characterized by congregational, rather than episcopal, control.  Specifically, the tract argues 
that seniors, elders and deacons should govern the congregation according to the rubric 
outlined by Paul in his second letter to Timothy, through consultation, admonition, 
correction, and exhortation.  Wildly successful and circulated throughout London, the 
divisive quarto immediately ruffled feathers, and the ecclesiastical hierarchy was quick to 
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respond. 42  On June 27th the Bishop of Lincoln answered the tract in his sermon at Paul’s 
Cross.  Field and Wilcox were arrested and imprisoned in Newgate soon after. 
 In November of the same year, The Second Admonition to the Parliament was 
published, elaborating on the reforms outlined in the first tract.43  The tone of the Second 
Admonition is more vitriolic than the first, arguing that the bishops themselves are 
responsible for the anti-Christian elements of the Church, and should be roundly denounced.  
Like the satirists and reformers of the past, the author of the tract feels compelled to speak 
against the abuses of the bishops as a subject and a godly man: “for the very states sake, for 
the princes sake, for the churches sake, and for conscience sake, he hathe but a bade 
conscience that in this time will holde his peace, and not speak it for feare of trouble, 
knowing that there are such intollerable abuses in it.”44  The Dean of Lincoln and Master of 
Trinity College, John Whitgift, was tapped to issue the orthodox literary response, entitled An 
Answere to a certen Libel intitled An Admonition to the Parliament.  In turn, Whitgift’s 
quarto was countered by Thomas Cartwright, who answered his old adversary from 
Cambridge with the punchy A Replye to an answere made of M. Doctor Whitgifte, Againste 
the Admonition to the Parliament, by T.C. in September of 1573.  A year later, Whitgift 
retorted with A Defense of the Answere, and Cartwright issued The Second Replie (1575) and 
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The Rest of the Second Replie (1577).  Whitgift chose not to respond to the last tracts printed 
and, indeed, bid farewell to authorship.45  
In his various Replyes to Whitgift, Thomas Cartwright echoes the language of rebuke 
found in the two Admonitions.  In his skirmish of words, Cartwright positions himself as a 
godly admonisher and his interlocutor as a spurious railer.  He charges Whitgift with moral 
hypocrisy for condemning the methods he would employ himself: “in words condemning it / 
and approving it in your dedes / I will not say that you mislike thys sharpness / as you are 
sory that you are prevented / and are not the first in it.” 46  Cartwright accuses Whitgift of the 
using the same pugnacious rhetoric he would rebuke in the Admonitions.  At the end of his 
Replye, Cartwright counters Whitgift’s assertion that the tracts of the Admonitions should be 
condemned as libels by arguing that Whitgift’s tract is a satire: “If he call it a libel / because 
it useth some sharper speeches / surely all men see that hys book deserveth then to be called a 
Satyre / having for tarte wordes /  bitter [replies] / and for one / twentie.” 47  For Cartwright, 
Whitgift has lost his authority through his bitter rebukes of godly men; his book is nothing 
more than a satire, without profit or the potential for reform.   
Building upon the urgency demonstrated in his Admonition to the Parliament, John 
Field continues to employ the vitriolic language of reformation throughout the decade 
following the publication of The Admonitions.  In his examination before the High 
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Commission, Thomas Edmunds describes Field as an instigator of violent dissension and 
himself as a voice of caution, arguing for the potential harm of open antagonism: 
I talked with him, what harme was already done … in beating 
this their new Reformation into the heades of the common 
people, … Whereunto hee answered, tush, holde your peace: 
seeing we cannot compass these things by suite nor dispute: it 
is the multitude and people that must bring them to passe. 48 
 
Whatever Field’s role in the Marprelate tracts, his level of frustration and potential for 
revolutionary vitriol marks his lack of confidence in the “suits and disputes” which had failed 
so many times before.49  He dismisses the potential factional backlash and the caution from 
Edmonds with a mere “tush.”  The revolutionary favors action—however divisive—over 
more peaceable, but impotent, measures of appealing for reform.     
Other Puritans, however, expressed anxiety over the bitter castigations of the 
Admonitions and Cartwright’s Replyes, in spite of the zeal with which their cause was 
defended.  For example, Walter Travers’s Ecclesiasticae Disciplinae … Explicatio (1574) 
translated as A Full and Plaine Declaration out off the word of God, and William Fulke’s 
The Learned Discourse (1584) pointedly resist the ad hominem attack so often employed by 
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the authors of the Admonitions. 50  By and large, these tracts appear to embrace a gentler, 
more supplicatory tone, diagnosing corruption, but refrain from attacking persons, thus 
attempting to shield the reformist cause from the charges of railing and sedition.  The varying 
tenor of the petitions introduced into Parliament and brought before the Queen—from 
respectfully seeking compromise to unabashedly pursuing separation—suggest a Puritanism 
divided over the employment of vitriol and satire in religious discourse.51  This house divided 
would soon come to both celebrate and condemn the vitriolic polemicist, Martin Marprelate. 
 
Martin Marprelate, Gentleman 
The first satires of Martin Marprelate demonstrate an unstable, madcap authorial 
presence. Marprelate switches personae, constructs parodic voices for his opponents, and 
even spills into the margins of his work to insert voices which alternately criticize and praise 
him for his satire.  Raymond Anselment likens the interplay of these personae to that of an 
anti-rhetorician—Martin Marprelate is at once a “vociferous clown, country simpleton, and 
dissembling auditor” in his capacity as an innovator, transforming “sterile polemic into an 
elaborate parody of serious disputation.”52  Ritchie Kendall notes Marprelate’s resemblance 
to the characters and dialogue of the theater, citing Marprelate’s “kaleidoscopic assembly of 
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colorful characters, shifting settings, and varied incidents” which promote his satire of the 
Churchmen.53  Unlike Anselment, however, Kendall is careful to position this dramatic 
milieu in the service of Marprelate’s commitment to religion rather than rhetoric: he states 
that Marprelate’s “final allegiances lay … with the Holy Ghost rather than the Muses.”54  
However, the tension between Martin’s commitment to religious reform and Marprelate’s 
love of satiric jest cannot easily be pieced out.  Rather, Martin Marprelate constantly revises 
his authorial personae to accomplish what he perceives as his goal of earnest declamation.  
He begins as an unrepentant satirist. 
Responding fiercely to the latest defense of the episcopacy, Marprelate issued his first 
satiric pamphlet, The Epistle, jesting and mocking John Bridges, Dean of Sarum for his 
longwinded Defense of the Government Established. Here, Marprelate mocks the language of 
supplicatory petitions, calling attention to both the impotence of such weak complaints and 
the author’s sense of his own wit and learning.  Co-opting the official frame of the petition to 
denounce John Bridges for a dunce and a fool, Marprelate immediately attacks the Dean’s 
verbosity:  “‘Most pitifully complaining,’ therefore, you are to understand that Dean Bridges 
hath written in your defence, a most senseless book, and I cannot very often at one breath 
come to a full point” (17).55  Marprelate also parodies Bridges sometimes colloquial style, 
shouting “So-ho, Brother Bridges!” and “Riddle me a riddle!” (31-32).  Martin Marprelate 
aims to satirize the churchmen into reformation.  
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Self-conscious of his mirthful dismissal of Bridges, Marprelate pauses a moment at 
the beginning of his first tract to justify his playful satire, citing his need for decorum, and 
reaching back to scripture in order to defend himself more fully from a charge of improper 
jesting.  At the opening of The Epistle, Marprelate cites decorum personae as his overriding 
theme: “give me leave to play the dunce for the nonce, as well as [Bridges], otherwise I 
cannot keep decorum personae…I could not deal with his book commendably, according to 
order, unless I should be sometimes tediously duncical and absurd” (17).  Directly justifying 
himself through the confines of literary decorum, Marprelate also indirectly references the 
scriptural commandment to “Answere a foole according to his foolishness, lest he be wise in 
his owne conceite” (Proverbs 26:5).56 Marprelate will respond to Bridges with parody and 
satire, trading what he sees as Bridges’s slanders for his own. Potentially, Marprelate sees 
Bridges as the mere lapdog of the ecclesiastical regime, exempt from power; as such, he is 
dismissed as “no wiser then a Goose.”57 
Unlike the lapdog John Bridges, the Archbishop of Canterbury cannot be dismissed 
as irrelevant; rather, Marprelate must assault Whitgift with all the weapons in his arsenal.  
Marprelate sees any action or vice—however small or insignificant—as an available target 
with which to berate the bishop. Most prominently, Marprelate denounces Archbishop 
Whitgift as not only a “petty pope and a petty antichrist” (43) but also as a corrupt official in 
league with Catholic Spain against Elizabeth.58  Marprelate then moves from complaints 
against Whitgift’s office to attacking Whitgift’s status and moral efficacy as a man.  
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According to Marprelate, Whitgift is poor, both financially and morally: the Archbishop had 
to work his way through Oxford by toting Dr. Perne’s belongings, and he swears too much.59 
Not satisfied with confining his satire to Archbishop Whitgift, Marprelate quickly 
enlarges his attack to include the entire episcopal order. He charges John Alymer, the Bishop 
of London, with advancing unlearned and even illiterate men to profitable livings, but also 
rebukes him for his obsession with outdoor recreation.60  He elides the weighty crimes of 
simony and hypocrisy with Alymer’s apparent addition to playing at bowls.  Marprelate 
alternately dismisses and satirizes the bishop, taunting him through his irrelevancy:  “(I will 
spare John of London for this time, for it may be, he is at bowls, and it is pity to trouble my 
good brother, lest he swear too bad)” (24).  He cannot stay away for long, however.  
Marprelate re-engages Alymer through a direct ad hominem attack that plays upon his name:  
Alymer had many trees removed from his estate and, for that crime, receives the moniker 
“Mar-elm” (46), an insult with likens the bishop to Mar-prelate himself.61 
Another common target of Martin Marprelate, Bishop Cooper receives his worst 
treatment for his shrewish and unfaithful wife.  In The Epistle, Marprelate dismisses Cooper 
as a hypocrite (71); as ugly, (“his face is made of seasoned wainscot”) (72); as ignorant of 
biblical languages (61); and, as a plagiarist who supposedly stole Cooper’s Dictionary from 
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Robert Stephanus’s Thesaurus (91). Marprelate waits for his fourth tract, Hay Any Worke for 
Cooper, however, to hit the bishop squarely below the belt.  In the tract meant to refute 
Cooper’s defense of the establishment, entitled An Admonition to the People of England, 
Marprelate routinely refers to the bishop emasculatingly as “Mistress Cooper’s Husband” 
and openly gossips about the lady’s many infamous indiscretions.  In the tract, Marprelate 
rebukes Cooper as impotent not only in sexual intercourse, but in any normal human action 
or social congress.   
Such rabidity in attacking his opponents made Martin Marprelate both an asset and a 
liability for his reformer contemporaries who were divided as to this method of personal 
attack.  He boils down the ecclesiastical debate to its most essential elements and forefronts 
his tracts with character denunciation, ad hominem attack and lascivious gossip of the 
churchmen, strengthening his argument that they are corrupt.62  Simply stated, Marprelate 
arraigns the bishops on a litany of charges, publishing their offences in such a manner as to 
increase Christ’s government:   
I saw the cause of Christ’s government, and of the Bishop’s 
antichristian dealing to be hidden.  The most part of men could 
not be gotten to read anything written in the defence of the one, 
and against the other, I bethought me, therefore of a way 
whereby men might be drawn to do both; perceiving the 
humours of men in these times to be given to mirth, I took that 
course.  I might lawfully do it. (239)    
 
Marprelate sees his mirthful rebuke of the bishops as the occupation of the righteous.  
Through his jest, he discovers sin in its hidden and secret confines, exposing it to the censure 
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of society.63  Through his mingling of gossip and moral denunciation, Marprelate will 
increase the numbers of the righteous on earth and retard the moral authority of the corrupted 
bishops.  As long as ‘the worldes inhabitants / Sucke the infectious blood of sinnes sweete 
lip,” Marprelate will gaily deride their crimes as an effective strategy for sins’ overthrow.64  
 Rhetorically, Marprelate is supported in his mixture of jest and earnest by the 
oratorical handbooks of Thomas Wright, Henry Peacham, and William Perkins.  On the one 
hand, Wilson famously advises his reader to win over audiences with mirth and delight: “for 
except men find delite, they will not long abide: delite them, and winne them.” 65 Citing 
preachers as the worst offenders of audiences for their boring and stern sermons, Wilson 
even urges the godly to “now and then play the fooles in the pulpit, to serve the tickle eares 
of their fleting audience, or els [the preachers] are like sometimes to preach to the bare 
walles.”66  Wilson applauds the intermixing of mirth and sobriety as a measure to enhance 
the audience’s delight and a weapon to stave off boredom or apathy. For Wilson, as well as 
for Marprelate, it is mirthful foolery which makes a grave message more palatable.  Choosing 
to emphasize the rhetorical savvy of blending silliness with soteriology, Wilson leaves the 
potential ethical price for such jest poignantly unquestioned.   
Representing a less secular approach to rhetoric, Henry Peacham and William Perkins 
cannot separate their interest in rhetoric from their occupations as ministers in the Church of 
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England.  In The Garden of Eloquence, Peacham is more hesitant than Wilson regarding the 
indiscriminate stirring of emotions, particularly from the pulpit.  He cautions his reader to err 
on the side of discretion, privileging the modesty of the orator over the benefit of moving the 
affections of the audience.  In his description of Pathopeia, for example, Peacham notes that 
while laughter and gravity can be profitable, the orator must carefully gauge the audience:  
“for in divine Orations, and Sermons, to move laughter doth much diminish and oppose the 
modestie of so grave an action and so serious a cause.”67  In relation to the indiscriminate 
verbal assault upon one’s opponent, Peacham admits such a barrage may have a place in 
rhetoric, but also urges caution:  “Wisdome and charity ought to direct the use of 
[Onedismus] lest it be used for every little displeasure as foolish persons are wont to 
do…which is an absurdity offending against good manners, a folly repugning wisdome and 
an effect of mallice opposed to charity.” 68  
Writing in the same year as Peacham, William Perkins specifically engages the moral 
integrity of mixing jest and rebuke in the pulpit.  In his 1593 tract A Direction for the 
Government of the Tongue, Perkins insists that “all speech must edifie and minister grace to 
the hearers,” but he stops short of condemning all jest as intolerable or unbefitting a minister.  
Rather, he makes room for the possibility that mirth may be soteriologically permissible, if 
not even useful: “when [the prophets] jested against wicked persons, … they sharpely 
reproved their sins.”69  Here, both mirth and sharp rebuke are put in the service of God and 
his church, justifying both emotions as godly and with scriptural precedent.  Perkins is 
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careful not to allow mirth and jest to be taken too far, however.  Like Peacham, he cautions 
that laughter itself must be “moderate and seldome” and should be used only when discretion 
permits.  He notes that while scripture tells us that Christ wept three times, “we never read 
that hee laughed.”70   
 
“The Puritans only excepted” 
Despite Marprelate’s insistence that his methods were godly and righteous, many of 
his Puritan contemporaries repudiated the satirist’s style, uniting against what they regarded 
as inappropriate vitriol.  These Puritans recoiled at his scurrilous rebuke of the bishops, 
worried that he would sully their cause through his improper use of jest and indiscriminate 
ridicule.71   For example, Thomas Fuller condemned the tracts as “unbeseeming a pious 
spirit,” 72 and Thomas Brightman thought the tracts fit for burning.73  Likewise, Richard 
Greenham asserted that the potential benefit of Marprelate’s muckraking did not outweigh 
the ugliness of its appearance.  Henry Holland, Greenham’s friend and compiler of his works, 
captured the essence of Greenham’s objection:  “these bookes helpe little to godliness, but 
rather fill the heads and hearts of men with a spirite of contradiction and contention.” 74 On 
the other side of the Protestant religious spectrum, Francis Bacon condemned the scurrilous 
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language being entertained on both sides of the debate, citing such satire as “a thing far from 
the devout reverence of a Christian and scant beseeming the honest regard of a sober man.” 
The future Lord Chancellor argued the Marprelate tracts negated the proper use of 
compassion and indignation as weapons against sin and turned “religion into a comedy or 
satire.” 75   According to his critics, Marprelate sullied his own righteousness by mixing the 
sacred and the profane in his religious discourse.76  He did not raise jest to the level suited to 
a godly debate, but rather, sank religion into the mud.   
Despite this wide-ranging condemnation, a few authors spoke more ambivalently 
regarding the benefit of a bitter style in general and Marprelate’s method of attack in 
particular.  While Francis Bacon does condemn the tenor of the Marprelate controversy itself, 
he cautions that violent rebuke has a valued place in religious discourse.  He argues that 
“bitter and earnest writing must not hastily be condemned; for men cannot contend coldly, 
and without affection, about things which they hold dear and precious…a feeling Christian 
will express in his words a character of zeal or love.”77  Bacon positions bitter argument in 
the service of God, contrasting the heat and zeal of a “feeling Christian” with the 
dispassionate and cold argument of a “politic man” who may intelligently state his point, but 
will rouse no emotion to his side.   
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Similarly, Thomas Cartwright hesitates to condemn fully the tracts of Martin 
Marprelate after their publication, yet distances himself from the satirist’s “naughtie” verbal 
abuse in his text A brief Apologie of Thomas Cartwright (1596).  Looking back to 
Marprelate’s vitriolic style at the close of his own career, Cartwright treats the mere 
suggestion of his complicity in the Marprelate affair as a slander:  “For me, I am able to 
produce witnesses, that the first time that ever I heard of Martin Marprelate, I testified my 
great misliking & grief, for so naughtie, and so disorderly a course as that was. … when I 
was allowed to preach, I condemned all dealing in that kinde.”78 Like his Puritan 
contemporaries who disapproved of Marprelate, Cartwright focuses his condemnation on 
Marprelate’s disruptive and contemptuous nature.  
While Cartwright indeed “condemned all dealing in that kind,” shunning Marprelate’s 
ribaldry in what he perceived as a godly cause, his carefully chosen words subtly remind his 
audience of his own troubled relationship with rebuke.  In point of fact, Matthew Sutcliffe, 
his accuser before the High Commission, notes the resemblance between the two scourgers 
of bishops: Cartwright “by his scoffes and flowers of railing traced out a way for Martin.”79 
Sutcliffe also challenges Cartwright’s purported condemnation of Martin Marprelate, 
accusing him of applauding Marprelate for giving the bishops what they deserved.  
According to Sutcliffe, Cartwright had privately confessed that “it was no matter, if the 
Bishops were so handled [by Martin], seeing they would take no warning” and “it was the 
justice of God, that Bishops whose calling was unlawfull should be so handled by Martin.”80  
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Sutcliffe would have had ample evidence to implicate Cartwright through his own rebuke of 
the bishops. 
After the publication of his Replyes to Whitgift, Cartwright apologized for his 
employment of personal rebuke.  In his laudatory “Epistle to the Reader” prefaced to the 
English translation of Walter Travers’ A Full and Plaine Declaration of Ecclesiasticall 
Discipline (1584), Cartwright distanced himself from the aggressive use of rebuke and ad 
hominem attack as potentially harmful to a righteous cause. Cartwright praises Travers for 
resisting the temptation to grapple with his opponent, applauding him for achieving a level of 
focus Cartwright himself could not achieve: Travers, “havinge his minde bent onely on the 
cause, inveieth not against any mannes person.  Wherin having understanded off some in part 
offended with me modestly answeringe an importunate man, and lightely stinginge him 
againe, which thruste others thorowe with most sharpe reproaches: surely as I am sory that 
they are displeased with me.”81 Cartwright’s apology here exhibits the same vexed 
relationship with rebuke and attack which colors his “condemnation” of Martin Marprelate: 
his apology is coupled with a blow that refocuses blame to Whitgift’s own hypocrisy.  
Recalling the language of his Replyes, Cartwright views himself as “modest” and his sting as 
“light,” while he regards Whitgift as “importunate” and eager for a literary fisticuffs.    
Attempting to erase forcibly the tension between the end of reformation and the 
means of satiric rebuke, Marprelate responds to his Puritan critics by making them complicit 
in his crime.  As a punishment for their hypocrisy, Marprelate threatens to involve all 
Puritans in the guilt of his crimes, arousing the suspicions of Whitgift’s pursuivants and 
unifying the Puritan cause in its culpability.  As early as his second tract, Marprelate insists 
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upon the interconnectedness of reform and rebuke, and castigates those who would question 
his means while doing nothing to promote reformation: 
What!  will the Puritans seek to keep out the Pope of Rome, 
and maintain the Pope at Lambeth?  Because you will do this, I 
will tell the Bishops how they shall deal with you.  Let them 
say that the hottest of you hath made a Martin, and that the rest 
of you were consenting thereunto. (118-119)     
 
Marprelate’s threat of complicity here is palpable.  Many Puritans were hauled before the 
High Commission to be questioned as to their role in the Marprelate controversy, where they 
were largely assumed guilty.  John Udall and John Penry were arrested and imprisoned by 
the High Commission on suspicion of being authors of the Marprelate Tracts.  Udall soon 
died in prison, and Penry—through never officially charged with any crimes associated with 
the controversy—was hanged the evening of May 29, 1593.  The transcripts of their 
examinations and petitions drafted from prison reveal the political anxiety circulating around 
the Marprelate tracts. Both men affirm their loyalty to the Queen and deny authorship or 
knowledge of the tracts, but do so through the insistence that they disliked Marprelate’s 
method of personal attack.  The satirist’s emphatic scurrility enables equally emphatic denial.   
The transcript of John Udall’s examination before the High Commission attests to the 
minister’s anxiety surrounding the tracts’ use of ridicule and scurrility.  He professes his 
ignorance as to the author of the tracts and his overall distaste for the style of polemic as 
denial of the tracts’ legitimacy:   
for “Martin,” … they were never approved by the Godly 
learned: and I am fully perswaded, that those Books were not 
done by any Minister; and I think there is never a minister in 
this land, that doth know who “Martin” is.  And I for my part, 
have been inquisitive, but I could never learn who he is. 82 
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Although we can reasonably assume that Udall in some way was connected to the secret 
press that issued the Marprelate publications,83 he necessarily equivocates regarding his 
involvement and supports his disinterestedness with a round denouncement of the tracts’ 
style.  Distancing himself from the condemned tracts, Udall considers them antithetical to 
godly reformation.  He submits denial after denial, with each conjunction bringing forth a 
more specific denunciation:  first, he speaks of the “Godly learned,” who disapprove of such 
scurrility, then he moves to “ministers,” who would not write such filth, and finally, he offers 
his own innocence as a synecdoche of the righteousness of all Puritan ministers. According 
to Udall’s protestation here, the Marprelate tracts were more likely to be condemned than 
held up as models of godly reform. 
Another author linked to the secret press offered his own emphatic denial of Martin 
Marprelate’s vitriolic style. In his multiple pleas to Burghley for redress and release from the 
Poultry Compter and later the Queen’s Bench Prison, John Penry denies all connection with 
the “unjustifiable” and “yrksome” Marprelate.84  While he allows for the legitimacy of some 
of Marprelate’s content, Penry defends himself by taking obvious issue with Marprelate’s 
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style of attack.   He awkwardly states in a draft of a letter to Burghley that he is not 
Marprelate, and moreover he repudiates at least one of Marprelate’s ad hominem attacks:   
They say … that I am Marten.  I answer that my name is John 
Penri and not Marten Marp. … I dislyked many thinges in Marten 
for his maner, and for his matter of writing … yf ever I read them 
it was so cursoryly that I greatly heeded them not.  But this one 
thing for his maner I greatly dislyked, vz. That which hee sett 
downe touching him whome they call the Archb. of Canterbury.  A 
long story or mome their is some wher in his writinges sett down 
of him, as touching his clocbagg carying, his service done to D. 
Perne etc. … well I dislyked it and I do dislyke it and the rest of 
the thinges of that nature.85         
 
With his life on the line, Penry cites his distaste for the lampoon of Archbishop Whitgift’s 
economic status.  While he remains silent on the ad hominem attacks addressed to the rest of 
the bishops, Penry does claim that this particular attack was unwarranted and unseemly.  
Penry dismisses Marprelate’s attack of Whitgift’s economic disadvantages as a “mome”—
referencing Marprelate’s status as a “carping critic” but, more specifically, charging the 
satirist with an acute lack of self-awareness.86  In response to the charge of authorship, Penry 
insists that, far from attacking the archbishop, he actually would defend Whitgift from attack, 
though he acknowledges him to be “a great enemy of god his sayntes and truth … hir 
maiesties soul [and] the soules of hir people.” Despite his obvious distaste for Whitgift, “yf at 
this very hour, his enemy assayled him in my presenc, I wold not only defend his lyf, but 
even his welfare, and that most willingly.” 87 Admittedly, Penry’s insistence rings a little 
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hollow.  Despite his pronouncement of his “dislike” of Marprelate’s “manner, and for his 
matter of writing,” Penry is linked with the secret press until his death.  Penry’s last petition 
to Burghley for redress against the charges of sedition is labeled “1593, Marprelate” by a 
contemporary hand, regardless of its contents—nowhere else in the petition is Marprelate 
ever mentioned. 88 
 
Martin Marprelate’s Refashioning of Thomas Cartwright 
While many Puritan readers repudiated the style of Martin Marprelate’s The Epistle 
and self-consciously distanced themselves from his personal attack of the episcopacy, 
Marprelate styled himself the best hope for Puritanism’s future and the appropriate, albeit 
extreme, extension of the bitter castigations tossed about by reputable men in the well-
regarded Admonition controversy.  Marprelate lauds the Admonition tracts as the first to sting 
the bishops successfully, and he sees himself continuing their fight.  He elaborates upon 
many of the rebukes used in the Admonitions and Replyes by both assuming the authority of 
their reverend authors and refashioning that authority to suit his own vitriolic ends. 
The rhetorical likeness between Marprelate and the authors of the Admonition 
controversy has its limits, however. Marprelate recognizes that he lacks the innate moral 
authority of the authors of the Admonitions, and must construct such authorial legitimacy in 
order to defend himself as a polemicist. For this, he assumes the legitimacy of the reverend 
Thomas Cartwright.  In The Epistle, Marprelate repeatedly draws comparisons between 
himself and Cartwright, attempting to align himself with someone of irreproachable character 
and reputation.  Cartwright makes a fit champion; he had achieved the very goal Marprelate 
set out to accomplish, thrashing the episcopal regime into silence. Kendall convincingly 
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reads this homage as Marprelate’s need to justify his banter and wit, for which he “sought an 
external repository of work, earnestness, and respectability.” 89  As a testament to 
Marprelate’s admiration of Cartwright’s achievement over the bishops, Marprelate finds 
occasion to praise the author in five separate instances in The Epistle and cites Cartwright’s 
achievement over Whitgift predominantly, as early as the second page of the text.   
While he assumes the respected authority of Cartwright, Marprelate also is able to 
refashion his Cartwright to fit his own ends.  He taunts Whitgift with his loss to the Puritan, 
transforming Cartwright’s Replyes into violent and abusive pamphlet warfare:  “Well fare, 
old Mother Experience, yet!  The burnt child dreads the fire.  His Grace will carry to his 
grave, I warrant you, the blows which Master Cartwright gave him in this cause; and 
therefore no marvel though he was loth to have any other so banged as he was, to his woe.” 
(18-19).  For Martin, Cartwright did not merely win the war for the Puritans, he violently 
attacked Whitgift with what Marprelate perceives to be justifiable and righteous ridicule.  
Cartwright had succeeded where Marprelate aimed.  As Kendall has asserted, Marprelate 
implicitly argues for the righteousness of his taunts against Bridges and Whitgift by likening 
his sense of compulsion to Cartwright’s previous rebuke of the Archbishop.  Marprelate has 
been called to arms like Cartwright before him.90  Assuming Cartwright’s imprimatur, 
Marprelate intensifies the fight and heckles Whitgift with his loss to Cartwright throughout 
The Epistle, ironically condemning him for not escalating the fight.  He calls Whitgift a 
coward and too ignorant to defend the establishment against a man as learned as Cartwright.  
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He continues to insult Whitgift by threatening Bridges: “You shall not deal with my Worship 
as John with his Canterburyness did with Thomas Cartwright; which John left the cause you 
defend, in the plain field, and for shame threw down his weapons … like a coward” (48). His 
desperation and his cowardice makes Whitgift incapable of responding to Cartwright.  
According to Marprelate, Cartwright had bested Whitgift, as he himself would best Bridges 
and all the rest of the churchmen.  As he nears the conclusion of The Epistle, however, 
Marprelate slowly begins to move away from the image of Cartwright as a violent satirist and 
reinstalls his would-be mentor as a writer prominent for his theological scholarship.  
As if suddenly concerned that his previous portrayal of the Puritan might not be well-
received, Marprelate replaces his initial reliance on harsh words meant to denote physical 
brutality with those emphasizing Cartwright’s virtue and learning.  He turns to direct praise 
of Cartwright and his theological work, championing the English printing of Cartwright’s 
Confutation of the Rhemists Translation as his second condition of peace with the bishops, 
breaking off from his satiric jabs at the unlearned ministry in order to genuinely praise the 
work.  He calmly states: “My second suit is a more earnest request unto you, that are 
hinderers of the publishing of [it, that] the Confutation of the Rhemish Testament by Master 
Cartwright may be published. A reasonable request, the granting whereof I dare assure you, 
would be most acceptable unto all that fear God” (63). Marprelate carefully tempers his 
language in this “reasonable request” to the bishops, guarding his portrayal of Cartwright as 
one powerful and learned enough to confute any English Catholic who might read his work.  
Marprelate esteemed Cartwright very highly indeed; enough to posit himself as the work’s 
English champion and inflate his own prestige by his association with the well-regarded 
translation.  
48 
 
Unfortunately for Marprelate, this esteem was one-sided, and Marprelate’s second 
tract demonstrates a new tension between the author and his disapproving “precise brethren.” 
Having been publicly repudiated by his professed mentor, Marprelate obviously cannot go to 
the same well again; he can no longer legitimize himself solely according to his likeness to 
his Puritan contemporaries.91  In point of fact, Cartwright himself is conspicuously absent 
from the second tract, which Kendall reads as Marprelate’s hurt resonating from the recent 
repudiation. 92   
Although Cartwright does substantially diminish in prominence in Marprelate’s later 
works, Marprelate continues to rely on the preeminent Puritan author as a model for his 
reformist writings.  Instead of directly praising his predecessor’s achievements and thereby 
likening himself to the more established Puritan, Marprelate traces Cartwright’s reasoning 
back to the very scripture he cites.  Distancing himself from a direct address to Cartwright 
which could elicit reproof and rebuttal, Marprelate relies on Cartwright’s argumentation to 
bolster his moral authority.  He more subtly imitates Cartwright’s scriptural reasoning to 
liken himself to the godly man.  Cartwright annotates his own argument against the bishops 
with frequent scriptural citation, with Saint Paul’s Epistles—particularly First and Second 
Timothy—figuring prominently.93 Cartwright employs such references most often in 
connection with his argument for a return to the apostolic government of the Church or in his 
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challenges to Whitgift regarding proper rebuke and godly castigation.  Marprelate follows 
suit: in his work completed after the Puritan repudiation, Marprelate begins to replace his 
reliance upon gossip and mockery with the moral commandments outlined in First and 
Second Timothy, allowing him to claim a profound authority for rebuke.   
 
Pauline Rebuke 
Like Cartwright, the later Marprelate attempts to install himself in the tradition of 
godly rebuke, measuring his sense of his own castigation by the reformers’ Pauline ruler.  
His direct appeals to the Paul’s Epistles to Timothy occur most often in The Epitome and Hay 
Any Worke for Cooper, the two most self-conscious tracts in Marprelate’s repertoire, and are 
treated with a sense of decorum unusual for Marprelate.  In The Epitome, Marprelate breaks 
from his ribaldry to enter into a serious debate over the fundamental tenet of English 
Puritanism, namely the scripturally prescribed form of church government.  Prior to this 
reverend discussion, he had labeled John Bridges a fool, a lap-dog of the Bishop of 
Winchester, and a coxcomb (125), but he suddenly halts his jocular attack on Bridges in 
order to set out clearly the fundamental incongruity between the bishops and the Puritans 
who write against them.  As if suddenly reminded of the seriousness of his cause, Marprelate 
abruptly switches from satiric attack to grave polemic, changing tones and even personae:   
To the matter.  The state of the whole controversy between my 
brethren Bishops and my brethren Puritans, and so, between 
this worthy Doctor and these Discourses is, whether the 
external government of the Church of Christ be a thing so 
prescribed by the Lord in the New Testament, as it is not 
lawful for any man to alter the same, any more than it is lawful 
to alter the form of regiment prescribed under the Law in the 
Old Testament. (126) 
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He uses this opportunity to refute Bridges’ claim that the government of the church is a 
“thing indifferent,” or something which Christ has left up to the leaders of the Church to 
determine.94  Rather, Marprelate sees the apostolic model of government as the most 
scripturally authentic and divinely-sanctioned form of church government.  When he 
describes his plan for a true government based on the New Testament, Marprelate turns 
decisively to Paul, marginally citing various epistles a dozen times in an oddly calm selection 
of The Epitome.  He refutes Bridges, tracing the apostolic model of government throughout 
the New Testament and inserting citation of relevant scripture to bolster his own ethos.  
Acknowledging the decorum of scriptural paraphrase, Marprelate clearly and somberly 
outlines each position in the apostolic model, from pastor and doctor to deacon, enumerating 
the qualifications and duties of each.  He paraphrases Paul’s first Epistle to Timothy, citing 
the role of the deacon as the guardian and protector of the poor, of widows and orphans, and 
insisting that Paul ordained “that before these officers should be instituted, and as it were 
invested into their offices, there should be had due examination of their fitness to execute the 
same, and their unreproveable life” (127-128). This Pauline reliance upon the examination of 
Pastors continues throughout The Epitome, justifying his rebuke of the corrupt officials 
whom Marprelate judges morally unfit to serve as ministers of God.95    
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More than simply a tool of the “reformist” Martin Marprelate, the Pauline scripture 
referenced above actually underwrites much of Marprelate’s scorn towards the bishops and 
their men.  Marprelate assumes the apostle’s argument of godly reprimand in order to rebuke 
the bishops zealously for their unchristian lifestyles and their proclivity towards vice.  If Paul 
states that a bishop should demonstrate his moral authority by keeping his house in order and 
avoiding even the appearance of sin and debauchery, Marprelate is authorized, in turn, to 
denounce a bishop for demonstrating his lack of moral standing through his choice of wife.  
In I Timothy 3, Paul exhorts Timothy towards a conception of an ecclesiastical official that 
exemplifies the moral authority of a Christian minister: 
A bishop therefore must be unreproveable, … One that can rule 
his own house honestly…For if any can not rule his owne 
house, how shal he care for the Church of God? … He must be 
well reported of, even of them which are without, lest he fall 
into rebuke, and the snare of the devil. (I Tim. 3:2-7) 
 
The standing of a bishop, for Paul, and, to a certain extent, for Marprelate, is located in his 
character and his moral authority.  If a bishop were to tarnish that moral authority, he would 
diminish the value of his office and compromise his ability to minister God’s word.  For the 
Puritans arguing for a reformation of the ministry and a return to the apostolic model of 
church government, few verses were more important than Paul’s exhortation to Timothy 
insisting that a bishop should be “proved” as an upstanding and untarnished man prior to 
being granted his ministry—a point that Marprelate also uses as the cornerstone for ousting 
the bishops from power.96  More than merely a criterion for separating the wheat from the 
chaff, however, Paul’s Epistle to Timothy is predicated upon the belief that a bishop’s moral 
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 At its most general level, Marprelate argues against the appointment of ministers by bishops because the 
bishops are likely to appoint unqualified ministers (e.g. Bishop Alymer’s appointment of his porter to the 
ministry)—if the congregation must ordain their own ministers, then the flock are more likely to choose a man 
of upstanding moral character. 
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standing is essential to his calling.  Marprelate takes Paul’s rubric to its logical conclusion in 
insisting that if the bishop is found wanting—as all lord bishops are—he should be rebuked 
until he gains repentance or, failing that, he should be removed from power.   
 Much like Paul, Martin Marprelate attempts to balance his zeal for satiric correction 
with a godly sense of righteousness.  For Paul, rebuke is an intricate and essential part of his 
Christian calling, but not one without complications. At the core of rebuke stands love, 
manifested in the idea of moral correction; for example, in II Timothy 4:2-4, Paul calls for 
Timothy to rebuke his people in order to keep them on the straight and narrow path towards 
salvation: 
Preach the worde: be instant, in season and out of season: 
improve, rebuke, exhorte with all long suffering and doctrine.  
For the time wil come, when they wil not suffer wholesome 
doctrine: but having their ears itching, shal after their owne 
lustes get them an heape of teachers, And shal turne their eares 
from the truth, and shal be given unto fable.  But watch thou in 
all things: suffer adversitie: do the worke of an Evangeliste: 
make thy ministerie fully knowen. (II Tim. 4:2-5)  
 
For Paul, rebuke is instrumental in making better Christians.  He encourages Timothy to use 
all means at his disposal to keep his people from the false prophets and the possibility of 
factional dissention. While the passage is clearly marked by an earnest desire to protect the 
congregation from harm, Paul seems to leave open the possibility that such admonition may 
be difficult to administer and may be misinterpreted.  In fact, the Renaissance commentators 
of the Geneva Bible gloss Paul’s last statement in the passage, attempting to clarify its 
nebulous meaning.  Warning Renaissance readers of the possibility of a tarnished reputation,  
the glossators urge, “So behave thy self in this office, that men may be able to charge thee 
nothing, but rather approve thee in all things.” In other words, he who rebukes must do so 
from a position of moral authority.  The editorial comment here emphasizes the action of 
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accusing one of a crime, warning that the satirist should be above reproach.  For Paul, the 
apostle must possess the innate moral authority to urge correction upon the congregation; that 
this correction will be met with antipathy on the part of the reproved seems certain.97   
 In addition to the possible retaliation against rebuke in general and his style of 
ribaldry in particular, Marprelate must also contend with the allegation that he delights in 
casting aspersion upon the bishops.  In an effort to dismiss suspicion, Marprelate adapts his 
persona to demonstrate his reluctance as a satirist.  Like Paul, who utilizes rebuke in the 
service of moral correction, Marprelate attempts to balance the urgency of scorn with a sense 
of moral righteousness.  Unlike Paul, though, Marprelate finds authority for his rebuke in 
secular, rather than exclusively religious powers.  Working to meliorate the possible criticism 
of himself as solely a railer, he insists that his rebuke is compelled by both the sins he sees 
and the love he bears the people of England.  In Hay any Worke for Cooper, Marprelate 
grounds his denunciation of the ungodly bishops specifically in his love and his loyalty to the 
Queen:   
shall I, being a Christian English Subject, abide to hear a 
wicked crew of ungodly Bishops … and in the love I owe unto 
God’s religion and her Majesty say nothing?  I cannot; I will 
not; … The love of a Christian Church, Prince and State shall 
work more in me than the love of  a heathen empire and state 
should do. (250)   
 
He is compelled, as both a satirist and a reformer, to castigate the vice in front of him in 
order to promote reformation and an improved commonwealth.   
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 Bishop Cooper cites this verse as evidence that Marprelate slanders the bishops out of spite and malice, not 
godly correction.  He states in An Admonition to the People of England that “who knoweth not that they which 
have the office of judging, correcting, and repooving other, bee their doinges never so sincere, shall often light 
into the displeasure and misliking of manie and thereby gette misreport?” He directly references Paul’s Epistle 
to Timothy later, stating that Paul “did see that the office of teachers and reproovers, judges and governors, lieth 
in great daunger of evill speech and false accusations, and therefore would not have them rashly condemned, 
either in private or publike judgement, much less to be defaced and contemned, to be disobeyed and resisted, 
yea, though they were more grieuous offenders, then standeth with the worthinesse of their offices” See Bishop 
Cooper, An Admonition to the People of England (London, 1589), 13. 
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While he can legitimately construct himself as a reluctant satirist, Marprelate must 
also contend with the most common indictment of satire: that it is fundamentally 
uncharitable.   Later in Hay Any Worke, Marprelate spurns Bishop Cooper’s charge that he 
lacks charity in ranting against the bishops. Assuming the popular perception of satire as 
libel, Bishop Cooper posits that Marprelate’s attacks have more in common with revenge 
than moral correction, dismissing the rebuke of the satirist as malicious and unnatural back-
biting in An Admonition to the People of England.  Likening the administration of rebuke 
with paternal care, Cooper argues that Marprelate is unnatural and lacks patience: “a naturall 
childe, … [should] not therefore undutifully chide his father, but by such meanes as he can 
… with his best indeavour, wipe away the filth, that he gathered by his oft falling.”98  
Marprelate responds to this charge by redefining filial duty, putting it in the service of moral 
reformation and salvation rather than worldly reputation.  He castigates Cooper for 
misinterpreting the meaning of charity, potentially sacrificing his parishioners’ salvation for 
fear of earthly shame.   Adhering to a more strictly Pauline notion of rebuke born out of 
Christian love, Marprelate objects to brushing vice under the rug, claiming that covering up 
such fault will merely exacerbate sin. Marprelate, like the minister Hyperius, makes no room 
for exceptions: “There is no kinde of sinnes, in which the Preacher ought to wincke and be 
tongue-tied, or that may be permitted without reproofe.” 99 For Marprelate, reproof carries 
real power; when sin is made public, shame compels the perpetrator towards reformation. 
Marprelate mocks the bishop’s supposed concern for charity, arguing that the satirist’s 
“charitable” unwillingness to shame the perpetrator benefits no one and may actually 
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 Cooper, An Admonition to the People of England, 16-17. 
 
99
 Andreas Hyperius, The practis of preaching, otherwise called The pathway to the pulpet (London, 1577), 
161v. 
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legitimize the sin in covering it up.100  He argues that such charity lessens the moral offense 
of the perpetrator, thereby lessening the potential for reformation of either the sinner or 
society.101  Marprelate runs in the other direction, exposing the sins of mankind and 
appealing for the shame of discovery to have some sort of transformative effect on the 
bishops.  
Such reformation will not come easily for the bishops according to Marprelate; 
continuing to align himself with the Pauline notion of rebuke’s difficult administration, 
Martin emphasizes the caustic nature of the bishops’ purgation.  Similar to Paul’s severe 
administration of rebuke to the Corinthians, Marprelate must be sharp and bold in his 
castigation of the unchristian episcopal hierarchy. He admonishes Cooper, “I told you, T.C. 
that you should be thumped  for defending Bishops.  Take heed of me while you live!” (231).  
Marprelate acknowledges the need for harsh and even violent rebuke of such ungodly 
corruption and even delights in his more severe blows to the bishops.  As if to prove his 
righteousness in violently rebuking the bishops, Marprelate mocks the very concept of gentle 
reformation, calling out such pleading as obviously impotent of any real force.  He 
sardonically whines, “good John of Canterbury, leave thy popedom; good father John of 
London, be no more a bishop of the devil, be no more a traitor to God! … And good, sweet 
boys, all of you, become honest men; maim and deform the Church no longer” (263). Rather 
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 Martin Marprelate summarizes Cooper’s argument from scripture for a charitable obfuscation of vice, 
mimicking the bishop:  “Reverend T.C.:  Though the Bishops should offend as Noah did in drunkenness, yet 
good children should cover their father’s faults. For natural children, though they suffer injuries at their father’s 
hand, yet they take their griefs very mildly.” Marprelate responds, jeering that if children come upon their father 
drunk, they should naturally shout “Red Nose! Red Nose!” (262-263). 
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 Marprelate’s argument in this passage resembles that of Hyperius, who situates rebuke as one of the 
foremost duties of a minister and not innately in conflict with the duties of charity.  Hyperius states that when 
rebuke is not utilized by a minister, and by his “silence, enormities are not onely not rooted up, but all thinges 
also become worse and worse, then it is necessary, that hee goe forwarde in reprovinge so much as hee may 
doe.  For hee that sharpely rebuketh sinners albeit he doth nothing els, yet thus much bringeth he to passé, that 
he suffereth not the mischiefe to growe any further” (161r).   
56 
 
than hope for such weak admonitions to work, Martin Marprelate intends to verbally pummel 
the bishops into their reformation.  For Marprelate, it is apparent that the bishops will never 
reform if they are dealt with kindly. They must be thrashed.   
With his obvious joy in castigating the bishops, Marprelate explores the grey area of 
religious polemic.  While Paul commits to a rubric of rebuke contingent upon anxiety, 
sadness and regret, Marprelate momentarily elides rhetorical violence with play.  Paul 
approaches the Corinthians nervously, measuring his rebuke of their unchristian sin by his 
love of the people, so that they may be left in no doubt as to his desire for their reformation.  
He balances his sharp rebuke with his own sadness at the necessity of such admonition: “For 
though I made you sorie with a letter, I repent not, thogh I did repent: for I perceive that the 
same epistle made you sorie…I now rejoice, not that ye were sorie, but that ye sorowed to 
repentance: for ye sorowed godly, so that in nothing ye were hurt by us” (2 Cor 7:8-9).  Paul 
qualifies every claim which he makes, marginalizing any hurt he may have caused in an 
attempt to lessen the blow and explain his actions.  Born out of Christian love, rebuke is a 
necessity; it is never a delight.  By contrast, Marprelate routinely couples impulses of 
violence and play, aligning earnest appeals to radical reformation with a witty or even 
flippant ridicule of the bishops. As his opponents asserted, these juxtapositions occasionally 
work to undermine Marprelate’s more earnest demands for reformation; but, read in the light 
of Pauline qualification, Marprelate’s sense of play more often supplies a necessary lightness 
to his threats and denunciations.   In one instance, for example, Marprelate comes close to 
implying resistance against the government of the bishops, deriding the bishops and their 
defenders as “not only traitors to God and His Word, but enemies to her Majesty and the 
State” (238).  But, Marprelate carefully recasts what could be interpreted as a call for 
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resistance into a playful taunt.  He immediately follows up his denunciation with a giddy jab 
at Canterbury:  “Like you any of these nuts, John Canterbury?” (238).   
In carefully avoiding any direct claim to resistance in Hay Any Worke for Cooper, 
Marprelate is able to cast himself as the defendant threatened by the bishops, who, in turn, 
act as the aggressors.  He warns the bishops to expect his revenge for the warrant-less ill-
treatment he has suffered: “I will have my pennysworths of all of you brethren, ere I have 
done with you, for this pains which your T.C. hath taken with me” (215).  Imitating Paul’s 
reluctance to rebuke the Corinthians, Marprelate here showcases himself as reluctant 
participant in the battle, provoked to ire by the corruption of the bishops, whose ungodliness 
began the fray.  Instead, he portrays himself as a violent substitute for Cooper’s failed 
conscience, which is no longer a trustworthy measure of righteousness.  Marprelate, like 
Paul, will step in when the bishop veers off course—as he does when he defends the 
episcopal hierarchy.  Moreover, Marprelate attempts to construct his violence as a godly act 
of judgment imposed upon Cooper for his moral failings. 
 As he enlarges the corruption of the bishops with the scope of their power, Marprelate 
once again alters the register of his rebuke, with playful threats of violence giving way to the 
language of divine wrath.  Marprelate charges the bishops with pulling the state towards 
spiritual ruin and forcing Elizabeth to wage an unnatural war against God:   “God, with 
whom our bishops have, and do make our Prince, and our governors to wage war, who is able 
to stand against Him?” (240).  Against such power, Marprelate is only able to voice the 
warning and admonition of a prophet:   
Repent, caitiffs, while you have time. … Take heed you be not 
carried away with slanders.  Christ’s government is neither 
Mar-Prince, Mar-State, Mar-Law, nor Mar-Magistrate.  The 
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living God, whose cause is pleaded for will be revenged of 
you. (241) 
 
Marprelate here urges the bishops towards repentance under the threat of total annihilation, 
warning the Queen and the Parliament to truly consider the controversy before them.  While 
the tone of violence is undeniably present in this passage, Marprelate carefully shapes the 
threat to originate in the wrong committed against God, not himself.  He largely erases 
himself from this condemnation, mentioning himself only tangentially through the words of 
Cooper charging Marprelate—and the Puritans as a whole—with seeking to overthrow the 
kingdom.  Using the language of Cooper’s own Admonition against him, Marprelate denies 
any subversive intent towards the institutions of the state, and pleads with the bishops to 
amend their faults.  If they fail to do so, it will not be Marprelate who revenges himself upon 
the bishops, but God himself.   
 
“A Martin in Every Parish” 
 In order to mount a more urgent resistance to the bishops’ corrupt government, 
Marprelate realizes the threat promised in the Epistle; because the bishops had violated the 
conditions of peace outlined by Marprelate, they will be met with the sons who will carry on 
their father’s work.  In his first tract, Marprelate threatens the bishops with an familial army 
of reformers and satirists: “I will place a young Martin in every diocese, which may take 
notice of [the bishops’] practices…I will place a Martin in every parish.  In part of Suffolk 
and Essex I think I were best to have two in a parish.  I hope, in time, they shall be as worthy 
Martins as their Father is, every one of them able to mar-a-prelate” (82).  On July 22, 1589, 
the bishops met the first of Martin’s sons.  A new tract, Theses Martinianae, appeared 
“published and set forth as an after-birth of the noble Gentleman Himself by a pretty stripling 
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of his, Martin Junior” (349).  Theses Martinianae offers the voice of another Martin, yet 
immature in the ways of reformation and syllogism but eager to follow in his father’s steps.  
To promote the legitimacy of the new Martin as the rightful heir of Martin Marprelate, the 
text constructs the fiction of duality and even partnership.  The unpublished work of the 
original Martin Marprelate is combined with an epilogue penned by Martin’s young son.  He, 
quite literally, takes on the work of his father, publishing and augmenting that which 
otherwise would have remained unknown. The multifarious avenues of such a family and 
such sons are even more fully realized with the publication of the next tract, purportedly 
penned by Martin Junior’s older brother, an author who called himself Martin Senior.  The 
tract was entitled A Just Censure and Reproofe of Martin Junior: Wherein the rash and 
undiscreet headiness of the foolish youth is sharply met with, and the boy hath his lesson 
taught him, I warrant you, by his reverend and elder brother, Martin Senior.  Fully exploring 
the sibling dynamic and enlarging the army of filial supporters, the author claiming to be 
Martin Marprelate engages the possible benefits and criticisms of employing satire as a 
means of reformation. 
The constructed masks of Martin Junior and Martin Senior enable the satire of Martin 
Marprelate to rework itself amid the ambivalent tensions of the English reformation.  Rather 
than enlarge Marprelate’s playful banter and ridicule of the bishops, the new tracts are 
characterized by a heightened sense of scriptural authority and an increased confidence of 
Marprelate’s place in the canon of the reformation tradition.  The madcap Martin Marprelate 
of The Epistle has been replaced by a more orderly, godly, and legitimate reformation author. 
The acerbic word-play, satiric wit, and threats of violence to his enemies still appear 
occasionally in the latter tracts, but are put in the service of scriptural reformation rather than 
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in the service of Martin’s own delight.  In his many different forms, Marprelate will scourge 
the bishops into reformation for the love he bears the people of England.  Through the 
construction of his reformation family, Martin Marprelate is able to revise his authorial 
presence into a more strict—yet still permissive—adoption of a Pauline voice. 
 In the prefatory material appended to the Theses Martinianae, Martin Marprelate—in 
his own voice—revisits his previous threats of violence against the bishops, but reframes 
such physical brutality in the language of curative satire. No longer will he look to engage a 
bishop in either a literary duel or an apocalyptic battle as he did in Hay Any Worke for 
Cooper; now he will medicinally bleed the bishops into reformation or let them be.  In a 
moment of clear self-assessment which begins the fifth tract of the controversy, Marprelate 
acknowledges that he is disliked on both sides of the ecclesiastical fray.  On the one hand are 
the Puritans who “mislike” Martin’s methods—“Those whom foolishly men call Puritans, 
like (of) the matter I have handled, but the form they cannot brook” (304).  On the other hand 
are the unchristian bishops, who “though they stumble at the cause, yet especially mislike my 
manner of writing” (304).  While there is still possibility for the Puritans to become inspired 
through the righteousness of the godly, the bishops are beyond all hope. Having exhausted 
his arsenal of satire, godly admonition, and even prophetic warning, Marprelate resigns 
himself to the damning of the bishops in the next life.  In this life, Marprelate can only wish 
for their moral correction; he is unable to make it happen:  “The bishops, I fear, are past my 
cure, and …with this farewell unto them, I wish them a better surgeon” (304).  Marprelate 
acknowledges his limited resources in aiding the bishops’ reformation and salvation, 
counting his previous strategies as all but impotent in the face of such corruption.  He can no 
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longer help them by bitterly admonishing their unchristian government. Another reformer, he 
hopes, may be more successful.  
 Marprelate goes on to demand that the bishops reconcile themselves to the true 
Church,  promoting the unity of its members and the peaceful resolution of dissention.  He 
urges the bishops to mend the corruption and discontent which has plagued the Church, 
arguing for a return to scripture: “if, then, they have, indeed, any purpose at all, to quiet the 
contentions of our Church, let them bring unto us, not these babbles, … but some sound 
warrant from the Word” (306). This desire to promote quietness within the Church is the first 
step towards reconciling the bitter pamphlet feud which has begun.  Derived almost straight 
from Paul’s insistence upon the unity of the Church and the easing of dissension, Marprelate 
earnestly calls for peace. 
 Marprelate expects the bishops to counter his new, peaceable course with violence 
rather than unity.  According to Marprelate, the bishops are incapable of putting the unity of 
the Church above their zealous need to avenge themselves on the author of the dissident 
publications.  Attributing to the bishops the very weapons of brutality and satire they had 
once attributed to him, Marprelate identifies the violent instruments of the bishops as satire 
and execution: “Fire and faggot, bands and blows, railing and reviling, are, and have been 
hitherto, their common weapons.  As for slandering and lying, it is the greatest piece of their 
holy profession” (305).  While Marprelate promises to employ only medicinal tools in 
purging the bishops of their corruption, the bishops will use the instruments of corporal 
punishment.  Seeing his future in the bishops’ brutality, Marprelate resigns himself to their 
inevitable judgment against him and prepares for the fires of martyrdom.  
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Literally marginalizing the text of violence and resignation as prefatory material, 
Marprelate casts the theses themselves as scripturally sanctioned arguments against the 
bishops’ corruption.  Theses Martinianae presents Martin Marprelate’s 110 theses, or 
“Certaine Demonstrative Conclusions,” that would show the prelates of the Church of 
England to be anti-Christian bishops in the service of the Antichrist (301). The theses are 
supported with scriptural citation and largely refrain from the secular ad hominem attacks 
which characterized Marprelate’s previous tracts.  While Marprelate is unwilling to exchange 
all his vitriol for temperate and godly rebuke, the charges levied in the Theses are framed 
more directly to urge moral reformation than mere antagonism. The great majority of the 
theses come from Pauline scripture, namely his letters to the Corinthians, Ephesians, Romans 
and Timothy, while some continue to charge the bishops directly:  Marprelate accuses the 
bishops of treason against the Queen (theses 29, 40, 50, 109); he dubs them “false prophets” 
and “minions” of the Antichrist (33, 62, 63, 90); and lastly, he compares the bishops’ offices 
with the occupation of prostitutes in the Southwark stews (34).  Although these charges offer 
harsh critique of the bishops, they adhere more strictly to a scriptural rubric.  He argues 
morality based upon Paul’s exhortation to Timothy to rebuke in order to save. Marprelate 
exerts greater self-control over his writing, turning from ad hominem attack to godly 
admonition justified by scripture. 
While Martin Marprelate marginalizes his previous satiric tendencies in favor of a 
more appropriate scriptural rebuke in the Theses, Martin Junior continues to promote his 
father’s cause against the bishops by attempting to increase his father’s ethical credibility.  
Martin Junior proposes a series of possible explanations to account for Martin Marprelate’s 
recent epistolary silence.  First, he speculates that his father is furiously engaged in 
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answering the bishops in a new tract; secondly, he hypothesizes that Martin Marprelate has 
enlisted in the Queen’s Army and is fighting at the Groine; and lastly, the son raises the 
possibility that his father has been captured and even executed by Archbishop Canterbury’s 
pursuivants.  With each of these scenarios, Marprelate is lauded as righteous and deserving of 
acclaim.  If he were preoccupied in answering the bishops, Martin Marprelate would be 
praised as stalwart and unyielding in his cause of reformation, undaunted by the bishops’ 
threats.  If he were fighting on the Continent, Marprelate would be deemed a patriot—the 
very opposite of a traitor who would “mar-state” or “mar-prince.” If he were being held by 
the Archbishop’s pursuivants, then he would be considered a martyr for the cause.  This last 
possibility enables Martin Junior to position the godly work of his father in opposition to the 
corrupt and unjust bishops. He charges the bishops with the possible torture and even murder 
of his father, under the guise of seeking after him:  “Speake then, good nuncles, have you 
closely murdered the gentleman in some of your prisons?  Have you strangled him? Have 
you given him an Italian fig?  Or, what have you done unto him?” (323).  The bishops here 
are portrayed as employing every underhanded and unjust means of dispatching Martin 
Marprelate; he is killed in prison, strangled without trial, or slipped a poisonous fruit.  Martin 
Junior submits that it is the bishops—not Marprelate—who are the scourge of God, placed in 
England “to chastise His church, and then to be burnt in hell” (326).  While Martin Junior 
does not elaborate on the possible sin for which the bishops are visited upon England, he 
redoubles the charge that the bishops resort to dubious satiric means, while he portrays 
Martin Marprelate as “a great blessing of God” and a zealot in the vein of Tyndale, Fryth, 
Barnes, Hooper, Knox and Lambert.   
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The fiction of Martin Marprelate continues to prove inwardly conflicted and self-
regulatory, however.  While Martin Junior uses accusation and attack to promote the image 
of his father as a reformer and martyr, his elder brother Martin Senior complicates the 
legitimacy of such means, objecting to his younger brother’s emergence as his father’s 
champion. Martin Senior castigates Martin Junior’s “rash and undiscreet headiness,” calling 
him a “springal” whose youth prevents discretion.  Specifically, Martin Senior objects to the 
hasty publication of his father’s imperfect works on the grounds that Martin Junior has 
disrupted his father’s quietness by reigniting the pursuivants’ search for his secret press.  In 
an attempt to argue his own legitimacy as Martin Marprelate’s true heir, Martin Senior 
assumes one of the personae appearing in the first Marprelate tract, beginning his own tract 
in the voice of the imitative rustic; he starts: “Wo-Ho then! And boys will now be a ‘Pistle-
making, either without their father’s leave, or their elder brother’s advice” (351).  Martin 
Senior berates his younger brother with the possibility that his father has deliberately chosen 
retirement and ease:  
What if he had in purpose to write no more, seeing the danger 
and trouble that comes of it?  Will this be any means to work 
the old man’s quietness, for a foolish and heady springal to go 
set abroad his papers?  (351-352)  
 
Martin Senior portrays his father as abandoning his satiric occupation for a life removed and 
safe.  For the eldest Marprelate, the Theses will not only bother the bishops and the Puritans, 
they will also unsettle the author, who never meant them for publication.    
Martin Senior argues that the satiric tracts of Martin Marprelate were safely 
marginalized by their very sauciness—the very reason many Puritans repudiated his writings 
and the bishops were so offended.  Here, the charge of improper jesting is constructed as 
Marprelate’s rescue and protection from bodily harm at the hands of the pursuivants.  Prior to 
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the publication of the Theses, the bishops, according to Martin Senior, perhaps could have 
dismissed Marprelate as an insignificant concern of the past:  
Thou sawest well enough that Martin’s doings were almost 
forgot and husht.  And the men of sin themselves, I mean the 
Canterbury Caiaphas and the rest of his antichristian beasts, 
who bear his abominable mark, were content, in a manner, to 
turn his purposes from a serious matter to a point of jesting; 
wherewith they would have only rhymers and stage-players 
(that is plain rogues, as thou hast well noted) to deal. … it may 
be that the syllogisms, whereby our father hath cracked the 
crown of Canterbury, should have had no other answer, or he 
himself none other punishment, but this: “I’ faith let him go—
Martin is a mad knave.”  (352) 
 
Martin Senior embraces the perception that the earlier Marprelate tracts were below rebuke, 
aligning such madcap railings are mere jest, more fitting of a court fool than a dangerous 
reformer. Qualification is key, however. Martin Senior carefully implies that only the anti-
Christian bishops regard his father’s writings as mere jokes, qualifying his statement to that 
effect: the bishops “were content, in a manner, to turn his purposes from a serious matter to a 
point of jesting” (352 my emphasis).  It is the bishops’ misinterpretation of the tracts which 
will free Marprelate, not the nature of the tracts themselves.  In his rebuke to his younger 
brother, Martin Senior turns from the bishops’ possible underestimation of Martin Marprelate 
to engage the very real threat of their father’s martyrdom.  If the pursuivants are re-energized 
in their pursuit of Martin Marprelate, Martin Senior laments that his father will be unable to 
build his kingdom of godly men and women.102  He portrays his father as having willfully 
abandoned his satiric “pistle-making” for a more godly life of promoting reform. 
Martin Senior argues for the complete abandonment of the satiric occupation in the 
face of the extreme corruption of Whitgift and the other bishops.  According to the eldest son 
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 Martin Senior states: “Dost thou think that the kingdom of Christ which thy father seeketh to build shall be 
able to stand, seeing John of Canterbury with so many men rideth about the country, to proclaim nothing else 
but fire and sword unto as many as profess themselves to be the true subjects thereof?” (360). 
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of Marprelate, the past satiric pamphlets have proven impotent in the task of the bishops’ 
moral or ecclesiastical reformation, and their continued publication should be discarded.  He 
admonishes Martin Junior to consider realistically his desired result: “Dost thou persuade 
thyself, silly stripling, that there is any good to be done in sending an ‘Pistle unto him[?]” 
(361).  Indeed, John Whitgift is beyond the help of even the great Martin Marprelate.  Martin 
Senior asserts that the Archbishop “by great likelihood, … is so finally hardened in his 
heinous sins against God and His Church; that as he cannot be reclaimed” (366).  With his 
heart hardened with his sin against God, Whitgift cannot be helped by an earthly force.  He is 
damned by God for his crimes against the Church and against the godly.  According to his 
elder brother, Martin Junior, along with the rest of the Puritans, should no longer waste his 
effort on the redemption of Whitgift and the other minions of the Antichrist.  Rather, Puritan 
gentlemen should appeal to the Queen herself for reformation.  For Martin Senior, the satiric 
means simply cannot accomplish the ends of reformation.  
Once satire is invalidated as a means of promoting reformation, Martin Senior urges a 
return to the more peaceable language and style of the royal supplication and petition.  
Martin Senior urges the Puritan gentlemen to motivate reform through reason; specifically, 
he asks the gentry to counsel Elizabeth to a more godly ecclesiastical rubric.  The suit to the 
Queen should encourage a learned ministry, should denounce the offices of lord bishops and 
archbishops, and should promote only those ecclesiastical offices found in scripture. These 
requests rehearse the same demands enumerated by William Fulke in The Learned 
Discourse103 and the “conditions for peace” set out by Martin Marprelate in his Epistle and 
mark a turn away from the angry and disorderly satire of the previous tracts.  Keeping with 
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the trend of quiet supplication, Martin Senior adds a final request to the list, emphasizing 
reconciliation and compromise over satiric attack and threats of violence.  He asserts the 
benefits of a coming together in the search of truth: 
that for the quiet and orderly taking up of these controversies 
which are risen in our Church, … between our prelates and 
those learned men which are contrary-minded unto them, there 
might be had a quiet meeting of both parties, and the 
controversies determined on their side, who shall be found to 
deal for (and not against) the truth. (371)  
 
Martin Senior promotes the quietness and orderliness of the process and the meeting, 
emphasizing such conference as compromise rather than public disputation.   In this final 
moment of the tract, Martin Senior abandons the dubious employment of ad hominem attack 
in favor of quiet and orderly means of reconciliation.  Such conciliatory aims would be 
quashed, however, with what Martin Marprelate would see as the aggression of the bishops 
and the willful dismissal of peace through their seizure of the secret press and the 
imprisonment of the printers.104 
 
The Revolutionary Martin 
 After his sons have quarreled, Martin Marprelate re-emerges, publishing a self-
conflicted last tract which fashions its author as both an aggressor, ever-ready to berate the 
bishops, and as a passive martyr, resigned to burn.  In The Protestatyon of Martin 
Marprelate, the author demonstrates urgency and impassioned defiance against the force and 
power of the bishops.  According to the promises of the title page, Marprelate will continue 
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 On Thursday, August 14th, 1589, the secret press and the manuscript copy of More Worke for Cooper (not 
extant) were confiscated and the printers commissioned to print the newest tract condemning the Bishops were 
arrested. William Pierce argues that “the seizure of the printers and the Marprelate manuscript was the first 
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Historical Introduction to the Marprelate Tracts, 191). 
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his epistolary pummeling of the bishops if they do not agree to public disputation.  The 
Protestatyon’s frontispiece is the most violent and ridiculing aspect of the tract, pledging a 
return to the violent rebuke and ad hominem attack of Marprelate’s previous tracts and 
embodying the very rationale provided in Hay Any Worke for Cooper.  In The Protestatyon, 
satire and ridicule are advertisement, “used as a covert, wherein [he] might bring the truth to 
light” (239) but remain undelivered in the text itself.  Although he asserts the same violent 
promises of his previous works, Marprelate lessens his characteristic sense of play in his last 
tract, not bothering in his urgency to adorn his charges in witty syllogisms and puns. Rather, 
the oration is bold, messy, and without artifice.  The result is almost illegible: 
he maketh it known unto the world that he feareth neither 
proud priest, Antichristian pope, tiranous prellate, nor 
godlesse catercap: but defiethe all the race of them by these 
presents and offereth conditionally, as is farthere expressed 
hearin by open disputation to apear in the defence of his 
caus aginst them and theirs. 
 
Which chaleng if they dare not maintaine aginst him: then 
doth he alsoe publishe that he never meaneth by the 
assitaunce of god to leave the a flayling of them and theire 
generation untill they be uterly extinguised out of our 
church. (393) 
 
In this announcement of defiance, Marprelate returns to some of the very name-calling 
employed in his previous tracts—proud priest, anti-Christian pope, tyrannous prelate, and 
godless catercap—in order to provoke the bishops into open disputation.  If the litany of 
insult is not enough to incite them to public demonstration, then Marprelate is sure to add the 
threat of continued harassment.  Even while employing such bully tactics, however, 
Marprelate continues to position himself on the godly defensive, offering to “apear in the 
defence of his caus aginst them” and to only fight the bishops with “the assituance of god.”  
Sandwiched between unadorned name-calling and threats of annihilation, Marprelate 
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momentarily portrays himself as a lamb before the lions of the church.  This juxtaposition of 
persons—of both indignant aggressor and of slandered party—is hardly new to the tracts of 
Martin Marprelate, but the rapidity and placement of this prominent exchange highlight the 
tension between the author’s voices.   
 Marprelate exerts more control over his own voice in the tract itself, however, 
retreating from the language of ridicule and assuming the language of spiritual reflection and 
reformation.  The remainder of the tract judges satiric jest to be an inadequate earthly 
substitute for reason and contemplation.  The tone of reflection resonates throughout the tract 
as Marprelate takes stock of his moral standing before his Maker.  He acknowledges the 
ominous seizure of the press and printers, and pauses to reflect:  “These events I confess do 
strike me and give me just cause to enter more narrowly into myself to see whether I be at 
peace with God or no” (397).  Faced with the very real possibility of capture and execution, 
Marprelate reasons his salvation through his continued fight for truth, and invigorates his zeal 
as he casts the bishops as eternally damned for their crimes against God.  While Marprelate 
portrays himself on God’s errand and within a long line of reformers, the bishops ally 
themselves only with violence and persecution. 105   
At one point in the tract, Marprelate urges a more active resistance while 
simultaneously distancing himself from any potential bloodshed that could result from a 
possibly violent upheaval.  He accomplishes this by reminding his audience that the violence 
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 Of the disparity between the previous urgers of reformation and the unholy bishops, Marprelate states:  “Be 
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70 
 
of the reformation is controlled by the bishops, who cast themselves as “butchers and 
horseleeches” when they insist reformers die for Christ’s true church.  Marprelate absents 
himself entirely from responsibility and portrays the violence of the controversy as 
fundamentally avoidable if only the bishops would resign peacefully.  He inserts himself only 
with his distanced plea to “tell them from me” that the godly cause will continue to promote 
the laws of God, not men.  In adopting such language, Marprelate adheres to the theories of 
disobedience outlined by his name-sake, Martin Luther, and by John Calvin. Paraphrasing 
Calvin, Marprelate insists that the bishops, because they act against the laws of God, forsake 
their godly sovereignty and may be disobeyed.106  Quoting Christ’s exhortation to his 
apostles, he encourages his readers to resist the soul-killing laws that might hinder salvation:  
“And feare ye not them which kil the bodie, but are not able to kil the soule, but rather feare 
him, which is able to destroye bothe soule and bodie in hel” (398). Aligning himself with the 
Protestants from the Continent, Marprelate argues that loyalty to God prohibits the 
population from adhering to the ecclesiastical laws ordered by the bishops of the Church of 
England.  
 In positioning the laws of man as antagonistic to the commandments of God, 
Marprelate questions one of the more important tenets of Pauline literature, that of 
theological unity and peace.  Even the mild theories of disobedience of Luther and Calvin jar 
with the very elements of Pauline theory previously employed by Marprelate in his tracts. 
Paul states in his Epistle to the Romans that earthly magistrates are appointed by God and 
must be obeyed:  “there is no power but of God: & the powers that be, are ordeined of God.  
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Whosoever therefore resisteth ye power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist, 
shal receive to them selves judgement” (13:1-2).  Such a commandment is not without 
equivocation, however.  Many Protestant reformers interpreted Romans 13’s insistence upon 
a subject’s unquestioning obedience to be merited by only a truly godly government.  If the 
government—in this case of bishops rather than of monarchs—were to fail to execute their 
righteousness duty towards God, then disobedience is permitted.  In his Warning to his Dear 
German People (1531), Luther concedes that a subject should disobey a magistrate if the 
earthly power presumes to ordain laws contrary to the word of God.107   Likewise, in the 
Latin edition of his Institutes (1559), Calvin references the book of Daniel to argue that quia 
excesserat ille fines suos: nec modo imiurius fuerat in hominess, sed cornua tollendo 
adversus Deum, potestatem sibi ipse abrogaverat108 Calvin strengthens his argument for 
disobedience in his Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles (1552), referencing Peter’s 
injunction that “it is better to obey God rather than man” (Acts 5:29), forming what has 
become known as the Petrine Exception.109  According to Calvin, once a magistrate turns 
from God, the subject’s duty to obey disappears.  Martin Marprelate transfers these 
arguments to the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Church of England and builds up his 
arguments from Paul’s Epistle to Timothy. Given the bishops’ moral failures to execute the 
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 Martin Luther, Dr. Martin Luther’s Warning to his Dear German People, in Luther: Selected Political 
Writings, trans. and ed. J. M. Porter (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), 136. 
  
108
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standards prescribed in scripture, Marprelate argues that they are no longer worthy of 
obedience.   
While Marprelate’s impetus for resistance is rooted in the theories of disobedience 
from the Continent, he enlarges such claims by empowering the populace to rise up against 
the ecclesiastical hierarchy.  Both Luther and Calvin are careful never to condone popular 
revolt, choosing, like the Apostle Paul, to favor unity over dissension.  In contrast, 
Marprelate urges dissension and disobedience, although which precise form of resistance he 
envisions, he does not say.  The language is often bloody, calling for an overthrow of the 
bishops by any means necessary; at other times, however, such language appears to threaten 
little more than name-calling and epistolary taunts.   
Whether dealing in blows or libel, Marprelate posits that far-reaching, popular 
reformation is coming.  He finds historical and spiritual warrant for popular rebellion in the 
religious wars in the Low Countries and the Huguenot rebellion in France, comparing the 
bishops’ unjust seizure of the secret press and inevitable torture of the printers to the events 
which provoked such revolutions on the Continent. While he acknowledges the failure of 
these revolts, Marprelate promises his readers success:    
I would not have thee discouraged at this, that has lately fallen 
out.  … If, in beholding the state of the Low Countries and of 
France, thou wouldst have so reasoned with thyself, thou 
mightest easily have given the holy religion the slip, … Nay, 
let them know that, by the grace of God, the last year of 
Martinism, that is, the descrying and displaying of lord 
bishops, shall not be till full two years after the last year of 
Lambethism. (398-399) 
 
For Marprelate, the violent religious wars of the Continent pave the way for the overthrow of 
the bishops in England.  While the impetus to war in France was overtly bloody, taking the 
form of massacre, Marprelate implies that the crimes of the bishops against his compatriots 
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in printing may be equated with such exercises of unjust power.  Again, however, Marprelate 
hesitates before arguing for open revolution; he relies on implication over direct 
announcement and on deflation over incitement.  In the end, Marprelate overtly promises 
only the continuation of his epistolary occupation.  He and his followers will not abandon the 
“descrying and displaying of lord bishops” until the bishops resign their offices.   
 As if anxious regarding his revolutionary implications, Marprelate is sure to close his 
final tract with a proclamation of loyalty to the Queen, again distancing himself from the 
charge of treachery.  His fight is with the bishops, who have trespassed on the godliness of 
the Queen and have hindered her salvation.  In contrast to their wickedness, Marprelate 
positions himself and his followers as opposed to all threats to God and Queen Elizabeth.  
Defending himself against many of the charges previously levied at him, Marprelate 
distances himself from the more aggressive and politically dangerous sects of Protestantism 
and enemies to the state.  He embraces the perception of the satirist as fundamentally apart, 
claiming to be “at defiance with all men,” but only as far as they are enemies to the highest 
orthodoxy (411).  In fact, Marprelate ends the tract hopefully, aligning himself with the godly 
English and recasting Martinism as a mark of achievement and prestige.  In his last epistolary 
moments, Marprelate redefines what it means to be orthodox. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has aimed to unpack the very deliberate and dynamic authorial fiction 
constructed by whomever the author of the Marprelate tracts was.  As an author unhindered 
by factual biography, Martin Marprelate adopts different masks throughout his tracts as his 
aims and means evolve.  What emerges from the sequence of pamphlets is a malleable 
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authorial entity, one at times in conflict with itself, at other times self-regulatory and eager to 
please leading Puritans such as Thomas Cartwright.  Consequently, his language subtly 
transforms from the bitter satire characteristic of the First and Second Admonitions and that 
of Thomas Cartwright’s Replyes, to the more godly scriptural language utilized by the 
Apostle Paul in First and Second Timothy.  Yet he neither parrots other’s words nor ever 
rests fully contented with his own mode of discourse.  Splintering his identity into a family, 
his personae are never static but rather are dynamic and complex engagements with the 
rhetorical conventions and righteous authorities of contemporary religious culture.  The 
authorial fiction created by “Martin Marprelate” demonstrates that the boundaries between 
acceptable and unacceptable religious discourse were not clear or definitive during the 
formation of the Elizabethan Settlement.   
Soon, the authorial mask of “Martin Marprelate” would prepare the way for the 
arrival of more well-known literary personae, namely Thomas Nashe’s Pierce Penilesse and 
Jack Wilton. While the authorial mask constructed by the author claiming to be Martin 
Marprelate endeavored to portray the author amidst godly readers and to argue for the 
righteous cause of reformation, the personae born out of such a fiction would run in the other 
direction.  Unlike the fiction of his literary nemesis, Thomas Nashe deliberately constructs 
his various personae as  “below rebuke,”  muddying the satirist’s moral authority in order to 
interrogate the profit of the satiric occupation. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
“In those vaines here-to-fore have I mispent my spirite”: Nashe’s Prodigal Satire 
On September 8, 1593, Thomas Nashe published his Christs Teares Over Jerusalem 
and bid “a hundred unfortunate farewels to fantasticall Satirisme” (II: 13).110  In this text, 
Nashe rejects his previous satires, positioning them as a prodigal waste of time and wit.  
Referring perhaps to earlier tracts, An Anatomie of Absurditie, An Almond for a Parrot, and 
Pierce Penilesse His Supplication to the Divell, Nashe apologizes for his wasted youth: “In 
those vaines heere-to-fore have I mispent my spirite, and prodigally conspir’d against good 
houres” (II: 12).  To this end, Nashe professes his “unfained conversion” to a more worthy 
literature which lauds Christ and promises his reader moral edification (II: 13).  Through this 
latest tract, he will make up for his previous works: “Those that have beene perverted by any 
of my workes, let them reade this, and it shall thrice more benefite them” (II: 13).   By 
positioning the moral education promised by Christ’s Teares in opposition to the misspent 
energies of his previous works, Nashe casts satiric literature as an unprofitable occupation for 
an author and unworthy of serious endeavor for a reader. When Christs Teares Over 
Jerusalem was reissued the following year, however, this concern for his readership was 
omitted, replaced with Nashe’s confidence in the strength and applicability of satire:   
of diverse great divines I askt counsel, and made it a matter of 
conscience whether it were lawfull to rap a foole with his owne 
bable and teach him to know him selfe, and they expressly 
certified me it was everie way as allowable as the punishing of 
malefactors and offenders.  Indeede I have heard there are mad 
men whipt in Bedlam, and lazie vagabonds in Bridewell; 
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wherefore me seemeth there should be no more differece 
betwixt the displing of this vaine Braggadochio, then the 
whipping of a mad man or a vagabond. (II: 181) 
 
Here, the purpose of his previous satire of Gabriel Harvey is cast as educational.  The 
lawfulness of Nashe’s satire is affirmed by “diverse great divines” who assert the task of 
satire to be one of reformation, that of teaching a fool to “know him selfe.”  In addition to its 
educational goals, satire here is marked by a punitive element: it is associated with the state’s 
administration of discipline and the admonition of malefactors.  Indeed, Nashe questions the 
legitimacy of satire throughout his career, torn between a conception of the mode as the most 
profitable form of literature, one that urges the reformation of society and the edification of 
its readers, and the fundamental prodigality of satire, demonstrating its status as morally 
impotent to cleanse individuals of their sins.    
 
The Prodigal Motif in the Renaissance 
Nashe’s concern for the “literary profit” of satire reflects an anxiety prevalent in the 
last decade of the sixteenth century concerning the artistic merit of fiction and poetry.  
Richard Helgerson argues that authors of fiction and poetry were ambivalent as to the value 
of their own artistic occupations, pulled between the commercial success promised by 
narratives of vice and the moral satisfaction of narratives of virtue:  
unable to ignore the suspicion that poetry was morally harmful, 
and equally unwilling to forgo it, they had to prove again and 
again that it might be made beneficial.  They were thus forced 
to argue that their work, rightly understood, warns against the 
very wantonness it portrays, but such arguments only involved 
them in a maze of self-contradiction.111   
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Specifically, these authors were concerned with the moral ambiguity aroused by their 
narratives. Composed largely of their protagonists’ indulgence in vice, repentance narratives 
attempted to christianize the youthful rebellion of their protagonists through the interpretive 
guards of admonition and repentance.112  According to Helgerson, this model offered 
Elizabethan prose writers a safety valve for social and political grievances through its pattern 
of the protagonist’s initial admonition by an elder, his resultant youthful rebellion and, lastly, 
his sorrowful repentance and conversion from folly.113  Authors who wanted to satisfy their 
readers’ demands for romantic and roguish protagonists—the stuff of commercial success—
and to promise the moral profit of the protagonist’s repentance, turned for inspiration to the 
story of the prodigal son. While the sixteenth-century adaptations of the prodigal son parable 
differ in important ways from their scriptural source, the interpretive anxiety of sixteenth-
century adaptors may arise from the parable itself.   
The scriptural parable of the prodigal son occurs only in the Gospel of Luke (15: 11-
31), and stands as one of the most well known of Christ’s three parables to the Pharisees:  the 
parable of the lost sheep, the lost coin, and the lost son, respectively.  Renaissance 
commentaries of the prodigal son parable largely concentrate their exegesis upon the later 
events of the story, first upon the repentance of the prodigal, which grows with his 
debasement, and the overwhelming love of the father, who unconditionally welcomes back 
his contrite son, who “was dead, and is alive again.”114 In emphasizing the prodigal’s 
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 For example, in his Paraphrases of the Newe Testamente, Erasmus offers four times as much commentary 
relating to the prodigal’s repentance and homecoming than to his original fall from grace.  See Desiderius 
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suffering and repentance rather than his rebellion, Renaissance commentators harness the 
parable’s didactic qualities, offering moral lessons to their readers by preserving the negative 
example of rebellion followed by repentance. In their hands, the parable is made a didactic 
testament to humanity’s sinfulness and Christ’s merciful forgiveness.  In order to accomplish 
this didactic lesson, however, biblical commentators must gloss quickly the rebellion of the 
prodigal, subordinating his “riotous living” to the importance of his conversion.115  Deflating 
the time devoted to prodigal’s rebellion, glossators attempt to negate the possibility of the 
reader’s dangerous misinterpretation of the parable.116 Elements of the parable continue to 
pose interpretive problems, however.  Many commentators accentuate the problematic 
confrontation between the elder brother, who is unwilling to celebrate the return of his 
profligate brother, and the loving father, who opens his arms to his repentant son.   Such 
glosses often pit the elder brother against the prodigal, running the risk of actually 
encouraging prodigality.117  The commentators of the Geneva Bible gloss the prodigal’s 
                                                                                                                                                       
Erasmus, The First Tome or Volume of the Paraphrase of Erasmus upon the Newe Testamente, 1548 (Delmar, 
New York: Scholars’ Facsimile and Reprints, 1975), 130-133. 
 
115
 The Bishops Bible (1568) states, “And not long after, when the yonger sonne had gathered all that he had 
together, hee toke his iourney into a farre countrey, and there hee wasted his goodes with riotous living” 
(15:13).  The nature of the prodigal’s “riotous living” is not elaborated upon by Luke, who positions the elder 
brother’s version of events as unreliable. The elder brother angrily tells his father, “thou neuer gauest me a 
kidde to make mery with my friendes: But assoone as this thy sonne was come, which hath deuoured thy goodes 
with harlottes, thou hast for his pleasure kylled that fat calfe” (15:29-30).  It is not until Erasmus’ Paraphrases 
of the Newe Testamente that the prodigal’s riotous living is fleshed out: “He spente and wastefully consumed 
among straungiers all the substaunce, not of his owne, (for nothing it was that he had of his owne) but of his 
fathers.  And he spent it out riottously at dyce, on harlottes, and in feastyng and banquettyng.  For plaine it is, 
whatsoever is spent about the inordinate lustes of ye body without necessitie” (130). 
 
116
 In order to avoid such “misinterpretation,” Samuel Gardiner, in the first full-length exegesis of the prodigal 
son parable in English, interprets the parable as “the Epitome of the Gospell, the abstract and compendium of 
the whole woorke of our redemption,” but omits the elder brother from the prodigal’s reunion. See Samuel 
Gardiner, Portraiture of the Prodigal Sonne (London, 1599). 
 
117Erasmus states of the elder brother, “Here, beholde a Iudaicall herte & stomake: which whereas it ought to 
have rejoyced for the receyving of his brother, which ought to have praysed the mercifulnesse of his father: yet 
had rather to envie his brother, and to take indignacion agaynst his father.”  On the other end, the younger 
brother is described as newly brought to health from disease: “For continuall felicitie never interrupted or 
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conversion as more righteous than the untried virtue of the elder brother, who does not 
indulge in the prodigal’s experience and thus does not enjoy his rebirth.  Even to modern 
audiences, the parable continues to jar with our sense of fairness: the brother who dutifully 
remains home is condemned as stubborn and unrighteous while the prodigal is celebrated.  
To mollify the tension within the parable itself, many commentators read much of the parable 
literally, but turn to allegory in their treatment of the elder brother to avoid the problematic 
confrontation. For example, in his Paraphrases of the New Testament, Erasmus complicates 
the parable’s tension between experience and precept by interpreting the younger brother as a 
type: his fall is characteristic of wayward youth.  On the other hand, Erasmus reads the rigid 
elder brother as historical allegory, representing the Pharisees whom Christ rebukes.  
Erasmus describes the two brothers: 
For ignoraunce and lacke of thynkyng and casting afore what wil 
come after, is always for the moste parte joined and coupled with 
youth. And therfore so muche the more willingly we dooe forgeve 
youth, and beare the more with this age whan it doeth offende.  But 
the Jewe, which to hymselfe semeth just, and standeth muche in 
his owne conceypte for fulfilling of the lawe, dooeth trespace more 
grievously with envying against his brother, then the other had 
synned by sweruyng and strayghyng out of the right way. (133) 
 
While Erasmus characterizes the prodigal’s wandering experience as benignly “swerving and 
straying” from the righteous path, he counts the elder brother’s sin as more “grievous” than 
such indiscretion.  He calls for patience in dealing with youthful rashness, but demands 
condemnation for the elder brother’s rigid adherence to precept or “lawe.”  The parable’s 
ambivalence between the value of precept and the value of experience is not easily pieced 
out.  
                                                                                                                                                       
broken of, hath not so muche pleasure or delectacion in it. But lyke as a disease or sickenesse afore goyng doeth 
commende healthe unto us, and make it seme the sweter unto us after we be restored to it agayne: even so the 
misfortune which I have had afore for my sonne, maketh our mirth now the more, for that he is gotten agayne” 
(133). 
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In contrast to the glossators, the authors of prose fiction who adapted the prodigal son 
parable in the sixteenth century seem to have embraced the possibility of the reader’s 
misinterpretation. Although authors such as Robert Greene, John Lyly and even Philip 
Sidney retain the didactic paradigm of admonition, rebellion and repentance, they belabor the 
scenes of the prodigal’s dissolute lifestyle, weighing more heavily the prodigal’s rebellion 
than his conversion.   In these texts, the episodes of rebellion take center stage, book-ended 
by aged admonition and the prodigal’s repentance on the other.  By way of affirming their 
loyalty to conservative morals, these authors attempt to christianize their texts against the 
criticism that, in demonstrating such scenes of debauchery, they actually encourage the vice 
their texts profess to admonish.118  Adopting the prodigal paradigm, they justify publishing 
pleasurable and even licentious texts as didactic literature, thereby enjoying the best of both 
worlds: they benefit from the commercial success that comes with printing narratives of vice 
and corruption, all the while embracing a posture of moral didacticism.  One of these authors, 
Robert Greene, Nashe’s friend and literary colleague, professes his commitment to a patriotic 
didacticism, adorning his licentious and prodigal conny-catching pamphlets with the 
Ciceronian motto, nascimur pro patria, “we are born to serve our country.”  
 
Nashe’s Satiric Career 
Like these prose adaptors, Thomas Nashe returns to the prodigal paradigm at various 
points throughout his career, adapting the construction of admonition, rebellion and 
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 The story of the prodigal son does not act solely as source material; many authors of the 1580s also adapted 
the parable as a pattern for their own careers, transposing the parable’s pattern of the protagonist’s indulgence in 
vice and his resultant repentance to their notions of authorship itself.   For these writers, fiction writing 
represented idleness and the waste of resources, necessitating that such authors publicly recant their sonnet 
sequences and romances as experiments in youthful folly, fit only for mere recreation.  As recreational texts, 
romances and sonnet sequences were safely marginalized and excused from the paradigm of profit.   However, 
modern audiences need not take such professions of prodigality strictly at face value; despite their authors’ 
claims of repentance, romances and sonnet sequences continued to be published at an alarming rate. 
81 
 
repentance to suit his own ends.  At first, his sense of his career and the power of didactic 
admonition is seemingly indistinguishable from those of his literary colleagues.  In An 
Anatomie of Absurditie (1589), Nashe professes the ability of didactic literature to build up 
readers’ discretion and of admonition to reform society.119 In his first major publication, 
Nashe acknowledges the problems inherent in satire: he recognizes that the satirist must 
strengthen his ethos in order to admonish the ills of society, but also that he must contend 
with the charge of arrogance.120  To counter these two criticisms, Nashe constructs a hybrid 
ethos in An Anatomie, assuming both the godly authority of a fatherly admonisher and the 
experienced, ironic authority of the prodigal son to argue for reform of England’s educational 
program.   
Unlike the authors discussed by Helgerson, however, Nashe later employs the 
prodigal persona and paradigm in order to question the nature and efficacy of didacticism 
itself.  Confronted with the arbitrariness of authority and power early in his career through 
his association with and subsequent repudiation by the ecclesiastical hierarchy, Nashe turns 
to attack didacticism, interrogating the ability of admonitory literature to reform humanity.   
Brought into the bishops’ response to the Martin Marprelate tracts along with John Lyly, 
Robert Greene and Anthony Munday, Nashe represented the conservative views of the 
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 Many modern critics seem to take their cue from Nashe himself in largely ignoring the existence of An 
Anatomie of Absurditie.  In his Works, McKerrow observes that neither Nashe nor Gabriel Harvey ever 
mentions its existence after its publication, leaving its only public mention that of Nashe’s advertisement for the 
work in the “Preface to the Gentlemen Students of Both Universities” appended to Robert Greene’s Menaphon: 
“It may be, my Anatomie of Absurdities may acquaint you ere long with my skill in surgery, wherein the 
disease of Art more merrily discovered may make our maimed Poets put together their blankes unto the 
building of an Hospitall” (III: 324). 
   
120
 Although not printed until 1589, An Anatomie of Absurditie was written presumably while Nashe was either 
at Cambridge or when he first arrived in London in 1588. 
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ecclesiastical hierarchy against their froward epistolary opponent.121  According to 
Archbishop Whitgift, it was Richard Bancroft who advised that Martin Marprelate be 
answered in his own style.  And while the tactic enjoyed popularity with London audiences 
eager for the stage-shows like The Maygame of Martinisme and for the pamphlets issued like 
A Whip for an Ape, the authorities quickly began expressing their anxiety with their strategy 
of rebuke.122   
By October, less than four months after the bishops had begun answering the 
author(s) of the Marprelate tracts “after their own vein,” the authorities began to doubt the 
godliness of engaging in such a dirty fight.123  According to “Pasquill” and “Double V,” the 
authorities began by suppressing the stage-shows.  Pasquill claims that one anti-Martinist 
play has been censored by the authorities, asserting to his companion, “I have a tale to 
tell…of the sly practice that was used in restraining” them from being performed.124  
                                                 
121
 The anti-Martinist responses are numerous, beginning with now lost stage plays that pilloried Martin 
Marprelate but quickly turning to the popular pamphlet medium that suited Marprelate himself.  Several tracts 
were issued: first were the contentious and spurious Mar-Martine (July 1589) and A Whip for an Ape (July 
1589), both presumably penned by Munday; more mild admonitions were also published, including Leonard 
Wright’s A Friendly Admonicion to Martin Marprelat and Tobias Bland’s Baite for Momus.  A month later, A 
Countercuffe given to Martin Junior appeared, claiming to be by “the virtuous, hardie and renowned Pasquill of 
England, Cavaliero.”  The success of this pamphlet provoked two sequels, The Returne of Pasquill (October 
1589) and Pasquill’s Apologie (July 1590).  It is now assumed that Pasquill was, in the first two incarnations, 
Robert Greene, who penned the tracts in Marprelate’s saucy style, informed by the leg-work and research of 
Thomas Nashe.  It is largely accepted that the last Pasquill tract, The Apologie, was penned by a different 
author, maybe Munday.  At the same time of Greene’s The Returne of Pasquill,  the tract Pappe with a Hatchet 
(October 1589) arrived at bookstalls, most commonly attributed to John Lyly who wrote it under the 
pseudonym “Double V,” as well as Martins Months Minde, penned by the anonymous Marforius.  While Nashe 
may have contributed directly to other tracts (most probably those authored by Greene), he does not officially 
enter the Marprelate fray as an author until An Almond for a Parrat (probably written during November of 
1589).   
 
122
 The stage shows went on tour, according to Pasquill, who claims that the actors had been “long in the 
Country,” and A Whip for an Ape quickly enjoyed a second printing.  See McKerrow, Works of Thomas Nashe, 
I: 100.  
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 Quoted in Charles Nicholl, A Cup of News: The Life of Thomas Nashe (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1984), 67. 
 
124
 McKerrow, I: 100. 
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Likewise, “Double V” laments, “Would those Comedies might be allowed to be plaid that are 
pend, and then I am sure [Martin] would be decyphered and so perhaps discouraged.”125  The 
anti-Martinist pamphlets, supposedly representing the interests of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, 
are threatened with censorship by those they aimed to help. In his later pamphlets, Pasquill 
notes that the anti-Martinists, like Martin himself, are disliked on all sides: in The Returne, he 
asserts “Peace, Cavaliero, your tongue will be slitte if you take not heede: I have heard some 
say you should wring for this geare.”126 Later, in The Apologie, he more overtly documents 
the cool feelings towards the pamphleteers, arguing that their audiences find it abhorrent to 
“see us runne one at another like furious Bulles, foming and casting out those reproaches, 
which hereafter we shall never be able to wipe away.”127 Here, the threat is not only from the 
political and religious forces at work in early modern London, but also from within: the 
railing fray that has ensued between the Martinists and the anti-Martinists will taint the soul 
of each party.  Gabriel Harvey also denounced the anti-Martinists for indulging in such 
scurrilous pamphleteering, though his motives are perhaps not as pure as he would attest:  
What scholler or gentleman can reade such alehouse and 
tinkerly stuffe without blushing? … What good could grow out 
of it, but to make every man madbrayned, and desperate; but a 
generall contempt of all good order in Saying and Dooing; but 
an Universall Topsy-Turvy?128  
 
It is in this volatile epistolary environment that Nashe pens the most famous, and by many 
accounts the most successful, anti-Marprelate tract, An Almond for a Parrat.   
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 Pappe with a Hatchet, (London, 1589), D2v. 
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 McKerrow, I: 83. 
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 McKerrow, I: 110. 
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 According to Charles Nicholl, Harvey’s attack, Advertisement for Papp-hatchett and Martin Marprelate, 
was finished on November 5, 1589, though not published until it was included in his attack on Nashe, Pierces 
Supererogation in 1593.  See Gabriel Harvey, Pierces Supererogation, in The Works of Gabriel Harvey, Vol. 2. 
ed. Alexander B. Grosart (London: Hazell, Watson, and Vincy, 1884), 130-131. 
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 An Almond for a Parrat more fully answers Martin Marprelate’s scurrilous jests and 
ad hominem attacks than the previous anti-Marprelate pamphlets, mimicking the style of the 
forward pamphleteer.129 As is the case with the later anti-Martinist tracts, Nashe’s tract 
references the unease of the bishops, who kept the tract from being published until 1590, well 
after Marprelate had ceased to write.  In his dedication to the soul of Dick Tarleton, Nashe 
laments the authorities’ current crack-down on the press: 
for now a dayes a man cannot have a bout with a Balletter, or 
write Midas habet aures asininas in great Romaine letters, but 
hee shall bee in daunger of further displeasure. Well, come on 
it what will, Martin and I will allow of no such doinges; we 
shall cracke half a score blades in a backe-lane though a 
Constable come not to part us. (III: 341-2)  
 
Nashe’s literary bout with Marprelate will occur whether the bishops like it or not.  In the 
text of his tract, Nashe continues to threaten his epistolary enemy with a clandestine beating, 
reflecting his own strained relationship with the ecclesiastical hierarchy that sponsored him: 
“If authority do not moderate the fiery fervence of my enflamed zeale, ile assaile thee from 
terme to terme” (III: 369); later, he goes further, arguing “O God, that we two might bee 
permitted but one quarter, to try it out by the teeth for the best benefice in England, then 
would I distill my wit into incke, and my soule inot arguments, but I would drive this Danus 
from his dunghill, and make him faune like a dog for favour at the magistrates feete” (my 
emphasis, III: 369).  His tract demonstrates Nashe’s tense relationship with his sponsors, as 
well as his sense of camaraderie with his enemy.130   
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 According to Charles Nicholl, Nashe’s tract, for reasons of timing and style, “has the feel of being the anti-
Martinists’ coup de grace” (Cup of News, 75)   
 
130
 It has been argued multiple times that Nashe was heavily influenced by the style of Martin Marprelate.  
Charles Nicholl observes, “As one reads into the Almond one glimpses a kind of covert allegiance between the 
antagonists.  They speak the same language – ‘M. Martin, how like you my stile, am I not old Ille ego qui 
quondam at ye besleeving of a sichophant?’ In the outlaw Martin, the budding satirist finds his own venturings 
beyond the pale of propriety writ large” (Cup of News, 77). 
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It is this strained relationship with moral and political authority which would inform 
Nashe’s own persona throughout his literary career.  After his involvement in the anti-
Martinist circle, Nashe develops a more cynical perception of his satiric occupation, 
questioning not only the ability of admonition to reform the world, but also the constructed 
nature of authority.  In his most famous tract among early modern audiences, Pierce 
Penilesse His Supplication to the Divell, Nashe divorces satire from its claims of moral 
authority.  He trades in the voice of the godly father for that of the unrepentant prodigal, 
demonstrating the ineffectiveness of  didactic admonition.  Despite his cynicism regarding 
his own artistic occupation, Nashe cannot give up on didacticism completely.  In Pierce 
Penilesse, he still holds out hope that the righteous poetry and drama of others can inspire 
and instill virtue in society.    
 By the time he publishes The Unfortunate Traveller, or The Life of Jack Wilton 
(1594), Nashe’s cynicism has quickly expanded, causing him to reject the premise that 
published literature could instill virtue in its audience.  Having suffered repeatedly at the 
hands of the literary censures, Nashe disavows his own moral authority as a satirist, choosing 
again to adopt self-consciously the pose of the prodigal.131  In contrast to his Anatomie, 
which posits the legitimate moral goal of satire and admonition, The Unfortunate Traveller 
argues for a reconsideration of the mode.  Replacing the conventional moral authority of the 
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 As we have seen, Nashe’s Almond for a Parrat was temporarily suppressed.  His next work, the “Preface” to 
the pirated edition of Philip Sidney’s Astrophel and Stella was called in by Burghley himself and was excised 
from all subsequent editions.  Entered into the Stationer’s Register the same month as The Unfortunate 
Traveller, Christs Teares Over Jerusalem landed Nashe temporarily in prison.  In the summer of 1597, he was 
in trouble again, this time for his contributions to The Isle of Dogs. He escaped prison (the punishment of Ben 
Jonson) only by fleeing the city.  On August 15, 1597, the Privy Council ordered Richard Topcliffe to follow up 
evidence from a search of Nashe’s chambers—“peruse soch papers as were fownd in Nash his lodging, which 
Ferrys, a Messenger of the Chamber, will deliver” (qtd. in Nicholl, 244). Finally, but perhaps not surprising, the 
entirety of Nashe’s works were called in on the first of June, 1599, in the bishops’ ban.   
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satirist with the low repute of the criminal Jack Wilton, Nashe reveals the constructed nature 
of authority, emptying satire of its hollow promises of reformation and virtuous action. 
 
An Anatomie of Absurditie 
In his first major publication, Nashe argues for satire’s place as the most profitable 
form of literature.  Eliciting the reformation of its audience, conventional satire argues from 
precepts of good living to admonish the vice of corrupt society.  In short, satire tells people 
how not to live. In the heavily didactic An Anatomie of Absurditie (1588), Nashe embodies 
the satirist’s call to reformation, rebuking the particular vices he sees around London, namely 
the morally bankrupt literature poisoning the minds of readers, the painted ladies becoming 
more common in society, the holier-than-thou Puritans he would repeatedly write against, 
and finally, the lazy scholar advancing too quickly through his education.  Positioning 
himself as a satirist par excellence, Nashe constructs himself as a rare and discerning 
admonisher, one removed from the changeable opinion of society and thus able to see clearly 
the vice and corruption around him.  He represents himself as a plain-speaking satirist who is 
solely interested in the reformation of England: “For my part, as I have no portion in any 
mans opinion, so am I the Prorex of my private thought: which makes me terme poison 
poison, as well in a silver pleece, as in an earthen dishe” (I: 5-6).  In claiming to be the 
viceroy of his own private thoughts, Nashe demonstrates a strong sense of self-sufficiency 
and discretion.  Through his satire, Nashe is capable of diagnosing poison—no matter how it 
hides itself—and publicly shunning such moral infection for the benefit of society.  He will 
profit society through his insistence upon the reformation of its members.   
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Nashe acknowledges that although satire will profit society, it does not come without 
problems.  On the one hand, Nashe must clear himself of the charge typically levied against 
satirists—that of ironically seducing the reader to the very ruin the author hopes to avoid—by 
calling upon the strength of his own ethos.  On the other hand, Nashe must counter the 
negative perception of the satirist, namely that his constant admonition of the reader casts the 
satirist as an arrogant and hypocritical rebuker of vice rather than a moral guide gently urging 
reformation.  In an attempt to strike the ethical balance necessary, Nashe complicates his 
personae in An Anatomie, first assuming the didactic admonitory ethos of a wise father in 
order to establish the moral efficacy of his work. Once he has demonstrated his moral 
authority, however, Nashe revises that pose, transforming its admonitory didacticism into a 
ethos characterized by earnest repentance.  He replaces the pose of the godly father with that 
of the reformed prodigal, bolstering his ethos through his advice.  By “proving” the didactic 
precepts of the father with his experience as a prodigal, Nashe achieves the necessary moral 
authority of the satirist.   
Nashe uses his authority as a fatherly admonisher to identify vice and diagnose sin.  
Employing his discretion for the benefit of the reader, Nashe positions himself in an advisory 
role in An Anatomie, didactically admonishing his reader, whom he, in turn, positions as the 
prodigal child to be instructed.  By assuming the persona of a godly father, Nashe attempts to 
imitate the strong ethos granted to the father in the adaptations of the prodigal son parable.   
His title page promises his reader the profit of reformation, advertising his tract as “a breefe 
confutation of the slender imputed praises to feminine perfection, with a short description of 
the severall practises of youth, and sundry follies of our licentious times”  (I: 3).  For Nashe, 
An Anatomie serves as a metaphoric commonplace book of vice: it reproduces popular 
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castigations of bad behavior, couching a promise of the reader’s reformation in the language 
of utility.  Nashe sells his tract as didactic lessons “breefe” and “short,” as easy to remember 
and apply.  The tract’s claim for the benefit of such precepts cements Nashe’s role as a 
fatherly advisor to the reader and positions the tract as applicable to future circumstance.132  
According to its title page, the text will be “No lesse pleasant to be read, then profitable to be 
remembered, especially of those, who live more licentiously, or addicted to a more nyce 
stoycall austeritie” (I: 3). An Anatomie will offer its readers useful advice, applicable, as such 
admonition has been in the past, to the reformation of a licentious or austere life.   
Unlike the morally insubstantial texts which he berates in his tract, Nashe’s Anatomie 
promises and claims to deliver profit to its readers through its satire.  Nashe links his satire to 
the reader’s moral education:  he demonstrates and diagnoses the corruption of sin for those 
unguarded readers who may otherwise be seduced to folly.  Nashe offers his readers satiric 
examples of vice in the form of precept or adage, beginning his text with a proverbial 
expression taken from Erasmus:133  
Zeuxes beeing about to drawe the counterfet of Juno, 
assembled all the Agrigentine Maydes… that in their beautie, 
he might imitate what was most excellent: even so it fareth 
with mee, who beeing about to anatomize Absurditie, am urged 
to take a view of sundry mens vanitie, a survey of their follie, a 
briefe of their barbarisme, [in order] to runne through Authors 
of the absurder sort, … sucking and selecting out of these 
upstart antiquaries, somewhat of their unsavory duncerie, 
meaning to note it with a Nigrum theta, that each one at the 
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 Richard Helgerson notes the impersonal nature of Henry Sidney’s letter of precepts to his son Philip, noting 
that the occasion was motivated by a sense of paternal guidance rather than any deviant behavior on the part of 
the son: according to Helgerson, Henry Sidney “does his duty as a father [in writing such precepts to his son], 
just as he expects Philip to do his as a son” in obeying his father’s advice (The Elizabethan Prodigals, 17). 
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 McKerrow cites numerous instances of Nashe’s adaptation of Plutarch, Pliny, and Seneca in The Anatomy, 
arguing that he probably came to such references through Erasmus’ Parabolae.  See McKerrow V: 118. Indeed, 
in this case, Nashe takes from Erasmus liberally.  See Erasmus, Parabolae in The Collected Works of  Erasmus 
(Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1978), XXIII: 226.  
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first sight may eschew it as infectious, to shewe it to the worlde 
that all men may shunne it. (I: 9) 
 
Nashe will anatomize his subjects through his compilation of their worst vanity, folly, and 
barbarism.  As Zeuxes would imitate only the most excellent examples of beauty before him, 
so Nashe will cull through all the vice he sees and reads for its most choice “absurditie,” 
“sucking and selecting out” the most appropriate examples.134  After all the vice is 
assembled, Nashe will mark it with a nigrum theta, a mark of condemnation, so that he may 
model for his readers the rejection of such vice.  Much like Zeuxes’ painting of Juno which 
will serve as a standard by which to judge the potential beauty of all women, Nashe’s 
Anatomie will represent all vice, and will demarcate future corruption for its readers.  With 
this promise of his text’s diagnostic profit, Nashe attempts to educate his readers through the 
precepts he has assembled through classical literature, contemporary sources, and the daily 
experience of London life. As the “compiler” rather than the “author” of An Anatomie, Nashe 
asserts the power of reproducible precept to teach his reader discretion.135  As he promises in 
his title page, however, Nashe must weigh the pleasantness of his text with the moral 
discretion he has pledged to his reader.   In order to accomplish this, he must replace his 
ethos of didactic admonition with the humility of the prodigal. 
As the prodigal, he uses his experience as an instrument to strengthen his moral 
lessons and defend himself and his satire. Typifying an education learned through 
experience, Nashe positions his wit metaphorically as a repentant prodigal, home from its 
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 In this way, Nashe mimics the humanistic emphasis upon commonplace books and texts interested in 
compiling sententiae from classical sources, like Erasmus’s Adages and the text Nashe has the most use for, his 
Parabolae.  Unlike these texts, which promise tools beneficial for oratory and demonstrating rhetorical savvy, 
Nashe will compile negative examples to encourage discretion.  
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 On the title page, Nashe de-emphasizes his authorial role, listing himself as a compiler rather than creator of 
the text. 
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morally dubious adventures to share its experience abroad.  He urges his reader to learn from 
his experience, not repeating his mistakes. He confesses his former prodigality:   
What I have written, proceeded not from the penne of vain-
glory but from the processe of that pensivenes, which two 
Summers since overtooke me: whose obscured cause, best 
knowne to everie name of curse, hath compelled my wit to 
wander abroad unregarded in this satyricall disguise. (I: 5) 
 
In this obscure passage, Nashe constructs his prodigal wandering as a defense against the 
possible criticism that he has endeavored in his satire for his own glory, framing the rest of 
the sentence in the passive voice to distance himself from the charge of arrogance.136  
Adopting a common justification for his satire, Nashe legitimizes his text through his sense 
of compulsion, but tweaks the commonly used topos to authorize his wit’s exploratory 
wanderings rather than his satiric rebuke.   Nashe’s statement that his wit wanders abroad 
carries with it the negative connotation of the prodigal’s idle travel, ungoverned by reason.  
As Red Cross Knight strays from the path to wander in the woods of Error, Nashe travels 
abroad “unregarded.”  While the “unregarded” here may refer simply to Nashe’s wit 
wandering “incognito,” it may also modify his wandering, opening the possibility that 
Nashe’s wit has dangerously wandered without the government of reason, but, now contrite, 
has returned home, chastened by his experiences and willing to admonish other prodigals 
through his confession.  
Much as he frames his wit as a repentant prodigal, Nashe casts his satiric text as the 
product of prodigal recreation, subtly questioning the profit of his satiric occupation.  Such a 
stance may serve to mollify his critics who may read his castigations as alternately too harsh 
or too permissive.  To deflect such criticism of his task, Nashe humbles himself, posturing 
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 For his discussion of the “obscured cause” of  Nashe’s pensiveness, see Arthur Kinney, “Gallant young 
Juvenall’: Thomas Nashe and the Revival of the Second Sophistic” in Humanist Poetics: Thought, Rhetoric, 
and Fiction in Sixteenth-Century England (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), 307-309. 
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himself as a simple rustic and his work as unlearned in his dedication.  He self-consciously 
dismisses his work as an “undigested endevour” full of “unschooled indignities,” and his 
dedication as “rude” and unworthy of his patron, Charles Blunt (I: 7-8).  As common as such 
a pose is in the sixteenth century, Nashe refashions it by coupling such humble confession 
with proverbial comparison, likening his satire to the malorum Civitas of Phillip of 
Macedon.137  Assuming only the part of the comparison that suits his needs, Nashe protests 
that satire may be a prodigal mode:  
even as Macedon Phillip having finished his warres builded a 
Cittie for the worst sort of men, which hee called πουηρόπολις, 
malorum Civitas, so I: having laide aside my graver studies for 
a season, determined with my selfe beeing idle in the Countrey, 
to beginne in this vacation, the foundation of a trifling subject, 
which might shroude in his leaves, the abusive enormities of 
these our times. (I: 9) 
 
As the equivalent of sixteenth-century beach reading, Nashe’s satire is subject to decorum.  
Because Nashe authors the “trifling” text in the spirit of mere recreation, it is fit only for idle 
time spent in vacation.  Nashe pleads with his patron not to judge the text out of context, 
casting satire as simply the product of idleness.  Despite such an apparently humble claim 
about his text, Nashe begins to display an ambivalence regarding the profit of his satiric work 
here.  He interrogates his satiric choice to “shroude in his leaves” the sins of his time, 
simultaneously positing that there may be hidden potential in the text if he addresses the 
abusive enormities of England properly, but also leaving open the interpretation that such 
negative examples would be better hidden for the benefit of the commonwealth, even in a 
work castigating such behavior.  Through his choice of “shroude,” Nashe entertains the 
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 From Erasmus, Parabolae, 202.  Nashe makes use only of the first half of the comparison, leaving Erasmus’ 
condemnation of the busybody poignantly unsaid.  Like a satirist, the busybody “collects bad things from every 
source, and stores his memory with a treasure of what is ugly and unpleasant.”   
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contradictory possibilities of veiling and embracing such vice.138  Through his ambivalence 
here, Nashe hits upon the very “problem” of satire: that any display of vice may ironically 
promote the very behavior the satirist would admonish his audience to avoid.  Later in the 
dedication, however, Nashe compounds his own commitment to his text’s identity as mere 
recreation.  Just as he sets aside his “graver studies” to accomplish what he sees as his idle 
work, he requests that Blunt remove from sight all his learned discourse so that Nashe’s work 
will appear less simple by comparison.  At the end of his Epistle, he asks, “I am to request 
your worship, whiles you are perusing my Pamphlet, to lay aside out of your sight, 
whatsoever learned invention hath heretofore bredde your delight, least their singularitie 
reflect my simplicitie, their excellence convince mee of innocence” (I: 8). Here, Nashe 
adopts a common humility trope to describe Blunt’s recreational reading of his own work, 
emphasizing the lightness and prodigality of his satire with words such as “peruse” and 
“pamphlet.”  He flatters his potential patron: in opposition to Nashe’s recreational toy, 
Blunt’s work must be “learned” and “singular.”  Such a humble interpretation may disguise a 
more confident claim, however.  While he assumes Blunt’s ability to discern profitable 
literature from recreation, Nashe also cleverly implies that his work possesses its own worthy 
singularity, and should be judged according to no other standards but its own.  Through his 
wordplay, Nashe asserts the ultimate status of satire while protecting himself from the charge 
of arrogance.  As such a discerning satirist, Nashe must deflect the indictment that, through 
his satire, he aims to “correct” the vice of his patron, while, at the same time, he must argue 
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 The OED provides contradictory definitions of “shroude.”  Most commonly, it denotes a covering: “To hide 
from view, as by a veil, darkness, cloud; to cover so as to conceal; to screen, veil.”  This meaning indicates that 
Nashe will hide vice from view of the reader, leaving his reader ignorant of its existence.  On the other hand, 
Nashe would later use “shroude” to mean something different; the OED marks his use of the word to mean “To 
include, [or] embrace” in Christs Teares Over Jerusalem, offering the reader an interpretation which implies the 
embrace vice in order to rebuke it.   
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for the wide applicability and profit of his work.  In order to accomplish this, Nashe posits 
two readerships: that of Blunt, the discerning reader who may regard satire as mere 
recreation, and that of his wider readership, filled with those who must build up their 
discretion through admonition.   
 While Nashe clearly positions Blunt as embodying the discretion of a most learned 
reader, capable of culling profit from even the lowest texts, he credits the average sixteenth-
century reader with little in the way of interpretive discretion.  As a result, Nashe condemns 
those texts which try the naïve reader’s ability to distinguish between profit and recreation 
without authorial guidance and offers his satire as an means of increasing the reader’s 
discretion.  Rebuking those authors who would seduce unlearned readers to vice, Nashe 
insists that texts should fulfill their promises of profit with substantial lessons in the forms of 
overt precepts and didactic moral lessons, preserving not only negative examples, but also 
illuminating the consequences of vice.  Without such moral guideposts, insubstantial and 
hollow texts offer only a “Chaos of sentences without any profitable sense” and are 
comparable to drums “which beeing emptie within, sound big without” (I: 10).  Here, 
didacticism is a containing force.  Absent the restraint inherent in the applicability of moral 
didacticism, the wild narrative enjoys full prodigal license, widely ranging in the author’s 
debaucherous wit and enticing the reader to folly rather than repentance.139  Specifically, he 
calls out prose romances for playing down morality to emphasize rebellion: “in their bookes 
there is scarce to be found one precept pertaining to vertue, but whole quires fraught with 
amorous discourses, kindling Venus flame in Vulcans forge, carrying Cupid in tryumph, 
                                                 
139
 Roger Ascham castigates Italian romances in The Schoolmaster, calling them out as deliberately attempting 
to ensnare England’s youth towards vice.  He argues that the negative examples of these books “sold in every 
shop in London, commended by honest titles the sooner to corrupt honest manners, dedicated overboldly to 
virtuous and honorable personages, the earlier to beguile simple and innocent wits.”  See Roger Ascham, The 
Schoolmaster, ed. Lawrence V. Ryan (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1967), 67.   
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alluring even vowed Vestals to treade awry, inchanting chaste mindes and corrupting the 
continenst” (I: 10).  The authors of these texts eschew their instructional duty and instead 
place the responsibility of interpretation entirely upon their readers.  According to Nashe, the 
authors of these “emptie drums” rely upon their readers’ discretion without first 
strengthening it through precept and admonition.   As the reader will inevitably flounder in 
the overwhelming presentation of such vice, Nashe condemns both author and reader as 
prodigals:  while both waste their resources, he regards the prodigal reader sympathetically, 
the prodigal author, villainously.  From Nashe’s perspective, the reader wastes time 
inefficiently trying to harness a moral out of the overwhelming amount of folly presented in 
the text and the author squanders the virtue of the printing press: 
Were it that any Morall of greater moment, might be fished out 
of their fabulous follie, leaving theyr words, we would cleave 
to their meaning, … we would pry into their propounded sence, 
but when as lust is the tractate of so many leaves, and love 
passions the lavish dispence of so much paper, I must need 
send such idle wits to shrift to the vicar of S. Fooles… the 
Presse should be farre better employed. (I: 10) 
 
Nashe argues that, in struggling through the interpretation of these obscure works, the reader 
only finds more confusion and little profit.  Casting the initial statement in the conditional, 
Nashe emphasizes both the author’s responsibility to create profitable literature and the 
reader’s expectation of such profit in the text.  Through his emphasis upon didactic moral 
lesson, Nashe here reduces the benefit of reading almost exclusively to the moral profit 
achieved through didactic admonition.  As such, literature which is morally unclear is more 
apt to lead to the reader’s descent into sin than to his ascent to virtue.  Nashe urges his reader 
to be on guard against this seductive literature, educating himself in order to distinguish 
between texts which merely promise morality and those which deliver moral lesson.   
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Nashe offers his Anatomie as a text very concerned with increasing the reader’s 
discretion through its emphasis upon the educational experience of not only university 
students, but readers in general.  Largely adapting his arguments from humanist educational 
tracts such as Roger Ascham’s The Schoolmaster and Thomas Elyot’s Boke Named the 
Governor, Nashe attempts to balance the benefit of wide reading with its liabilities.140  Both 
of these educational texts argue that good literature presents the delight of divinity and the 
allurement to learning.  More so than Ascham and even Elyot, however, Nashe acknowledges 
that such profit often is obscured and difficult to decipher; but, he argues that, in the end, the 
hardest poetry hides the most beneficial lessons.  For Nashe, the struggle and the reward is 
proportionate.  He assures his reader that “in Poems, the thinges that are most profitable, are 
shrouded under the Fables that are most obscure” (I: 26).  Unlike his earlier, more ambivalent 
use of “shroude,” Nashe here alludes only to “shrouded” as a veil or concealment. Simply 
put, the most profitable lessons must be hunted in obscure and difficult places.  Nashe paints 
a path to truth very similar to that represented in the emblematic Choice of Hercules:  it is 
through the submission of the will to virtue and the ascent up “the steepe, and craggie hill,” 
of righteousness that the reader “is sure / For his rewarde, to have a crowne of fame.” 141  
Importantly, Nashe is careful to insist upon the relative slowness of the ascent to learning.142  
Because such fables and obscurity must be deciphered and digested by a knowledgeable 
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 These texts offer a paradigm of education focused upon the bringing up of England’s noblemen for the 
purposes of their service to the commonwealth.  The tracts emphasize the sheltering of the youth until an age of 
reason, agreeing that before the age of adolescence, the governor should absent vice from curriculum and 
nursery.  After such an age, however, the tracts disagree about the best approach for the education of the 
gentlemen.   
 
141
 Geffrey Whitney, A Choice of Emblems (Brookfield, Vermont: Scolar Press, 1989), 40.   
 
142
 Nashe’s emphasis on the caution of the youth is akin to the hill of virtue described in the ekphrastic Tablet of 
Cebes, which demonstrates the Pythagorean Y:  more forgiving than the stoic model, the Tablet describes that 
the youth may put himself on the right path at various points, working his way towards virtue through caution 
and perseverance.   
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reader, Nashe advises his reader to proceed up virtue’s hill with caution.  Much like Ascham 
and Elyot before him, Nashe cites poetry as a delightful allurement to learning, but he 
deliberately constructs a more complicated relationship between such interpretive trial and 
his reader’s discretion than those offered in existing humanist educational tracts.  Nashe’s 
observation regarding the raw power of poetry and the necessity of cautious interpretation 
leads him to outline more carefully the educational program he would advance in England in 
the second half of his text.  
Nashe is largely ambivalent as to whether the digestion and interpretation of all texts 
should be undertaken by all students.  He waffles between utter confidence in the reader’s 
self-sufficiency and anxiety about the damage which may be caused by a too hasty 
interpretive trial. 143   First, Nashe posits that profit can be found in all literature: “even as the 
Bee out of the bitterest flowers and sharpest thistles gathers honey, so out of the filthiest 
Fables, may profitable knowledge be sucked and selected” (I: 30).  Assuming the common 
Renaissance metaphor of the bee gathering nectar, Nashe’s argument for the sufficiency of 
his reader figures knowledge (nectar) in terms of humanist precepts, to be compiled and put 
to use in the making of a gentleman (honey).144  In this way, his own Anatomie attempts to 
mirror the very profit he outlines, with his advertisement for the text emphasizing the 
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 In his Schoolmaster, Roger Ascham posits that such interpretive discretion figures more as the exception 
than the rule:  “And although I have seen some, innocent of all ill and staid in all honesty, that have used these 
things [translations of morally dubious texts] without all harm and without suspicion of harm, … yet if the 
meaning and manners of some that do use them were somewhat amended, it were no great hurt neither to 
themselves nor to others” (74). Thomas Elyot seems more optimistic in his Boke Named the Governor, positing 
that once a man is educated properly, he may cull profit from most any work.  See Thomas Elyot, The Boke 
Named the Governour, Vol. 1, ed. Henry Herbert and Stephen Croft (New York: Burt Franklin, 1967), 14-29. 
 
144
 This metaphor seems to recall a particularly humanist concern for precept and adages, likening a humanist 
emphasis upon copia and the copying out of adages and phrases in commonplace books to the gathering of 
nectar.  See Erasmus, Parabolae: “The bee flies everywhere, and carries home what she can use; and a studious 
man extracts from his reading what will make him better” (168). 
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gathering and storing of such knowledge in the reader’s memory.  The Anatomie embodies 
the very profit Nashe would promote to his readers.   
Nashe immediately qualifies his initial claim for his reader’s self-sufficiency, 
however, momentarily disqualifying untutored youths from ungoverned literary endeavors.  
For Nashe, although mature readers may contain the judgment necessary to cull the profit of 
virtue from the poison of vice, young students should be sheltered from the possible damage 
inflicted by unscrupulous reading. He clarifies his earlier claim of self-sufficiency, stating, 
“Neverthelesse, tender youth ought to be restrained for a time from the reading of such 
ribauldrie, least chewing over wantonlie the eares of this Summer Corne, they be choaked 
with the haune before they can come to the kernel” (I: 30).  Importantly, it is the manner of 
the youth’s reading (eating) which causes Nashe anxiety.  While Nashe refers to the text as 
ribaldry, he also acknowledges that it contains profitable kernels meant to be digested by 
knowledgeable readers.145  He complicates Ascham’s narrow restriction against a youth’s 
ungoverned reading by insisting that the “chewing” of the youth is wanton, rather than the 
ribaldry of the text itself. 146   Nashe asserts the flaw of youth to be a temporary one, 
characterized by heady and rash behavior which can be altered with education and corrected 
if necessary.147   Nashe argues that the reading of youth should be governed so that they may 
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 In a similar vein, Spenser emphasizes the half-digested books of Error in the initial episode of The Faerie 
Queene: “Her vomit full of bookes and papers was, / With loathly frogs and toades, which eyes did lacke” 
(I.i.20, 6-7).  Through his allegory, Spenser perhaps implies that Error would not be Error if the books were 
fully digested.  See Edmund Spenser, The Faerie Queene, ed. A.C. Hamilton (New York: Longman Press, 
1977), 35. 
 
146
 Unlike Nashe, Ascham argues for the complete sheltering of England’s populace against “bad” texts.  
Specifically, he dislikes Italian romances:  “Suffer these books to be read, and they shall soon displace all books 
of godly learning.  For they … shall easily corrupt the mind with ill opinions and false judgment” (69).  
 
147
 Nashe’s portrayal of youth deciding between virtue and vice complicates the choice of Hercules by allowing 
for mistake and correction, more embracing the ekphrastic description of the Tablet of Cebes.  The Pythagorean 
Y of the emblem dictates that the youth (Hercules) must choose his path and, once the choice is made, may not 
deviate.  Should he choose vice and pleasure, he will end in only repentance.  Should he choose virtue, he will 
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learn how to digest fully the profitable parts of the summer corn; but, as Nashe implies, in 
time the youth will grow to be a self-sufficient, discreet reader.148  
Nashe advises that the discretion of the reader be built up slowly, making solid the 
reader’s ability to distinguish between profit and poison, but hesitates to commit to how such 
a skill may be developed.  Nashe states that any reader seeking profit from such texts must be 
able to discern the kernel from the husk, the pearl from the pebble:  “He that wil seeke for a 
Pearle, must first learne to knowe it when he sees it, least he neglect it when hee findes it, or 
make a nought worth peeble his Jewell” (I: 30).149  Nashe’s conception of education here 
seems largely to hinge upon his use of discretio, defined by Thomas Elyot as “a separation 
… Sometime election of good from ill.”150 On the one hand, such discretion may be arrived 
at through learned precept, which may help order experience and enable the youth make 
better sense of the world.151  On the other hand, discretion may resemble the virtue of 
                                                                                                                                                       
end happily and with a crown of fame.  Nashe’s education of his reader does not adhere rigidly to such a 
perspective, making room for the ongoing process of learning.  See George Wither, Collection of Emblems 
Ancient and Modern  (London: Printed by A.M. for Robert Allot, 1635), 22.  
 
148
 In his emphasis upon the progressive growth of the reader through education, Nashe seems more in line with 
Elyot than Ascham.  Elyot figures the growth of the reader into maturity by recalling the Latin, “maturitas,” 
meaning ripening, a process by which reason is refined and confirmed through both precept and experience: 
“And whan a man is comen to rype yeres, and that reason in him is confirmed with serious learning and longe 
experience: than shall be in reading tragedies execrate and abhorre the intolerable life of tyrants: And shall 
condemne the foly and dotage expressed by poetes lascivious” (I: 30).  
  
149
 Erasmus emphasizes the commonality of the pebble in his own comparison in his prefatory letter to Pieter 
Gillis: “I have not chosen what was ready to hand, not picked up pebbles on the beach; I have brought forth 
precious stones from the inner treasure house of the Muses” (Parabolae, 131). 
 
150
 Thomas Elyot, The dictionary of syr Thomas Eliot knight (London: 1538), 35. Emblems for discretion 
emphasize its difficulty, but do not elaborate upon how it may be attained or perfected:  for example, Geffrey 
Whitney’s A Choice of Emblemes (1586) argues “That harde it is, the good from bad to trie: / The prudent sorte, 
shoulde have suche judgement sounde, / That still the good they shoulde from bad descrie: / And sifte the good, 
and to discerne their deedes, / And weye the bad, noe better then the weedes” (Geoffrey Whitney, A Choice of 
Emblemes (Brookfield, Vermont: Scolar Press, Gower Publishing Co., Ltd, 1989), 68.) 
 
151
 In The Schoolmaster, Ascham argues for the committing of precept to memory before undertaking personal 
experience: “Learning, therefore, ye wise fathers, and good bringing-up, and not blind experience, is the next 
and readiest way that must lead your children, first to wisedom and then to worthiness, if ever ye purpose they 
shall come there” (52). 
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prudentia, which implies a knowledge of the world gained by experience, both perhaps the 
objective experience of histories and the subjective experience of the individual.152  Nashe’s 
insistence upon the reader’s learning of discretion would later lead him to argue for the more 
empirical instruction offered by interpretive trial and cause him to abandon the type of rote 
precepts he applauds in the Anatomie.  Here, however, he carefully argues only the idealized 
half of discretion, implicitly urging his readers to acquaint themselves only with profit, and to 
shun all vice.  Nashe focuses on recognizing the Pearl, not the Pebble, thus confining his 
praise of discretion to only profitable kernels, refusing to tempt his readers by instructing 
them in the ways of  vice.   
Further retreating from advocating the ungoverned experience of reading, Nashe 
reaffirms the role of precept over experience in his return to the fatherly voice, admonishing 
the prodigal reader to build up his discretion. He positions himself as the voice of instruction 
and government, arguing for the necessity of solid knowledge before the reader attempts to 
engage texts which aim to challenge his discretion.153  Casting the over-hasty reader as a 
                                                 
152
 Geffrey Whitney’s emblem for Prudence offers the typical Janus figure, looking back in order to best judge 
the events of the future; he describes the figure as having regard: “as hee sees, the yeares both oulde, and newe, 
/ So, with regarde, I may these partes behoulde, / Perusinge ofte, the newe, and eeke the oulde … his lookes did 
teache this somme; / To beare in minde, time past, and time to comme” (108).   
 
153
 Ascham argues for a similar definition of admonitory learning in The Schoolmaster, urging youth to listen to 
the advice of their elders, trusting in their experience instead of seeking their own: the true scholar will be “glad 
to hear and learn of another.  For otherwise he shall stick with great trouble where he might go easily forward, 
and also catch hardly a very little by his own toil when he might gather quickly a good deal by another man’s 
teaching” (30). In his Zodiake of Life (London: Robert Robinson, 1588), Palingenius argues for his readers to 
pursue prudence through advice: “Sapience to Angels doth belong, and Gods above you see: / Where onely 
Prudence dothe pertaine to men that mortall bee. / Whereby they may take good advice from harmes and hurts 
to flie / And gather things that may give aide, and live here quietlie. / What thing to doe, and what to leave, to 
man doth prudence show: / Therefore who wisheth well to live, and eke where thornes doe grow / With feete 
unpricked for to goe, let him seeke her to know.”  Palingenius distinguishes between sapience (heavenly 
knowledge) and prudence (earthly), offering prudence as a means of easing our lives rather than attaining 
knowledge of moral virtue or heavenly pursuits (97).   
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cautionary tale, Nashe returns to portray the reader as the prodigal son in need of discretion 
and admonition: 
They that covet to picke more precious knowledge out of Poets 
amorous Elegies, must have a discerning knowledge, before 
they can aspire to the perfectiỡ of their desired knowledge, 
least the obtaining of trifles be the repentant end of their travel. 
(I: 30) 
 
Noting that the pursuit of knowledge in dangerous mediums often ends badly, Nashe aligns 
the willful boldness of youth with the fate of the prodigal son.  He refigures the scriptural 
parable to condemn not the search for material wealth, but the overzealous search for 
knowledge.  Outlining a causal relationship which positions the achievement of discretion 
before the reader’s trial, Nashe insists upon his reader’s maturity and sufficiency of 
knowledge before he tests himself with dangerous amorous texts.  Nashe does not dismiss 
experience and trial wholly, however; while the reader must first have discretion before he 
adds experience, he will never reach the “perfection of [his] desired knowledge” without the 
experience of difficult interpretive trial.154  Nashe’s emphasis upon perfection and his use of 
harvest imagery in the passage recalls Elyot’s Latinate maturitas, positing that each step of 
growth as necessary for the reader.   For Nashe, if the maturation process is thwarted, the 
result will reduce the prodigal reader to repentance.   
More so than his later works, An Anatomie of Absurditie argues for the educational 
benefit offered by admonition, guiding the reader through the world by advice and precept 
passed down from a godly father-figure.  Even in the heavily didactic Anatomie, however, 
Nashe cannot wholly disavow the power of interpretive experience.  In order to achieve full 
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 Palingenius seems to entertain both knowledge based on learning and knowledge based on experience, 
emphasizing the need for youths to study in order to achieve their intellectual potential; however, his wording 
emphasizes the application and use of knowledge: “On bookes with study for to looke, applying day by day. / 
For otherwise can none be learned except with untrue fame, / For fewe are learned now in deede, but many are 
in name” (96). 
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interpretive knowledge, Nashe’s readers must hazard interpretive uncertainty to reach a more 
perfect knowledge brought through particular experience, rather than knowledge which has 
sacrificed particulars to generalization and abstraction.  By the time of his publication of 
Pierce Penilesse His Supplication to the Divell, Nashe’s growing emphasis upon the 
constructed nature of experience causes him to abandon the didacticism of precept to favor a 
more particular, applicable knowledge. Nashe’s previous voice of admonition drops out of 
Pierce Penilesse entirely and is replaced by the author’s full embrace of the prodigal pose, a 
pose which disavows the moral authority of the satirist, reducing the authorial voice to a 
bankrupt poet ready to sell his soul to the Devil for a thousand pounds. 
 
Pierce Penilesse His Supplication to the Divell 
In his later tracts, Thomas Nashe refashions the admonitory tone of An Anatomie of 
Absurditie into colloquies of morally bankrupt personae, all incapable of projecting the 
conventional moral authority needed for a strict satire of society’s ills.  He transforms his 
authorial presence from his first major publication—a tract characterized by its investment in 
satire’s ability to elicit reformation—into numerous postures which disavow the profit of 
abstract admonition and divorce satire and the satirist from moral righteousness.  Within two 
years of An Anatomie’s printing, Nashe would pen his most popular tract among early 
modern audiences, Pierce Penilesse His Supplication to the Divell, a text in which Nashe 
begins to challenge the nature of moral authority and the profit of satire.  In this text, Nashe 
deliberately frustrates his readers’ expectation of satire’s moral profit by constructing his text 
with a distinct lack of a moral center or compass.  At almost every opportunity, Nashe 
prevents his reader’s passive receipt of didactic moral lesson, substituting An Anatomie’s 
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persona of righteous admonition with the unlikely voices of prodigality and criminality. 
Through these distinctly “low” voices, Nashe privileges the reader’s interpretive experience 
of the text over the didactic power of the narrative, creating for his text an active readership 
invested in increasing their own discretion. Despite his rejection of passive didacticism in his 
own text, Nashe cannot disavow wholly the didactic power of all literature.  Within Pierce’s 
supplication, he continues to praise poetry and drama as vehicles of inspiration and virtue, 
urging his audience to read poetry and attend plays in order to acquaint themselves with both 
virtue and vice.  While he deliberately thwarts moral lesson in his own tract, he leaves open 
the possibility that other literature may inspire righteous behavior in London’s wayward 
population.  
In 1592, the publisher of Pierce Penilesse His Supplication to the Divell printed the 
text with a title page very similar to that advertising An Anatomie of Absurditie, identifying 
the tract as participating in the prodigal tradition and scripting for Nashe’s readers a narrative 
of repentance leading to moral profit.  The tract promises its readers a discussion of the seven 
deadly sins, demonstrating the tract’s reliance upon classic precept and medieval admonition.   
The subtitle of the first edition, printed by Richard Jones, pledges that the text will describe 
“the over-spreading of Vice, and suppression of Vertue. Pleasantly interlac’d with variable 
delights: and pathetically intermixt with conceipted reproofs” (I: 149).155  This language 
publicizes the tract as morally profitable, specifically offering the reader pleasure and 
precepts in the form of “delights” and “conceipted reproofs” and satisfying the public’s 
expectation of moral didacticism. While it remains unclear whether this edition was indeed 
“pirated” as Nashe claims, the authorial changes made to the prefatory matter in Pierce 
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 For her discussion of the publication history of Pierce Penilesse, I am heavily indebted to Lorna Hutson, 
Thomas Nashe in Context (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 176-180. 
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Penilesse’s second printing indicate that Nashe took umbrage with the printer’s “impudence” 
in altering his prescribed format (I,153).156  To his new edition, Nashe appends “A private 
Epistle of the Author to the Printer,” correcting the original publication for the new printing: 
Now this is that I woulde have you to do in this second edition; 
First, cut off that long-tayld Title, and let mee not in the 
forefront of my Booke, make a tedious Mountebanks Oration 
to the Reader, when in the whole there is nothing praise-
worthie. (I: 153)    
 
While assuming the language of humility, Nashe dismisses the prodigal subtitle of his text as 
a “long-tayld Title” and replaces the printer’s promise of profit with a bare title and the 
aggressive motto Barbaria grandis habere nihil.157  In his insistence that the new tract lack 
an interpretive frame which prescribes a certain way of reading, Nashe rejects the very 
concept of reader expectation and argues against the contemporary humanist emphasis upon 
literature’s profit and utility, an emphasis Nashe himself fully had embraced in his Anatomie 
of Absurditie.  Lorna Hutson reads this editorial change as Nashe’s attempt to “shock readers 
into thinking for themselves” and to deflate the emphasis given to typical prefatory material 
in interpreting obscure texts.158  More specifically, Nashe’s textual change parodies the 
flimsy didacticism popular in commercial literature of the 1580s.159  He omits the prefatory 
                                                 
156
 Hutson reads Nashe’s explanation as genuine and the second edition as the reliable authorial text (176-177). 
 
157
 The motto comes from Ovid’s Amores, III.vii, which Marlowe translates as “Wit sometimes was more 
precious than gold / Now poverty great barbarism we hold” (qtd. in Hutson, 176).  The motto is very different in 
intention from the Christian one advertising An Anatomie: “Ita diligendi sunt homines, ut eorum non diligamus 
errors,” translated as “So human beings should be loved, although we do not love their errors” (I: 3) 
 
158
 Ibid. 
 
159Robert Greene is notoriously prodigal in his autobiographical prefaces and introductions: in his Greenes 
Never Too Late, he promises the repentance of his protagonist and himself—the text is a thinly veiled 
biography—urging his reader to “race out idlenesse with delight and follie with admonition” (IIX: 3). In 
Greenes Mourning Garment, he asserts his earnestness in abandoning prose romance: “though [his repentance] 
be Sero, yet is it Serio, and though my showers come in Autumne, yet thinke they shall continue the whole 
year” (IX: 123). In Greenes farewell to Follie, he promises to renounces romance for morally efficacious satire: 
“it is the last I meane ever to publish of such superficiall labours”(IX: 228-229).  References for Greene are to 
104 
 
material of his own work to frustrate the reader’s desire for an omnipotent authorial voice 
who would instruct the reader as to the proper interpretation of the text.  Without prefatory 
matter claiming the superficial righteousness of an authorial voice, Nashe promises his reader 
only the experience of reading, trusting only experience to educate the reader and increase 
his discretion. 
Juxtaposing the popular medieval format of the seven-deadly sins with a parodic 
supplication to the devil, Pierce Penilesse challenges its audience as a hybrid text.  In 
adapting the homiletic form, Nashe interrogates the power of didacticism to reform its 
audience.  He constructs his text deliberately to disorient his reader, insisting that the reader 
struggle through the experience of Pierce Penilesse, a text which embodies complicated 
notions of prudence and discretion.  The result is a satiric hodge-podge that thwarts 
expectation and tries interpretation.160  The seven-deadly sins paradigm employed by Nashe 
at first glance appears to embrace the educative value of precept over experience, prescribing 
for the reader a well-known litany of sins and their effects.161  However, the didacticism 
implicit in Pierce’s homiletic supplication rings hollow in its attempt to reform society.  
While Nashe continues to have recourse to Erasmean source material, pulling from his 
Parabolae and Adages to admonish his targets for Greed, Pride, Envy, Wrath, Gluttony, 
Sloth, and Lechery, he does not allow the power of such didactic admonition to go 
                                                                                                                                                       
The Life and Complete Works in Prose and Verse of Robert Greene, 15 vols., ed. A.B. Grosart (New York: 
Russell & Russell, 1964).  
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 Neil Rhodes reads the type of hybridity found in Pierce Penilesse as evidence for his theory of the grotesque, 
seeing Nashe as exemplifying the grotesque’s juxtaposition of the extraordinary with the low or benign.  For his 
discussion of the grotesque in sixteenth-century prose, see The Elizabethan Grotesque (Boston: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1980), 3-18. 
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 For his discussion of the history of the seven deadly sins paradigm, see Morton W. Bloomfield, The Seven 
Deadly Sins: An Introduction to the History of a Religious Concept, with Special Reference to Medieval English 
Literature (East Lansing, Michigan: State College Press, 1952), 69-121. 
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unquestioned.  While adhering to the generic restraints of the sermon, Nashe overturns the 
didacticism of the form he would co-opt, deflating the instructional power of the medieval 
seven deadly sins paradigm through his choice of “authorial” personae and his fictional 
audience of the devil.162  As Lawrence Manley argues, the “logic of the paradoxical 
encomium” enables Nashe to create a Supplication that is “a praise and celebration of the 
seemingly indefensible.”163  Resisting the urge to instruct his readers how specifically to read 
his text, Nashe argues for the development of interpretive prudence, demanding his reader 
struggle through the Supplication.  In doing so, Nashe recalls a sense of discretion similar to 
Aristotle’s phronêsis, or practical knowledge.  For Aristotle, this type of knowledge arises 
only from examples of deliberation, questioning the validity of general rules and privileging 
the reader’s experience.164  While prudence will not eschew wholly the type of knowledge 
that can be gained through general principles or truths, it subordinates such generalization to 
knowledge gained from particulars and deliberation.165  In Pierce Penilesse, Nashe privileges 
the process of deliberation over rule.  He will amass for the young reader the experiences of 
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 Lorna Hutson interprets Pierce Penilesse similarly, emphasizing Nashe’s mockery of disingenuous morality 
in order to parody the patronage system upon which he unhappily depends: “confessing the emptiness of the 
moralizing posture on which a successful bid for patronage depends, going on to turn the frustration of this 
knowledge into a carnival pleasure by openly acknowledging his patron is the devil, and bequeathing him, … 
all the irrelevant stock phrases under which individual profit masquerades as moral reformation” (180)   
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 Lawrence Manley, Literature and Culture in Early Modern London (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), 333.  
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deliberation.  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Hugh Rackham (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1934), 345-347. 
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his text, withholding his own authorial presence and interpretation, replacing his voice with 
the voice of Pierce Penilesse.       
 Through his persona of Pierce, Nashe demonstrates abstract precept to be wholly 
inapplicable to the fluctuating particulars of life.  In the most obvious invalidation of precept, 
Pierce ironically attempts to instruct the devil in sin and virtue by dedicating his homiletic 
prose to him, and, in doing so, deflates the educational value of admonition.  Any profit that 
might be gained by his rote representation of the seven deadly sins and satiric diatribes is re-
scripted by Pierce’s very purpose and authorial nature.  A diabolic sycophant, Pierce 
Penilesse “misreads” his audience and invalidates his own paradigm through his innate lack 
of moral authority.  Modern critics tend to dismiss Pierce as a disorderly construction meant 
to unify a text largely derived from equally disorderly jest-books, emphasizing the mimicry 
of Pierce rather than his originality, but such treatment of Pierce undervalues the role he 
plays in the work, reducing him to a vehicle for vice.166  Pierce works as far more than a 
mere cipher; he demonstrates Nashe’s commitment to devaluing the nature of general 
principle in favor of more applicable experience. Pierce routinely emphasizes the particulars 
of situations rather than their adherence to an abstract rule:  he rewrites the seven deadly sins 
in an unexpected way; likewise, he himself is an unexpected narrator.  Pierce is a fool and a 
malcontent, but more than anything else, he is an unrepentant prodigal.     
 Beginning and ending his tract in the pose of the prodigal son—unthrifty, rebellious 
and lacking in conventional moral authority—Pierce adopts the persona in order to highlight 
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 McKerrow argues for the tract’s “utter want of unity and definite plan” and states that “the original idea, that 
of a petition to the devil, is almost lost in a mass of scarcely relevant satire” (V: 18).  Stephen Hilliard likens the 
voice of Pierce Penilesse to the voice of Dick Tarleton and the jest-book tradition, adding to that a dash of 
Robert Greene, and a bit of discontentment.  Likewise, Hutson continually dismisses Pierce as a “diabolic 
buffoon” (174).  Stephen Hilliard, The Singularity of Thomas Nashe (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1986), 66-69. 
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the emptiness of its gestures.167   While he introduces himself and his tract through his 
posture of a repentant prodigal, he undercuts the earnestness of his penitence even as he 
asserts it.  Mimicking the didactic lessons professed by reformed prodigals, Pierce claims 
that he has learned from the mistakes of his youth and will be more cognizant of folly in the 
future.  He promises a narrative built on confession and the achievement of moral lesson, but 
cannot commit completely to a life as a profitable citizen: 
Having spent many yeeres in studying how to live, and liv’de a 
long time without mony: having tired my youth with follie, and 
surfetted my minde with vanitie, I began at length to looke 
backe to repentaunce, & addresse my endevors to prosperitie: 
But all in vaine. (I: 157)  
 
In his emphasis upon the folly of his youth and his mind’s previous preoccupation with 
vanity, Pierce assumes the language of the scriptural parable, but works to negate the very 
lesson offered by the prodigal son.  In his assertion that he spent “many yeeres in studying 
how to live,” Pierce argues against the value of admonition and precept, demonstrating the 
inefficacy of abstraction in the face of real experience.  Instead, Pierce emphasizes the 
educational power of the prodigal’s riotous living, relating his repentance to his full 
experience of folly in his youth.  Learning the wrong lesson from the parable, Pierce implies 
that it is only after indulgence, not study, that reformation may occur.  Like the prodigal 
son’s willful dismissal of his father’s godly advice, Pierce does not learn from precept, but 
from his mistakes.  Adopting the posture of repentance without the benefit of genuine 
reformation, Pierce attempts to fashion moral authority from the prodigal confession of his 
sins, but undercuts the sincerity of such confession even as he asserts his “earnest” 
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 Stephen Hilliard argues that Nashe adopts the persona of the prodigal Pierce to demonstrates his 
discontentment with society without risking the charge of railing. As a result, he reads the pose as mostly 
genuine (63-66).  What this reading omits is the prominence of the prodigal motif throughout his  introduction, 
supplication, and even in the reaction of his fictional reader, the Knight of the Post. 
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repentance.  He is a willful prodigal—selling his own repentance for a monetary reward:  
having gained all he can from his prodigal indulgence in sin, Pierce will now address himself 
to “prosperitie.”  The prodigal Pierce does not look for spiritual succor like his scriptural 
source, who throws himself upon the mercy of his godly father.  Rather, Pierce desires 
monetary fulfillment.  With his apathetic “But all in vaine,” Pierce negates the possibility of 
reformation before it has even begun.  
Pierce’s only direct reference to the prodigal son emphasizes the problem posed by 
Christ’s parable, demonstrating Pierce’s vexed interpretation of scripture.  Nashe develops 
and expands Pierce Penilesse’s adopted persona throughout the text, calling attention to 
Pierce’s revision of Christ’s parable, which highlights the ingenuity of the prodigal over his 
repentance and thus negates the narrative’s admonitory power.   Diminishing the didactic 
value of the parable, Pierce first omits all mention of the father’s godly advice to his 
wayward son in his revision, making the prodigal’s ruin almost inevitable.  Next, he 
questions the sincerity of repentance in general, interrogating the corruption of human will 
brought about by the fall of Adam, a trespass which makes earnest repentance impossible 
without divine mercy.  Finally, Pierce intrudes into the narrative alternately to sympathize 
with the prodigal and castigate him for his sin, positioning his voice as authorial and 
correctly “interpreting” the revised parable for his reader.  Through his revision and 
interpretation of the prodigal son parable, Pierce showcases the inapplicability of admonition. 
Within his narrative of Pride, Pierce constructs a conventional portrait of the prodigal 
son, initially portraying the young gallant as an ungrateful and effeminate spendthrift who 
feels entitled to the monetary treasure of the world. In the context of his supplication, Pierce 
particularizes the prodigal to be a young gallant who wastes his precious resources in the 
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Inns of Court and London and idly rails at his lack of fortune.  Inconsolable and discontented, 
the prodigal swears that he will leave England and will travel by ship to Spain, fulfilling the 
narrative’s requirement for foreign travel.  At first, Pierce adheres pretty strictly to the 
sequence of events laid out by the scripture, setting up the expectation of repentance, 
followed by spiritual renewal and moral lesson.  But, Pierce thwarts the didactic expectation 
of the narrative, quickly refashioning the remainder of the parable to undercut such profitable 
resolution.  The pure satiric force of the passage makes it worth quoting in full:  
  And when [the prodigal] comes there, poore soule, hee lyes in 
brine, in Balist, and is lamentable sicke of  the scurvies: his 
dainty fare is turned to a hungry feast of Dogs & Cats, or 
Haberdine and poore John at the most, and which is 
lamentablest of all, that without Mustard. 
  As a mad Ruffion, on a time, being in daunger of ship-wrack 
by a tempest, and seeing all other at their vowes and praiers, 
that if it would please God, of his infinite goodnesse, to delyver 
them out of that imminent daunger, one woulde abiure this 
sinne wher unto he was addicted; an other, make satisfaction 
for that vyolence he had committed: he, in a desperate jest, 
began thus to reconcile his soule to heaven. 
  O Lord, it may seeme good to thee to deliver me from this 
feare of untimely death, I vowe before thy Throne and all thy 
starry Host, never to eate Haberdine more whilest I live. 
  Well, so it fell out, that the Sky cleared and the tempest 
ceased, and this carelesse wretch, that made such a mockery of 
praier, readie to set foote a Land, cryed out: not without 
Mustard, good Lord, not without Mustard: as though it had 
beene the greatest torment in the world, to have eaten 
Haberdine without Mustard.  But this by the way, what 
penance can be greater for Pride, than to let it swing in its own 
halter? Dulce bellum inexpertis.   (I: 171) 
 
Through his insistence that “what penance can be greater for Pride, than to…swing in its own 
halter” Pierce attempts to conclude his fable of the prodigal son with a neat resolution 
condemning the prodigal’s selfish and unholy behavior.  According to Pierce’s authorial 
interpretation, because he suffers from Pride, the prodigal should suffer punishment for his 
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sin.  Pierce’s retelling of the prodigal fable does not bear out such a reading, however.  
Rather, the prodigal escapes danger with little sacrificed.  In short, Pierce demonstrates the 
inapplicability of didactic interpretation by appending an ill-fitting moral lesson onto his 
revision of the parable.  
Throughout his revision, Pierce continues to empty the parable of its didactic and 
admonitory value.  In it, the prodigal acts vilely, mocking the very nature of prayer, and in 
the place of earnest repentance, offering God a self-serving bargain, that of denying himself 
the “delicacy” of Haberdine.  It is only while he is afraid for his life that the prodigal prays to 
God like those around him, who were “at their vowes and praiers, that if it would please God, 
of his infinite goodnesse” to save them, they would amend their sinful lives.  While Pierce’s 
prodigal recognizes the form of prayer, he deliberately mistakes the content, substituting the 
promises of amendment with a meaningless dried fish.  The prodigal appears to parody the 
seemingly genuine repentance of the other sailors, mocking their godliness and showing 
himself to be morally destitute.  Within the context of his diabolic supplication, however, 
Pierce leaves the situation morally unclear.  On the one hand, the reader may condemn the 
prodigal harshly by reading him as an unholy villain for his “mockery of praier” and his 
presumptuous attempt to “reconcile his soul to heaven.”  As such, the prodigal is derided and 
hopefully serves as an admonition to readers against such vile behavior.  On the other hand, 
the prodigal may represent for Pierce an embodiment of human sinfulness.  The prodigal 
does not sacrifice to God anything of worth, denying himself a fish he will never desire; but, 
according to the Protestant insistence upon justification by faith alone, the other sailors offer 
no more than the prodigal, promising God only their own sin.  Neither deserve to be saved, 
but all are saved.  In his interpretation, Pierce ironically embodies more fully the didactic 
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power of the prodigal parable, demonstrating that post-lapsarian man can in no way reconcile 
himself to heaven, but must instead offer himself up to God’s mercy.  In comparing the 
prodigal to the other sailors, Pierce makes prodigality universal.   
 Pierce appends the Latin epigram Dulce bellum inexpertis to the prodigal fable, 
expressing the tension inherent in the didactic application of Christ’s parable.  As an emblem 
of God’s mercy to his undeserving creation, the prodigal son parable exists to reaffirm God’s 
love for humanity and his paternal kindness to sinners.  A problem arises, however, when a 
reader attempts to “use” the parable to govern his action.  While adaptations of the parable 
appear to argue for the youth’s adherence to the advice of the father, they also implicitly 
argue for the indulgence of experience as a necessary step for gaining knowledge and 
spiritual rebirth.  In a similar way, Pierce sympathizes with the prodigal, taking his side by 
admonishing the potential hypocrisy of the reader’s condemnation of the prodigal’s behavior.  
Insisting upon the value of experience in order to distinguish properly between good and evil, 
the acquaintance with both virtue and vice become necessary.  Pierce’s commentary 
regarding his revision of the parable bares this interpretation out.  Rather than insisting upon 
the prodigal’s confession at the conclusion of his fable, a resolution which would bring with 
it didactic admonition of the prodigal’s behavior, Pierce instead invalidates such didacticism 
by appending an inapplicable precept to his prodigal revision.  Once he has invalidated 
preceptoral knowledge as a legitimate way to order the world, Pierce is able to argue that true 
knowledge can be gained only by the particulars of experience.  He condemns the untried 
virtue for its hypocrisy: “It is a pleasante thing, over a full pot, to read the fable of thirsty 
Tantalus: but a harder matter to digest salt meates at Sea, with stinking water” (I: 171).  
Unlike his assertion in An Anatomie that precept acts to order existence and educate the 
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reader, in Pierce Penilesse, Nashe dismisses knowledge gained through precepts as 
knowledge largely untested.  He has replaced his previous emphasis upon reproducible 
knowledge with knowledge learned through interpretive exercise.  
Pierce pushes his argument for knowledge gained through experience still further, 
directly encouraging his reader to indulge in prodigality in order to increase his own sense of 
discretion.  Returning to his affirmation of experience, Pierce cites the knowledge of both 
virtue and sin as the only viable method of distinguishing good from evil.  Unlike his earlier 
claim in An Anatomie of Absurditie which urged only a positive sense of discretion, Nashe, 
through Pierce, now urges young men to engage in prodigal behavior as a means of building 
up their powers of discrimination.  In his discussion of Sloth, Pierce argues in support of the 
young London gallants who walk abroad in the world, gaining personal experience and 
profiting from their missteps.  He defends these prodigals and their behavior, asserting “how 
should a man know to eschew vices, if his own experience did not acquaint him with their 
inconvenience? Omne ignotum pro magnifico est: that villainy we have made no assasies in, 
we admire” (I: 210).  Here, Pierce privileges the knowledge of good and evil achieved 
through morally dubious behavior over that of more socially benign, but fundamentally 
unprofitable, pursuits.168  The experience of wrongdoing teaches and demystifies vice in a 
way that untried virtue cannot.169  Through Pierce’s insistence that gallants should indulge 
                                                 
168
 The Gesta Grayorum for 1594-1595 encouraged its members to indulge in a similar sampling in vice, 
advising the young men to “frequent the Theatre, and such like places of Experience; and resort to the better 
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 Under the guise of another fictional persona, Nashe urges his readers towards experience.  In An Almond for 
a Parrat, Cuthbert Curryknave serves the state in answering the poisonous pamphlets of Martin Marprelate, 
carefully differentiating between what he reads as his own righteous indignation and Martin Marprelate’s 
unrepentant railing. Curryknave repeats Marprelate’s attacks of the Bishops; but, lest his readers mistake the 
him for Martin Marprelate, Nashe is quick to clarify:  “Gentle reader, I give you but a tast of them by the waie, 
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sin, Nashe complicates the strict Aristotelian notion of prudence which argues for prudence’s 
virtue: distinguishing between mere “cleverness” and “prudence,” Aristotle insists that “the 
soul … cannot acquire the quality of Prudence without possessing Virtue.” 170  For Aristotle, 
while prudence ideally will embrace only the good, cleverness embraces vice.171  Nashe 
works from a more liberal definition of discretion, separating the instrument of prudence 
from the more dubious means which it is achieved.  For Nashe, discretion necessitates the 
experience of both the pearl and the pebble.  He reshapes the end of Aristotelian prudence 
from a means of achieving virtue to suit his ends: he refashions the virtuous action of 
prudence into profit, arguing the applicability of discretion to a humanist framework which 
lauds service to the state as the ultimate good.172   
 The satirist runs aground in his quest to profit the commonwealth, however.  In 
urging the indefensible—namely, the prodigality of the citizenry—the satirist loses his moral 
authority.  According to Nashe (this time in the voice of the Knight of the Post), satire is, 
itself, prodigal.  It will not bring about the reformation of its subject, nor will it profit the 
satirist.  At the conclusion of Pierce’s long supplication, the Knight of the Post confronts 
                                                                                                                                                       
that you may knowe them the next time you meete them in your dish, and learne to discerne a poysonous 
scorpion from a wholesome fish” (III: 348).  Nashe samples Marprelate’s vitriol to promote his reader’s 
discretion.  According to Nashe, in tasting the poysonous scorpion, the reader is better able to identify future 
raillery.  He weighs the danger of inflaming Martin Marprelate’s notoriety against the profit which may be 
gained in experiencing a small amount of his style.   
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 Nashe enlarges the benefit gained from negative experience from merely personal knowledge of good and 
evil to embrace the humanist paradigm of profiting the commonwealth as well.  He ironically recasts the 
prodigal behavior of youth into profitable service to the state.  He qualifies any harm the prodigal may come to, 
making his behavior and its consequences safely benign, and arguing that such behavior is justified through its 
unforeseen profit to young gallants and the commonwealth: “Besides, my vagrant Reveller haunts plaues, & 
sharpens his wits with frequenting the company of Poets: he emboldens his blushing face by courting fair 
women on the sodaine, and lookes into all Estates by conversing with them in publike places. … this livelie, 
wanton young Gallant, is like to proove the wiser man, and better member in the Common-wealth” (I: 210). 
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Pierce with his satire’s prodigality, dismissing Pierce’s creation as simple lunacy and 
misspent labor: 
A supplication calst thou this?  (quoth the Knight of the Post) it 
is the maddest supplication that ever I saw; me thinks thou hast 
handled all the seven deadly sinnes in it, and spared none that 
exceeds his limits in any of them.  It is well done to practice 
thy witte, but (I believe) Our Lord will cun thee little thanks for 
it. (I: 217) 
 
According to the Knight of the Post, the text will literally earn Pierce nothing; his satire 
represents time (mis)spent in mere recreation and will return no monetary profit to its author. 
Despite its castigation of the seven deadly sins and its attempt to reform society, Pierce’s 
satire is wholly prodigal.  The Knight reduces it to mere recreation, which invalidates its 
creation and publication as profitable activity.  Pierce’s treatment of the seven deadly sins, 
while thorough, can offer little compensation either from his diabolic patron or his 
readership.  This assertion by the Knight recalls Nashe’s anxious treatment of his satiric task 
in An Anatomie of Absurditie: through his remarks to Pierce, the Knight implicitly questions 
whether satire can hope to admonish the sins of society through the exposure and castigation 
of its vice. Whereas Nashe fights for satire’s ability to urge reformation in his previous tract, 
here, Pierce cannot refute the Knight’s dismissal of satire.  He merely changes the subject. 
At the close of Pierce’s and the Knight’s digressive narrative, Nashe himself finally 
enters the text to further question the nature of his satiric occupation.  Beginning with a 
jocular direct address to the reader, “Gentle Reader, tandem aliquando I am at leasure to 
talke to thee” (I: 239), Nashe’s epistle to the reader expresses anxiety regarding the power of 
moral didacticism to elicit reformation.  In it, Nashe consistently dodges authorial 
responsibility for his work through his adoption of a variety of morally low postures: he is 
first a “scurvy pedling Poet,” dragging the unwilling reader through Paul’s Churchyard (I: 
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239); then, he is a felon awaiting hanging for his crime of authorship (241); and lastly, he is a 
pen-pal to Aretino’s ghost, calling up the Scourge of Princes to rail upon the stingy patrons 
who will not sponsor his work (242).173  Through his persona of a criminal, Nashe refigures 
Pierce’s willful prodigality to more directly question the challenge posed by satire. 
In his epistle to the reader, Nashe argues for the metaphoric lowness of the satiric text 
by aligning his task as a satirist with the occupation of a thief.  Defending his decision to 
place his satiric apologia at the conclusion of the work rather than at its more conventional 
location, Nashe states, “a fellon never comes to his answere before the offence be 
committed” (I: 241).  In other words, Nashe, like any proper criminal, will wait for his 
reader’s indictment before he mounts his defense.  While he suggests through his metaphor 
that satire must be defended, the promise of his justification remains undelivered in the 
text.174    He can only problematize satire from the safe distance of metaphor. He equates his 
satiric achievement with horse-theft: “Wherefore, if I in the beginning of my Book should 
have come off with a long Apologie to excuse my selfe, it were all one as if a theefe, going to 
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steale a horse, should devise by the waie as he went, what to speake when he came at the 
gallows” (I: 241).  While this metaphor may represent a simple apology for his odd 
placement of the authorial epistle at the conclusion of his book, Nashe’s statement also 
engages the potential criminality of satire and the problem of Nashe’s own moral authority.  
He questions the legitimacy of his satiric occupation by equating his authorship of Pierce 
Penilesse with felonious action, specifically, a capital crime punishable by death.  Through 
his use of these comparisons, Nashe deliberately separates his low satiric occupation of 
exposing and diagnosing vice from the high inspirational qualities of poetry and drama, the 
didactic power of which he cannot bring himself to dismiss wholly.  
Despite his anxiety regarding his own artistic task, Nashe cannot be said to disavow 
completely the power of poetry to inspire virtue and instill righteousness in its audience.  
Rather, he seems to continue to regard poetry as profitable.  Demonstrated by his praise of 
Sir Philip Sidney in his opening of Pierce Penilesse and the admiration for Edmund Spenser 
with which he closes his text, Nashe harbors hope that the right literature can still return 
society to a grandeur similar to that of Eden.  Perhaps oddly, Nashe does not include himself 
in this group.  He idealizes both poets as the pinnacle of their profession and exemplars of 
virtue, but speaks of them as oddly separated from himself.  As an emblem of his praise and 
his anxiety, Nashe’s perception of poetry—perhaps not inappropriately—recalls the language 
of the most famous defense of poetry in the Renaissance.  In the context of Pierce’s 
supplication, Nashe affirms the utility of poetry in the commonwealth, maintaining Philip 
Sidney’s argument for the supremacy of the poet above all other professions.  For Nashe, 
poets and dramatists, more than chronographers and even ministers of God, are credited with 
the means to cleanse and purify rude speech and the power to inspire virtue.  In his 
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discussion of Wrath, Pierce aptly criticizes the enemies of poetry, castigating them for their 
jealousy of poets, a group in which Nashe does momentarily include himself: “they cannot 
sweeten a discourse, or wrest admiration from men reading, as we can, reporting the meanest 
accident” (my emphasis I: 194).  While potentially unable to assert his own art as worthy of 
likeness with Philip Sidney and Edmund Spenser, Nashe does position himself as opposed to 
the enemies of poetry, whom he speedily denounces.  After his invective against these 
“enemies of poetry,” he abandons his wrath to idealize poetry further as “the hunny of all 
flowers, the quintessence of all Sciences, the Marrowe of Witte, and the very Phrase of 
Angels,” and empowers poetry to inspire and affirm virtue: “The vertuous by [poets’] praises 
they encourage to be more virtuous” (I: 193-4).  Similarly, Pierce digresses to defend plays 
from those who would close down the playhouses for their perceived role in promoting 
idleness.  He lauds plays as reaffirmations of justice and righteousness, idealizations where 
the guilty are punished and the virtuous rewarded:   
In Playes, all coosonages, all cunning drifts over-guylded with 
outward holinesse, all strategems of warre, all the 
cankerwormes that breede on the rust of peace, are most lively 
anatomiz’d: they shew the ill successe of treason, the fall of 
hastie climbers, the wretched end of usurpers, the miserie of 
civill dissention, and how just God is evermore in punishing of 
murther. (I: 213)   
 
He recalls Sidney’s argument for literature’s power to display the actions of a  golden world, 
one unencumbered by historical fact and the corruptions which plague the iron age.  He 
closes his argument for the righteousness of drama with a statement which recalls his 
description of satire in An Anatomie of Absurdite: “[plays] are sower pills of reprehension, 
wrapt up in sweete words” (I: 213).  Mixing the profitable with the pleasant, righteous and 
inspirational literature offers examples of goodness to the reader.   
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While he embraces the power and pleasantness of poetry and drama in general, Nashe 
regards the profit of his own satiric task with a more jaundiced eye.  In speaking of the ability 
of the mode to elicit its subject’s reformation, Nashe widens the gulf between his own work 
and that of the poetry he praises in Pierce Penilesse, separating himself from the 
praiseworthy texts of Sidney and Spenser.  On the one hand, he praises satire as potentially 
the most authoritative mode and satirists as god-like in their power:  “[t]hose that care neither 
for God nor the Divell, by their quills are kept in awe” (I: 193).  Nashe’s praise of poetry 
here seems almost absolute.  More so than the specter of divinity or sin, satire has the means 
to discriminate between the righteous and corrupt in society, granting the mode control over 
fame and thereby threatening men into obeying the rules of order.  On the other hand, he 
reduces satire to mere libel, uninterested in the reformation of the wicked: “the vertuous by 
their praises they encourage to be more vertuous, [but] to vicious men they are as infernall 
hags, to haunt their ghosts with eternal infamie after death” (I: 193).  In this passage, satire 
can only maintain the status quo, it cannot threaten or cajole the vicious to adopt the ways of 
the virtuous.  Satire is not only impotent to educate or reform its audience, it is unconcerned 
with anything more than superficialities.  In this assessment, satire becomes little more than a 
vehicle for punitive injury to reputation.  Hardly the “hunny of all flowers,” satire shuns 
rehabilitation.  Importantly, Nashe gravitates to this darker view of satire in his treatment of 
his critics.  To his detractors, he threatens to unleash a sustained literary assault, leaving a 
monument “more lasting than bronze” to the infamy of his subject.  He promises his critics, 
“if I bee evill intreated, or sent away with a flea in my ear, let him looke that I will raile on 
him soundly: not for an houre or a day, whiles the injury is fresh in my memory, but in some 
elaborate, pollished poem, which I will leave to the world when I am dead, to be a living 
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image to all ages” (I: 195).  Nashe will rail rather than admonish.  The violence of Nashe’s 
attack serves as a reminder to his audience that, despite the commonplace regarding poetry’s 
ability to inspire virtue, the efficacy of satire as a means of reformation remains much more 
troublesome.   
In his first tract, The Anatomie of Absurditie, Nashe displays a confidence in his 
satiric task, assured of his moral authority and the profit of his occupation; however, in 
Pierce Penilesse, he begins to challenge the nature of the mode, divorcing moral authority 
from satire and complicating easy denunciations of vice.   In his later tracts, Nashe returns to 
the question of his satiric occupation. In The Unfortunate Traveller, he again adapts the 
persona of the prodigal to reject the power of admonition to bring about reformation and to 
mock the very nature of repentance in the fallen world.  Through his roguish clown, Jack 
Wilton, Nashe negates the ability of satire to accomplish the Herculean task of cleansing 
society of its overwhelming sin. 
 
The Unfortunate Traveller 
 
During his visit to Wittenberg, Jack and the Earl of Surrey witness a “scholastic 
entertainment” in honor of the Duke of Saxony.  According to Wilton’s appraisal, “The Duke 
laught not a little at this ridiculous oration, but that very night as great an ironicall occasion 
was ministred, for he was bidden to one of the chiefe schooles to a Comedie handled by 
scollers. Acolastus, the prodigal child, was the name of it” (II: 249).175  In referencing this 
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 First published in 1529, the heavily didactic Acolastus aimed to edify its audience of young schoolchildren 
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Traveller.  See J. Dover Wilson, “Euphues and the Prodigal Son,” The Library 10 (1909): 341. 
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particular prodigal son play, Nashe demonstrates the difficulty of rendering admonition 
applicable to its audience.   The play consists of four parts, namely the departure of the 
prodigal from his father’s house, his riotous living abroad, his growing poverty and 
repentance, and lastly, his reunion with his father and their celebration, but does not represent 
all parts equally.  Rather, almost three-fifths of the play are devoted to Acolastus’s dissolute 
rebellion, consisting of episodes showcasing the practices of parasites, conny-catchers, 
whores and bawds.  While the amount of time spent demonstrating the prodigal’s “riotous 
living” in the drama may seem disproportionate, the play, like many retellings of the prodigal 
son fable, casts the prodigal’s sinful indulgence as safely benign through its initial godly 
admonition to avoid such vice and the inevitable repentance and conversion of the prodigal; 
these didactic safe-guards undercut and christianize the riotous episodes of vice which 
otherwise may thwart the morally-edifying admonition of the parable.176  Not surprisingly, 
these safeguards fail before Jack.  
Jack Wilton easily ignores the didacticism of Christ’s parable.  Rather than gain 
moral edification from the show acted before him, Jack Wilton treats the moralistic drama as 
the ethical equivalent of any other evening’s entertainment.  He ignores the content of the 
parable, choosing instead to disparage aspects of performance.  He criticizes the show as “so 
filthily acted, so leathernly set forth, as would have moved laughter in Heraclitus” (II: 
249).177  According to Jack, the play’s moral didacticism is made no more effective than 
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farce.  He reduces the show to mere form and gesture, judging its artistry rather than its 
morality:   
One, as it he had ben playning a clay floore, stampingly trode 
the stage so harde with his feete that I thought verily he had 
resolved to do the Carpenter that set it up some utter shame. 
Another flong his armes lyke cudgels at a peare tree, insomuch 
as it was mightily dreaded that he wold strike the candles that 
hung above their heades out of their sockettes, and leave them 
all darke. Another did nothing but winke and make faces. 
There was a parasite, and he with clapping his handes and 
thripping his fingers seemed to dance an antike to and fro.  The 
onely thing they did well was the prodigall childs hunger, most 
of their schollers being hungerly kept; & surely you would 
have sayd they had bin brought up in hogs academie to larne to 
eate acorns, if you had seene how sedulously they fell to them.  
Not a jeast had they to keepe their auditors from sleeping but of 
swill and draffe; yes, nowe and then the servant put his hand 
into the dish before his master, & almost chokt himselfe, eating 
slovenly and ravenously to cause sport. (II: 249-250) 
 
Jack jocularly comments on his experience in the theater, distracting himself from the play’s 
moral lesson by criticizing the acting styles of the scholar-players, worrying about the 
construction and illumination of the stage, digressing to comment upon the dietary condition 
of the players, and finally pleading for more jests to entertain the sleepy audience.178  Simply 
put, the play does not succeed in spreading the Gospel to Jack. Instead of receiving the play’s 
moral lesson—one which would be particularly applicable to him—he can only “practice his 
wit” satirizing the actors. Through his description, he positions the didacticism of the 
prodigal son drama as a prodigal waste of time.  Left to amuse himself, Jack can only 
criticize the players for their bad form.  In this episode, Nashe points out the failure of drama 
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 Jack similarly disregards his very serious audience with Luther and Carolostadius, refusing to profit from his 
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to persuade, sharply contrasting his earlier assertion of its ability to inspire virtue.  While in 
Pierce Penilesse Nashe defends young men’s acquaintance with plays and poetry as 
profitable exercises for inspiring virtue, in The Unfortunate Traveller, they are, at best, a 
waste of time.   
As in his earlier texts, Anatomie of Absurditie and Pierce Penilesse, Nashe returns to 
the persona of the prodigal son in The Unfortunate Traveller, unifying the episodic world of 
Jack Wilton through its prevalent debauchery.  This time, however, Nashe adopts a more 
self-conscious approach to the scriptural narrative, reminding his audience of the prodigal 
son parable throughout the text.  Likening his protagonist to the anti-heroes of popular 
repentance literature, Nashe constructs Jack Wilton as a jocular swindler who fits the 
prodigal paradigm.  Much as he did in Pierce Penilesse, Nashe adapts the pattern of 
admonition, rebellion and repentance, but does so now in order to satirize the didactic 
authority of repentance narratives.  He evacuates the prodigal genre of its didactic safeguards 
of admonition and repentance, showcasing the inability of such narratives to reform their 
audience.  Instead, Nashe knowingly misrepresents the lessons of the parable: didactic 
admonition is weak, repentance is deceitful, and indulgence is fun.  This parodic deflation 
does not come without a price, however.   Nashe’s mockery of repentance narratives 
indirectly questions the ability of all didactic literature to reform its audience, even satire. In 
The Unfortunate Traveller, Nashe implicitly argues for a reconsideration of satire, removing 
it from its roots in medieval complaint and homiletic literature.  Through the persona of Jack 
Wilton, Nashe calls for satire to admit its impotence and abandon its undeliverable promises 
of edification and reform.   
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Most broadly, Jack’s narrative loosely conforms to Richard Helgerson’s model of 
Elizabethan prodigality, a didactic paradigm defined by the protagonist’s initial admonition 
by an elder, followed by his rebellion against the authority and advice offered, and closing 
with the protagonist’s repentance or imprisonment (or both).  The events of the parable 
attempt to present the riotous living of the prodigal within the didactic safeguards of his 
admonition by an elder and his contrition and repentance of his ill deeds.  Once reformed, the 
prodigal returns home, spiritually reborn from the ashes of his sin, and enjoys a feast 
celebrating his redemption.   
In The Unfortunate Traveller, the reader follows Jack through his prodigal travels on 
the Continent, where he repeatedly is admonished and imprisoned and, finally, claims 
repentance for his sins.  To summarize: Jack first gulls a Cider Merchant, for which he is 
whipped; undaunted, he cozens a Captain and Clerks; after leaving the war camp of Henry 
the Eighth and having exhausted his means of living, Jack contemplates returning to England 
but happily joins the retinue of the Earl of Surrey instead.  As Surrey and Jack idly travel 
throughout the Continent, they switch identities, are arrested for counterfeiting, meet a 
Courtesan in prison, get released, and continue to Italy. After he and Surrey part company, 
Jack cannot give up the disguise, claiming to be the Earl only to be admonished by Surrey for 
his presumption; Jack then continues on his prodigal journey, gets arrested on suspicion of 
rape and murder, and is almost hanged; on the scaffold, however, a Banished Earl offers 
testimony of Jack’s innocence, only to admonish him for his profitless travels; Jack ignores 
the banished English lord’s advice and later suffers imprisonment respectively by a Jew, an 
Anatomizer and the sexually insatiable Juliana.  After witnessing the graphic execution of 
Cutwolfe, Jack returns to the English court, claiming repentance for his prodigality:    
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Unsearchable is the booke of our destinies. … To such straight 
life did it thence forward incite me that ere I went out of 
Bolognia I married my curtizen, performed many almes 
deedes; and hasted so fast out of the Sodom of Italy, that within 
fortie daies I arrived at the king of Englands campe … and 
feasted many daies. (II: 328)  
 
The text closes with Jack’s insertion of a moral lesson and declaration of his reformation, 
seemingly returning Jack to the safe fold of the orthodoxy and completing his prodigal 
journey with his repentance and a feast.  
Despite his overall adherence to this prodigal paradigm, Nashe subtly alters the 
pattern in The Unfortunate Traveller.  The alterations help him to satirize early modern 
repentance narratives that profess moral edification but deliver debauchery.  The alterations 
are three.  First, pushing the humanist concern for literary profit to an absurd extreme, Nashe 
elevates his text’s utility, positioning his papers as serving the commonwealth as useful “wast 
paper,” fit for mustard pots, the storage of food and drink, and most importantly, toilet paper.  
In addition to mocking their claims of edification, Nashe also deflates the power of 
admonition in his own parodic text, demonstrating the weakness of the old, godly 
admonishers and their advice to the young prodigal.  Lastly, Nashe undercuts the final 
didactic safeguard of these texts, parodying the prodigal’s conversion through Jack Wilton’s 
promise of a sequel to his narrative of knavery. 
In his frame for The Unfortunate Traveller, Nashe parodies literature which claims 
for itself the easy profit of didacticism, elevating such use of the text to the point of 
absurdity.  In his introduction of Jack, Nashe admits to a vexed relationship with literary 
profit. He admittedly dismisses Jack’s text as prodigal, but qualifies his dismissal, adding that 
it is not wholly without profit.  Nashe first scripts for his readers the prodigal paradigm by 
alluding to Jack Wilton’s chronicle as “pages of his misfortunes,” framing the text as one of 
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repentance.  Creating the perception that Jack’s narrative will be a retrospective of his ill 
living culminating in an edifying scene of repentance, Nashe equates the text’s prodigality 
directly with its profit: “A proper fellow Page of yours called Jack Wilton … hath 
bequeathed for wast paper here amongst you certaine pages of his misfortunes” (II: 207).  
Nashe cannot stop there, however: he urges his reader, “In anie case keepe them preciously 
as a privie token of his good will towardes you” (II: 207).  Hinting at the mockery to come in 
the text, he juxtaposes contradictory theories about the value of literature, asserting that the 
chronicle should be kept “preciously” but also insisting that it is a “privie token of good 
will.”   
In a very literal way, Nashe urges his reader to make the text profitable, emphasizing 
the use of the text’s paper, not what is printed.179   Continuing to promote the physical 
properties of the chronicle, Nashe insists that the text be used “to stop mustard-pottes” and 
pleads with his readers to serve the commonwealth well with it: “To anie use about meat & 
drinke put them to and spare not, for they cannot doe theyr countrie better service” (II: 207).  
According to Nashe, The Unfortunate Traveller will be made profitable, serving the 
commonwealth as useful “wast paper.”   
Nashe further interrogates the didacticism implicit in the prodigal paradigm 
commonly used in repentance narratives by invalidating the moral authority of the 
supposedly godly admonishers who urge the prodigal to avoid “riotous living.” While Jack is 
routinely reprimanded for his prodigal behavior in The Unfortunate Traveller, the 
admonishers rarely command the moral authority necessary to reform the rogue to a morally 
profitable lifestyle, and more often than not, share in the blame assigned to Jack’s highjinks.  
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 For a discussion of Nashe’s introduction of Jack, see Mihoko Suzuki, “‘Signiorie over the Pages’: The Crisis 
of Authority in Nashe’s The Unfortunate Traveller,” Studies in Philology 81, no. 3 (1984): 348-371. 
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Within the world of the text, Jack is admonished multiple times with little promise of 
reformation:  early on, he is punished by the civil magistrates in the war camp of Henry the 
Eighth for his cozenage of the Cider Merchant; later, he is chastised by Henry Howard, Earl 
of Surrey for his presumptuous usurpation of the Earl’s identity; and lastly, Jack is advised 
by the Banished Lord to cease his prodigal traveling and to return home to England.  In each 
case, however, the authority of the supposedly godly admonisher is tainted by his own sin.  
Rather than reform their prodigal audience, their admonitions serve to reinforce the very 
riotous living they would admonish, erasing the moral difference between the righteous 
admonisher and the prodigal recipient of the advice.    
Early in the narrative, Nashe deflates the moral edification promised by admonition 
and corporal punishment by positioning the magistrates who reprimand Jack as complicit in 
his crime.  After he gulls the Cider Merchant, Jack is discovered and is “pitifully whipt for 
his holiday lye” by the king’s magistrates (II: 216).  In its purer forms, punishment intends to 
demonstrate both the heinous nature of the crime and the meting out of appropriate justice:  
according to Ronald Paulson, “punishment thus conveys a definite admonition,” showcasing 
the direct causal relationship between the crime and the punitive consequence.180  In addition, 
the edification offered by the administration of punishment reinforces the distinction between 
the beneficent orthodoxy and the riotous criminal who thwarts its rules.  More specifically, 
the corporal punishment of miscreants in early modern England “was seen as the most 
essential means of achieving order” among the potentially rebellious citizenry, strengthening 
the public perception of the orthodoxy as the ruling power of society through the public 
administration of justice.181  In contrast to this view of punishment as socially and morally 
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reaffirming, Jack opposes his punishment with his observation that although the magistrates 
punished him for his crimes, “they made themselves merrie with it manie a Winters evening 
after” (II: 216).  While he is declaimed as a perpetrator of misdemeanors by the whipping he 
receives, his punishment is divorced from its admonitory properties.  Instead, its 
rehabilitative qualities are replaced with laughter and even the encouragement of further vice.  
Contradicting his punishment with the apparent success of his plot, Jack deliberately casts the 
magistrates as part of his cozenage, subordinating the punishment he receives to the mirth he 
imparts to his ironic admonishers.182  In the end, the whipping of Jack Wilton demonstrates 
the fulfillment of the letter of law, but misses the spirit which animates it.183    
 In a similar way, Nashe deliberately undercuts the moral authority of the Earl of 
Surrey, leaving his standing as an admonisher in jeopardy.  Although Jack initially asserts 
that Surrey embodies the best qualities of the perfect poet, this portrayal soon transforms to 
demonstrate Surrey’s prodigality. (II: 242).  According to Jack, the Earl of Surrey formerly 
embodied the gravity and modesty of those poets separated from the world. He was once full 
of didactic moral virtue and commandment, but his infatuation with the lovely Geraldine has 
transformed him into a literary prodigal. As such a prodigal, he can only write love sonnets 
and other “profitless” verse and is unfit “for any calling in the Common wealth” (I: 37).184 
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Diamante—Jack pointedly speaks of his master’s odd emasculation: “I perswade my self he was more in love 
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Even more grievous than his adolescent love of Geraldine, however, Nashe hints that Surrey 
has abandoned his responsibility to his king and country. He implies that Surrey displays the 
worst of prodigality through his displacement of his royal father with his love, Geraldine.  
Surrey is “morally emasculated” through his pursuit of Geraldine’s love, choosing such 
consuming love over his duties to his king.185  Noting his master’s prodigality, Jack wonders 
why Surrey would leave the comfort of England: “what changeable humor had so soddainely 
seduced him from his native soyle to seeke out needlesse perils in those parts beyond sea” 
(II: 243).  Moreover, Nashe also raises the suspicion that Surrey’s departure from the court 
was perhaps committed without proper consent, as the King issues the commandment that 
Surrey return to England “as speedily as he could…whereby his fame was quit off by the 
shins” (II: 279).186  Coming upon his former page, Surrey acknowledges to Jack that he is 
divorced from his former self, and is now subject to amorous Cupid, who has usurped 
Surrey’s allegiance from his rightful father:  
Ah, quoth he, my little Page, full little canst thou perceive howe 
farre Metamorphozed I am from my selfe, since I last saw thee.  
There is a little God called Love, that will not bee worshipt of anie 
leaden braines; one that proclaimes himselfe sole King and 
Emperour of pearcing eyes, and cheefe Soveraigne of soft hearts; 
hee it is that, exercising his Empire in my eyes, hath exorsized and 
cleane conjured me from my content. (II: 243)   
 
                                                                                                                                                       
with his own curious forming fancie than hir face; and truth it is, many become passionate lovers onely to winne 
praise to theyr wits” (II: 262).  Nashe’s obsession with “form” over the “content” of Love would reach its 
logical embodiment in his pornographic poem, “The Choice of Valentines,” where the speaker realizes that his 
lover prefers a dildo to the flesh and blood man:  she tells her lover “Adiew faint-hearted instrument of lust, / 
That falselie hast betrayde our equal trust. / Hence-forth no more wil I implore thine ayde, / Or thee, or men of 
cowardize upbrayde. / My little dilldo shall suplye their kinde” (III: 412, lines 235-239). 
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 Ibid. Hutson argues for a similar interpretation: “Surrey’s travels through Italy, while posing no threat to his 
sovereign, seem to have been undertaken without the king’s authority; after winning the tournament Surrey is 
censored … by a king who orders him back to England against his own desire” (237). 
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Through his depiction of Surrey’s transformation, Nashe equates the Earl’s prodigal 
infatuation with Geraldine with a more dangerous prodigality.  In figuring Love’s triumph 
over him as an exorcism or conjuring, Surrey links the “little God called Love” with sorcery 
and the occult.  In addition, by referencing Ovid’s Metamorphosis, Nashe alludes to that 
author’s political exile for his literary endeavors, and implies Surrey’s treachery.187  Like 
Ovid, Surrey’s proper obedience to his King and godly father has been replaced by his 
prodigality: the dominion of infatuation conjures him away from his allegiance to his king.  
In doing so, he abandons his “sterne precepts of gravitie & modestie” which might have 
provided him a way to order his experiences, preventing his full devolution.  
  As he comes upon Surrey, metamorphosed from his “former self” into a prodigal, 
Jack does not deride his master’s transformation to prodigality.  Far from rebuking Surrey, 
Jack quickly observes that his transformation to prodigality has made him more likeable, 
erasing the moral difference between himself and his lord.  At first, Jack seems happy to have 
come upon the Earl, but withholds his true delight until after he observes that Surrey has 
abandoned his precept-driven life of virtue.  He observes of this new Surrey: 
Not a little was I delighted with this unexpected love storie, 
especially from a mouth out of which was nought wont to 
march but sterne precepts of gravitie & modestie. I swear unto 
you I thought his companie the better by a thousand crownes, 
because hee had discarded those nice tearmes of chastitie and 
constancie.  (II: 245) 
 
That Jack approves of Surrey’s new incarnation might be cause for the reader’s concern.  
Jack’s sarcastic assessment of Surrey’s former self—admonishing Surrey’s boring adherence 
to precept and applauding his turn to prodigality—reinforces Nashe’s own disillusionment 
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regarding the power of didacticism and admonition.  According to Jack, while Surrey once 
was good, now he is fun.      
Surrey fails as an effective admonisher because of his own damaged credibility.  He 
does not possess the moral superiority necessary to rebuke Jack for his presumptuous 
impersonation of his nobility, having earlier urged the very indiscretion he would now 
admonish.188  In fact, Jack cites precedent in order to justify his adoption of the Earl’s 
identity: “the state of an Earle he had thrust upon me before, & now I would not bate him an 
ace of it.  Through all the cities past I by no other name but the yong Earle of Surry” (II: 
267).  Through their earlier exchange of identities, Surrey obscures the difference between 
himself and Jack, sacrificing his moral authority for his freedom.  According to Jonathan 
Crewe, by trading names, Surrey and Jack erase the moral and social distinctions manifested 
by rank and mark the interchangeability of identity.189  Having previously endorsed the ruse, 
Surrey must accept Jack’s continuation of it.  In point of fact, when he discovers that Jack 
presumptuously has assumed his title, Surrey is only able to upbraid Jack with laughter.  In 
contrast, Jack expects to be punished for his crime.  He describes the scene, juxtaposing his 
expectation of reprimand with the reality of Surrey’s easy dismissal: 
In sted of menacing or affrighting me with his swoorde of his 
founes for my superlative presumption, he burst out into 
laughter above Ela, to think how bravely napping he had tooke 
us, and how notably we were dampt and stroke dead in the 
neast, with the unexpected view of his presence. (II: 268) 
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Because Jack recognizes the legitimacy of any punishment he may receive for his 
“superlative presumption,” he is momentarily positioned above the Earl, who cannot garner 
the authority to rebuke his charge.  The Earl recognizes that he has been made complicit in 
Jack’s fun through his previous sanction of the ruse and acknowledges that he lacks the 
moral standing to rebuke Jack.  Making light of the situation, Surrey chooses to emphasize 
the joke rather than Jack’s offense, highlighting the interchangeability of their identities by 
joking with his page:  “Ah, quoth he, my noble Lorde, (after his tongue had borrowed a little 
leave of his laughter,) is it my lucke to visite you thus unlookt for?  I am sure you will bidde 
mee welcome, if it bee but for the names sake.  It is a wonder to see two English Earles of 
one house at one time together in Italy” (my emphasis II: 268).  Surrey ironically elevates 
Jack through his acceptance of his adopted identity, titling him “Lord” and not distinguishing 
Jack as an imposter.  He laughs off the potential criminal action of Jack’s impersonation, 
dismissing the ruse as innocuous fun.   
 The moral interchangeability of Jack and the Earl of Surrey reaches a flashpoint 
immediately following Surrey’s good-natured laughter, however: while Jack attempts to 
escape real punishment through his assertion of his social and moral likeness with Surrey,  
Surrey tries to re-establish the moral distance between himself and Jack.190  Attempting to 
reaffirm his moral superiority, Surrey admonishes his page for his public association with 
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illiberal licentious action I have disparaged your name with, heape shame upon me prodigally, I beg no pardon 
or pittie” (II: 269).  Jack casts not himself, but the Earl, as the unthrifty and rebellious son,  upending the natural 
paternal hierarchy of nobleman over page.  Such inversion is short-lived, however. Jack immediately follows up 
his allusion by recasting himself as the repentant son, unworthy of his noble father’s pardon or pity. 
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Diamante, acknowledging the potential for Jack’s ruse to expose Surrey’s reputation to scorn. 
In reminding Jack of his duties as the impersonated Surrey, the genuine Earl attempts to 
reassert his role as a godly father figure. He demands that Jack give up his courtesan as a 
condition of his continued impersonation.  Surrey’s pleads with Jack:  “One thing, quoth he, 
my sweet Jacke, I will intreate thee, … that though I am well pleased thou shouldest bee the 
ape of my birthright, (as what noble man hath not his ape & his foole?) yet that thou be an 
ape without a clog, not carrie thy curtizan with thee” (II: 269).  While he seems to laugh off 
Jack’s “aping” of his identity as he did earlier, dismissing Jack’s ruse as unworthy of rebuke, 
Surrey also recognizes Jack’s ability to harm to his reputation by parading around Italy with 
his courtesan.  He asserts his authority through his charge that Jack dismiss her if he wishes 
to continue his impersonation.  In response to such a demand, Jack challenges the Earl’s 
moral and social superiority over him by refusing to repent and dismiss his lover.  Rather 
than leave Diamante, Jack resigns the Earl’s title.  Arguing that he “is thus challenged of 
stolne goods by the true owner,” Jack will return to his “former state” as the Earl’s page 
rather than give her up (II: 269).  Despite his admission of fault here and his re-assumption of 
his inferior role, Jack continues to insist upon his own autonomy.  He chooses to assume his 
previous role and abandons his pretensions to Surrey’s title, separating himself from Surrey 
by positioning himself as a self-sufficient, autonomous individual.  It is not surprising, 
therefore, that soon after, he and Surrey part company for good.191 
The last advisor in The Unfortunate Traveller, the Banished Earl, most obviously 
resembles the godly admonishers commonly deployed throughout Elizabethan prose fiction 
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by authors conscious of the need to christianize their narratives. He asserts precepts and 
admonitions straight out of Ascham, by way of John Lyly’s Euphues and His England, 
typifying the grave advice of a fatherly lord in the prodigal tradition.  And, like the 
admonishers of such narratives, the nameless Earl is unable to bring about Jack’s 
reformation. The Banished Earl’s experience mirrors that of Jack’s own narrative, itself 
adhering to the prodigal paradigm of admonition, rebellion and repentance.  As such, the Earl 
argues not just from precept, but also from experience, attempting to reform Jack’s 
prodigality by narrating his own misfortunes.192  Of course, the admonition fails, 
emphasizing the inevitable failure of all such admonitions.  Through his employment of an 
admonitory stock-character, Nashe highlights the empty nature of the gesture: in order to 
fulfill the requirements of a repentance narrative, the prodigal must ignore the admonition in 
order to proceed through his rebellion to repentance.   
Derived largely from Elizabethan prose fiction such as John Lyly’s Euphues and His 
England, the advice of the Banished Earl reflects the inability of admonition to elicit the 
honest reformation of its subject or the moral edification of its reader.  In borrowing so 
liberally from Lyly’s Euphues, Nashe implicitly reminds the Earl’s two-fold audience—both 
Jack and the reader—of the prodigal son narrative.  Specifically, Nashe highlights the tension 
in the narrative between the benefit of advice and the singularity of experience through his 
use of his source.  In Eupheus, the hermit admonishes the young Callimachus to avoid the 
mistakes he has made, narrating the lessons of his own repentance for the edification of his 
charge.  His is the story of the prodigal son:  “seeing my money wasted, my apparel worne, 
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my mind infected with as many vices as my body with diseases…I thought it best to retourne 
into my native soyle … to lead a solitary life.”193  Like the Banished Earl, the hermit 
confesses to his own prodigality in order to spare the youth his own missteps. In response, 
the youth dismisses the advice of the hermit, as all prodigals must do in order for the 
narrative to proceed to its final edification.  Acknowledging the problem of putting the 
parable of the prodigal son to use, Callimachus challenges the hermit to think of the ends 
rather the means: “Things are not to be judged by the event, but by the ende.”194  The 
repentance of the hermit—the end of his prodigal traveling—implicitly argues for the ironic 
profit of such riotous living and promotes the very wanderlust the hermit would admonish. 
Very similarly to the Hermit’s advice to Callimachus, the Banished Earl constructs 
his argument against foreign travel with an eye towards his own experience, urging Jack to 
learn from his mistakes and return home.  He closes his otherwise precept-laden discourse 
with reference to his own plight: 
I am a banisht exile from my country, though never linkt in 
consanguinitie to the best: an Earle borne by birth, but a begger 
now as thou seest.  These manie yeres in Italy have I lived an 
outlaw.  A while I had a liberall pension of the Pope, … I have 
since made a poore shift to live, but so live as I wish my selfe a 
thousand times dead. (II: 302-303) 
 
The Banished Earl embodies the moral lesson of the repentant prodigal: he has literally 
consumed his substance in riotous living and begs to return to the land of his father.  He 
confesses his crimes—although the nameless crime for which he is banished is hinted at 
rather than directly stated—and urges Jack to learn from his experience.  Reflecting the 
moral education he has received through his ill experience, the Banished Earl demonstrates 
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his shame. Weeping, he pleads with Jack to save himself a similar experience—reflecting 
Jack’s earlier claim for his reader to “buy experience of mee better cheape”—and to find 
refuge in England, assuming the language of Christ’s parable: “Let no man for anie transitory 
pleasure sell away the inheritance he hath of breathing in the place where hee was borne. Get 
thee home, my yong lad, laye thy bones peaceably in the sepulcher of thy fathers, waxe olde 
in overlooking thy grounds, be at hand to close the eyes of thy kindred” (II: 303). Finally, he 
likens himself to the devil, positioning himself as suffering a similar type of alienation as the 
great enemy of God: “The divel and I am desperate, he of being restored to heaven, I of being 
recalled home” (II: 303).  The Banished Earl here mirrors the language of the biblical 
prodigal son,  reaffirming God as the godly father at home, and himself as the penitent son 
unworthy of forgiveness, eagerly awaiting the possibility of mercy and the father’s blessed 
command.  But it is not enough.  As Callimachus dismisses the advice of the hermit, so Jack 
rejects the experience of the Banished Lord.  Through his liberal use of Lyly’s model, Nashe 
mocks didacticism, invalidating the interpretive safeguards of admonition and repentance. As 
such, Nashe fulfills another requirement of the prodigal paradigm while simultaneously 
highlighting its emptiness. 
After Jack blissfully indulges in all manner of sinful behavior, he must go through the 
motions and repent to christianize his text.  With Jack only paying lip-service to repentance, 
the conclusion of the text reinforces the emptiness of such moral profit. Jack mimics his 
target, namely, those repentance narratives which attempt to “undo” the rebellion and riotous 
living at the last moment through the repentance of the text’s protagonist.  In The 
Unfortunate Traveller, Jack’s claims of repentance for his knavery are undercut by his 
promise of a sequel to his narrative, should his text meet with commercial success.  In doing 
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so, Jack uses the paradigm of rebellion and repentance in order to sell his narrative, deflating 
any promises of the chronicle’s moral profit.  Instead of genuine penance, Nashe constructs 
for Jack a insubstantial moral lesson, vague enough to be applicable to any situation and 
therefore helpful to none.  After pages of debauchery and the routine promises of moral 
edification, the reader is left only with “Unsearchable is the booke of oiur destinies” (II: 
327).  Such an abrupt and flimsy moral mocks the reader’s very desire for a morally edifying 
resolution, nullifying the text’s sincerity.  According to Stephen Hilliard, Jack’s hasty 
repentance and marriage to Diamante rings false: “what might be the climax of a serious 
story of redemption is here wrapped up in two sentences.”195  Indeed, after he returns to the 
fold of the orthodoxy, Jack closes his narrative, looking ahead to a possible sequel which 
promises more roguish exploits.  He pledges to his reader his desire to please through his 
continued shenanigans: “All the conclusive epilogue I wil make is this; that if herein I have 
pleased anie, it shall animat mee to more paines in this kind.  Otherwise I will sweare upon 
an English Chronicle never to bee outlandish Chronicler more while I live.  Farewell as many 
as wish me well” (II: 328).  Co-opting the position which conventionally asserts the didactic 
moral lesson of the text in order to promise a sequel, Jack undercuts even his nominal 
repentance.196  Instead, he will “animate” himself to more such adventures, elevating any 
commercial success he may enjoy above the moral profit of his reader as Pierce Penilesse did 
earlier.  Jack’s repentance is emptied of moral rejuvenation, nullifying the resolution’s 
attempt to “contain” the riotous living of its protagonist within the paradigm of admonition, 
rebellion and repentance.  
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In dismissing admonition and edification as false didactic gestures, Nashe parodies 
the prodigal model in his own narrative, evacuating the world of The Unfortunate Traveller 
of any semblance of moral authority. As Lorna Hutson argues, Nashe parodies early modern 
notions of literary profit through The Unfortunate Traveller, revealing “the moral hypocrisy 
and aesthetic impoverishment of narratives thus obliged to sacrifice everything and everyone 
in the interests of credit and profit.”197 According to Hutson, Nashe pokes fun at the 
“pragmatic Tudor discourse” which demanded that literature demonstrate  such “profitable 
state service.”198 Indeed, through Jack’s repeated assertions of “instruction and godly 
consolation,” Nashe mocks those texts which pay lip-service to moral profit through his 
parody, highlighting the emptiness of these promises.199 Hutson’s claims may need 
qualification, however.  In assuming the language and structure of the texts he would satirize, 
Nashe erases the difference between the subject he would mock and his own work. 200  In 
other words, Nashe’s parodic emulation of such flimsy didacticism implies satire’s own 
hollow bravado.   
Through his anti-hero, Nashe lowers the satirist to the level of his target, diminishing 
his authority to rebuke through his mimetic art. Mocking the very nature of edification, 
Nashe constructs a prodigal anti-hero that can neither repent his crimes nor be reformed 
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through the admonition of others.  In short, Jack Wilton stands both as the rebuker and the 
object of rebuke.  “A certain appendix or page,” Jack represents for Nashe the prodigality of 
satire.  In The Unfortunate Traveller, the page is vexed by his own lack of authority.  Like 
satire, Jack claims that his text will be profitable to his readers, but the promises of moral 
profit remain undelivered in the text of the work (II: 209).   
Nashe uses Jack’s chronicle to erode the moral authority necessary for satire’s 
reformation of society, replacing the didactic edification satire promises with a moral 
ambiguity which erases the differences between virtue and vice.  Conventionally, the 
effectiveness of the satirist is bound intimately to his moral authority, specifically to his 
ability to discern righteousness from corruption.  Constructed from the “subjective angle of 
his moral vision,” the satirist’s ethos is developed through his “self-possessed moral standing 
within the world,” specifically, according to Lawrence Manley, in his “ability to weigh 
greater and lesser, tolerable and intolerable evils.”201   In other words, the essential task of 
satire is to demonstrate to its reader the difference between the righteousness of virtue and 
the corruption of vice.  Typically, the satirist accomplishes this through admonition and 
edification.  In contrast to this moralistic view of satire, however, Nashe constructs his text 
with an eye towards its immorality.  His satirist argues as a willful prodigal who will not 
listen to admonition or pleas for his own conversion.  He ends the text as he begins it, 
deliberately undercutting the morally profitable lessons demonstrated by arguments for his 
admonition and repentance.  
While Jack Wilton claims the profit of moral edification and godly instruction for his 
satire, he ultimately cannot maintain the ethical authority necessary to support such 
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didacticism.  While his text is framed to be read as a retrospective of his indulgence, 
promising his future conversion through the power of the narrative’s didacticism, Jack only 
once interrupts his narrative to profess his regret. Rather, he prides himself on his ingenuity 
and his knavery.  Early on, he boasts of his status as the “king of the cans and blacke jackes, 
prince of the pigmeis…[and] Lord high regent of rashers” (II: 209). Nashe compiles in Jack 
the morally low attributes of the rogue, the swindler, and the conny-catcher to construct the 
persona of the prodigal.  In this position, Jack insolently pledges future profit to his readers—
claiming to offer his text “for your instruction and godly consolation” (II: 227)—but 
consistently withholds satire’s promise of moral clarity in favor of ambiguity.  In his 
superficial concern for the welfare of his reader, Jack constructs himself as a godly satirist.  
He describes himself as an honest advisor to his naïve targets, urging one to “be ruld” by him 
(II: 222).  To his readers, Jack would do the same, positioning himself as a moralistic 
sermonizer: he promises that his narrative will augment his audience’s faith, and will 
demonstrate that God’s judgments “here shine in their glory” (II: 320).  He also embraces his 
persona as a prodigal, urging his audience to “buy experience of [him] better cheape” (II: 
282), positing an ironic authority for himself as a reformed man by claiming arguments from 
experience.  Jack professes himself to be the godly satirist of An Anatomie of Absurditie.   
Attempting to embody the promise implicit in his “conversion” narrative, Jack works 
to construct The Unfortunate Traveller as a via negativa, arguing for the use-value of his 
satire by positioning it as an instrument by which the reader may judge vice.  Recalling the 
language of Nashe’s Anatomie, Jack argues that his narrative of vice is meant for his reader’s 
edification: 
It is a pittie posteritie should be deprived of such precious 
Records; &  yet there is no remedie: and yet there is too, for 
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when all failes, welfare a good memorie.  Gentle Readers 
(looke you be gentle now since I have cald you so), as freely as 
my knaverie was mine owne, it shall be yours to use in the way 
of honestie.  (II: 217)  
 
Jack laments that his other “thousand better jests” must remain unchronicled, but casts his 
documented knavery as worthy of the reader’s memory and profitable “in the way of 
honestie.”  Framing his chronicle as a satiric instrument by which the reader may judge 
future vice, Jack builds an exemplar of corruption similar to Zeuxes’ portrait of Juno.  In the 
end, however, The Unfortunate Traveller’s protagonist cannot maintain the moral authority 
necessary to make the via negativa work.   
In order for his narrative to work as a negative example of vice, Jack must interrupt  
his retrospective chronicle of knavery to narrate his repentance or regret for his sins; instead, 
Jack regularly intrudes into his narrative in order to applaud his ingenuity or to mock his 
subjects further.  The interiority which Jack constructs through his narrative does not frame 
his story according to his claims of repentance which conclude the narrative, but rather, 
belabor his sinful indulgence.  For example, after his whipping by the magistrate, Jack does 
not address the reader to confirm the righteousness of the magistrates, but instead, remains 
undaunted, immediately returning to his knavery to cozen an “ugly mechanicall Captain” (II: 
217).  He laughingly describes his role in the Captain’s treachery and eventual torture, proud 
of his ability to wreak such havoc, and justifying his cozenage through the Captain’s 
stupidity:   
Adam never fell till God made fooles; … told the King he was 
a foole, and that some shrowd head had knavishly wrought on 
him; wherefore it should stand with his honour to whip him out 
of the Campe and send him home…Here let me triumph a 
while, and ruminate a line or two on the excellence of my wit: 
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but I will not breath neither till I have disfraughted all my 
knaverie. (II: 224-225)202 
 
 Likewise, Jack interrupts his narrative later to highlight his ironic lack of repentance.  While 
Jack is imprisoned with Surrey under the false charge of counterfeiting, he transforms a 
scene of possible contemplation into a scene of unrepentant adultery: “During the time we 
lay close and tooke physick in this castle of contemplation, there was a magnificos wife of 
good calling sent to beare us companie” (II: 260).  After he corrupts Diamante—claiming to 
his reader in an aside, “many are honest because they know not how to be dishonest (II: 
261)—Jack elaborates on the alteration of his situation in a direct address:  “How I dealt with 
her, gesse, gentle reader, subaudi that I was in prison, and she my silly Jaylor” (II: 263).  
Given the opportunity to contemplate repentance, Jack only furthers his indulgence.    
In his only narrative instance of regret, Jack rebukes himself for dismissing the 
Banished Earl’s advice. Although he momentarily commits himself to the repentance 
narrative’s retrospective viewpoint, he immediately rejects his own moralizing. Upon 
repudiating the Lord’s advice as a “cynike exhortation” worthy of little heed, Jack narrates 
his capture and imprisonment by Zadoch, Zachary, and Juliana, and immediately moralizes 
that “God plagud me for deriding such a grave fatherly advisor” (II: 303). Madelon S. 
Gohlke interprets this scene in The Unfortunate Traveller as the text’s movement to a moral; 
specifically, she reads Jack’s acknowledgement of the Earl’s good advice as the text’s 
emerging “moral pattern.”203  Likewise, Lorna Hutson interprets Jack’s acknowledgment of 
the righteousness of the Banished Lord as “a last ditch attempt on the part of The Unfortunate 
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Traveller to turn itself back into a profitable discourse by trying to prove that the page is a 
prodigal son who has finally ‘consumed his substance in riotous living.”204 While Gohlke 
reads the text’s moralizing turn as genuine and Hutson sees it as a failed attempt at authentic 
prodigal discourse, Jack’s assertion of a causal relationship between his scorning of the 
Banished Lord’s advice and his subsequent misfortunes rings false in a narrative so reliant 
upon the whimsy of chance.  Indeed, Jack himself invalidates this interpretation by 
immediately rejecting the jurisdiction of providence in the events, replacing God’s plan with 
the power of Fortune.  After his statement that he is scourged by God for his dense refusal to 
adopt the advice offered by the Banished Earl, Jack dismisses the thought, chalking the 
experience up to “the worst throw of ill luckes” (II: 303).  According to Jack, chance or 
fortune may be able to bring about reformation, but admonition will fail miserably.    
 The inability of his narrative to reform the fallen world is not simply a self-
deprecating estimation of Nashe’s own career, but is a result of his increasing cynicism 
regarding the power of didacticism to instill righteousness and inspire virtue in the 
individual.  The entrance of Surrey into the narrative affords Nashe the opportunity, through 
Jack, to pontificate on the nature of poets and poetry in the fallen world; however, Nashe’s 
estimation of the power of poetry has lowered substantially since the publication of Pierce 
Penilesse: Jack argues, “if there be anie sparke of Adams Paradized perfection yet emberd up 
in the breastes of mortall men, certainelie God hath bestowed that his perfectest image on 
poets” (II: 242).  He casts his statement in the conditional, implying through his irony that 
poets can no longer separate themselves from the dross of the sinful world.  Through Jack’s 
pessimistic “if,” Nashe argues that the perceived perfection of poets and poetry cannot exist 
after the fall.  He continues, ironically praising these poets:  
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None comes so neere to God in wit, none more contemne the 
world, vatis avarus, non temere est animus, sayth Horace, 
versus amat, hoc studet unum; Seldom have you seene anie 
Poet possessed with avarice, only verses he loves, nothing else 
he delights in: and as they contemne the world, so contrarlie of 
the mechanicall world are none more contemned. (II: 242)    
 
Far from allowing his poets to enjoy the limitless perfection of the divine image from safely 
above the fray of the world, Nashe’s ironic conception of poetry urges the poet to abandon 
his “supernaturall kind of wit” and to engage the world around him (II: 242).  According to 
Nashe, the poet can no longer separate himself from the world: after all, it is only through his 
rebuke of the world that the poet can ever hope to instill virtue and righteousness. Connecting 
poetry with satire more directly, Jack turns to Horace’s Epistles for support.  What he quotes 
from his source, however, is perhaps less telling than what he omits: after the quoted passage 
above, Horace praises poetry for its ability to instill virtue: 
  os tenerum pueri balbumque poeta figurat, 
  torquet ab obscenis iam nunc sermonibus aurem, 
  mox etiam pectus praeceptis format amicis, 
  asperities at invidiae corrector et irae, 
  recte facta refert, orientia tempora notis 
  instruit exemplis, inopem solatur et aegrum. (II: I: 126-131) 205 
 
In these lines, Horace emphasizes the transformative power of poetry; specifically, he cites 
satire’s ability to correct the “roughness and envy and anger” of the world through didactic 
precepts and examples.  In choosing to omit these lines, Nashe strengthens his argument that 
poetic didacticism is unable to reform society’s sinful members.   According to Nashe, the 
satirist must engage the realities of the world, risking the infection of the sin he attempts to 
castigate. He must sink to the level of his target.  In contrast to his earlier, more optimistic 
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assessment of poetry’s potential to raise mankind to virtue, Nashe now lowers virtue to 
mankind. 
Nashe’s mimetic satire of his contemporaries in The Unfortunate Traveller highlights 
the difficulty of separating satire from its moralistic roots: inevitably, in assuming the 
language and structure of his targets, Nashe erases the difference between the satirist and the 
satirized.  Much as Surrey cannot exert the moral authority necessary to admonish Jack after 
he has erased the moral and social difference between them, Nashe’s satire cannot separate 
itself from the taint of its subject. As a result, The Unfortunate Traveller at times rarely 
resembles a satire at all.206  Despite Nashe’s claim in his dedication that this work marks 
itself as “being a cleane different vaine” from his previous tracts, The Unfortunate Traveller 
returns to many of the issues and quandaries which Nashe struggles throughout his career.  
 
Conclusion 
 While he was tasked with defending the ecclesiastical establishment from Martin 
Marprelate’s scurrilous jests and ad hominem attacks, Thomas Nashe learned from his 
epistolary opponent. His most famous constructed fictions, Pierce Penilesse and Jack Wilton, 
admittedly owe a great debt to those of Martin Marprelate, Martin Junior and Martin Senior.  
But, while Martin Marprelate insists upon the righteousness of his mirth and his character 
assignations of the bishops, steeping his arguments in first reformist language and later 
Pauline rebuke, Nashe comes to embrace the lowness of his satiric persona.  Beginning his 
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career confident in the ability of didactic admonition to reform transgression, Nashe pens An 
Anatomie of Absurditie, constructing his persona as a godly paternal advisor.  After Nashe’s 
repudiation by the ecclesiastical hierarchy, however, his texts reflect a growing antagonism 
with authority.  Pierce Penilesse and The Unfortunate Traveller demonstrate Nashe’s denial 
of the satirist’s moral authority in favor of an authorial fiction that delights in vice and 
criminality. 
 While Nashe articulates through his texts a vision of satire divorced from its promises 
of reformation, Edmund Spenser divides satire into two manifestations in his epic. Like 
Nashe, Spenser associates satire with criminal speech, presenting his readers with the 
slanderous Malfont, the only self-titled poet in The Faerie Queene.  Unlike Nashe, however, 
Spenser cannot dismiss the value of satire completely. Through his allegory of Mercilla, 
Spenser argues that scorn and scornful speech must be utilized as a necessary component of 
earthly justice.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
Spenser’s Scorn and Mercy: 
A Study of The Faerie Queene, Book V, Canto IX, Stanzas 22-50 
 
 As Jonathan Goldberg asserts in James I and the Politics of Literature, James VI/I 
was offended at Spenser’s depiction of his mother as the villainess Duessa, tried before the 
allegorical queen of mercy, Mercilla.  Narrating the king’s displeasure, Robert Bowes wrote 
to Burghley to urge Elizabeth to condemn Spenser for his topical satire: 
The K[ing] hath conceaved of great offence against Edward 
Spencer publishing in prynte in the second book p[ar]t of the 
Fairy Queene and ixth chapter some dishonorable effects (as the 
k. demeth therof) against himself and his mother 
deceassed…he still desyreth that Edward Spencer for his 
faulte, may be dewly tried and punished.207    
 
While Spenser escaped punishment for his portrayal of the treasonous Duessa, modern 
scholarship was bruised by James’s topical interpretation of Mercilla’s court.  For a long 
time, James’s historical reading of Spenser’s allegory colored the way modern scholars have 
interpreted the second half of canto ix.208  By reading Duessa as Mary, Mercilla as Elizabeth, 
Malfont as Spenser, and Awe as Elizabeth’s famously tall porter, critics have simplified this 
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 This trend is countered by critics who argue that Spenser’s depiction of the trial of Duessa engages in legal 
theory, the emblem tradition, and early modern negotiations of power, but often with the careful proviso in 
place that Duessa is assuredly Mary, Queen of Scots.  See Andrew Zurcher, “Justice, Equity and Mercy in The 
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above, 1-17. Even Carol Kaske, whose argument for Spenser’s repetition and revisions of images and concepts 
brought me to this episode, dismisses Malfont as a mere “self-correcting strategy” (88). See Spenser and 
Biblical Poetics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).  
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episode of Spenser’s epic, flattening his satirical allegory.  By privileging a topical 
interpretation of the Mercilla episode, recent scholarship has subordinated the ways in which 
Spenser’s allegory may exceed and challenge the pattern laid out for it by its historical 
precedent.  In this chapter, I argue that Spenser’s trial of Duessa in the court of Mercilla 
offers more than a satirical portrait of the proceedings against James’s mother; rather, it 
presents an allegory that unfolds as an ambivalent, and even contradictory, interrogation of 
the role of scorn in the administration of justice.   
Mercilla’s trial and execution of Duessa in the legend of justice refigures the 
previous, more mild adjudication of the villainess which occurs in book one, the legend of 
holiness. Having released the imprisoned Redcrosse Knight from the dungeon of Orgoglio, 
Arthur presents him with Duessa, whose fate Redcrosse Knight is empowered to decide.   
Arthur leaves the knight as her judge, but Redcrosse Knight is cautioned by Una to be 
temperate in his punishment of his enemy: 
  To do her dye (quoth Una) were despight, 
  And shame t’avenge so weake an enemy: 
  But spoile her of her scarlet robe, and let her fly. (I, viii, 45.7-9) 
 
In book one, Una equates Redcrosse Knight’s possible execution of Duessa with “despight” 
or vengeance, condemning the scornful infliction of punishment as sinful.  For Una, 
representing Christian truth and holiness, the infliction of bloody punishment is damnable.  
As Penaunce asserts in the house of holiness, Redcrosse Knight must learn “wrath, and 
hatred, warely to shone, / That drew on men Gods hatred, and his wrath” (I, x, 33.5-6).  In 
book five, however, Spenser seems to contradict this assertion: Mercilla, the embodiment of 
mercy but also a monarch and agent of the state, condemns Duessa to die for her treason.  
Further complicating any easy reconciliation of the two extremes, Spenser asserts that each 
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allegory is correct.  As Carol Kaske asserts, the different moral perspectives by which the 
two judgments are enacted demonstrate the conflict in Spenser between the private and 
public virtues.209  While Una, personifying Christian truth, is concerned with Redcrosse 
Knight’s salvation—her mercy of Duessa possibly derived from Christ’s admonition to the 
unchaste woman—Mercilla, the agent of Justice, must condemn Duessa for her crimes, 
affirming the lamentable but necessary place of scorn in the administration of justice.    
Centering upon Spenser’s portrayal of justice as a function of scorn and mercy, the 
allegory of Mercilla’s court loosely divides into three sections.  The first two sections, the 
descriptions of the punished Malfont and the enthroned Mercilla, engage the emblematic 
values of scorn and mercy.  First, Spenser portrays Malfont as a scorner.  Specifically, 
Malfont is associated with scornful speech, his “rayling rymes” likened to unlawful satire and 
slander.  For Spenser, however, scorn is not limited to criminal speech; it is also an essential 
tool of justice.  Mercilla’s piercing of Malfont’s tongue demonstrates the applicability of 
scorn as punishment.  Countering this allegorical portrayal of scorn, Spenser next depicts 
Mercilla as an emblem of heavenly mercy and divine justice.  She represents an emblem of 
Christian restraint.  Building from these emblems of scorn and mercy, the final section, the 
trial of Duessa, allegorizes justice’s active administration, dramatizing the necessity of both 
scorn and mercy in the accommodation of justice to the fallen world.   
Spenser is constant in his use of “mercy” throughout The Faerie Queene: as a private 
virtue, mercy denotes a Christian temperance of anger; as a public virtue, it denotes the legal 
                                                 
209
 Kaske claims that the discrepancy between these portrayals can be reconciled, claiming Una’s condemnation 
of scorn exemplifies the private and Christian virtue while Mercilla’s execution of Duessa embodies the public 
virtues of duty and justice.  I disagree with Kaske on an important point, however.  She argues that Artegall is 
the true judge of Duessa, remarking that his status “first as a knight of duty, second as a knight of Justice” 
confirms him as a public official (137).  In correctly ascribing the decision regarding Duessa’s execution to 
Mercilla, the embodiment of Mercy, I argue that the distinction is not so neatly reconciled. 
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mitigation of punishment.  But, Spenser’s use of “scorn” is more slippery.  Throughout his 
portrayal of Malfont and Mercilla, Spenser activates scorn in many different forms.  At one 
moment, it is a private emotion associated with anger and vengeance that should be quelled 
in the administration of justice; at another moment, it is a speech act, an articulation of 
righteous indignation or criminal slander; thirdly, it is a function of justice, an animation of 
force likened to the legitimate execution of punishment, but also associated with brutality.210  
Finally, and most complexly, it can be a manifestation or combination of all three, it can 
denote an emotional state, a verbal act, and a physical reaction.   
Immediately after the distressed maiden Samient has sung the praises of her most 
merciful queen to Arthur and Artegall, they are introduced to the punished Malfont, the only 
self-titled poet in The Faerie Queene, made mute by Mercilla’s justice.  While often read 
biographically as an emblem of Spenser’s anxieties regarding his place in the court and his 
struggle to depict poetically the politics of Queen Elizabeth, Malfont and his punished tongue 
more directly question the ethics of scornful speech.  Spenser portrays his poet as a railer, 
aligning him with satire, admonition, and finally, slander, the crime for which he is so 
viscerally punished.   Although mute, Malfont’s tongue articulates the paradox of scorn: 
while Spenser depicts misdirected scorn as criminal, its criticism of power a slanderous and 
malignant threat to the security of the realm, he also demonstrates the legitimate application 
of scorn in his depiction of Mercilla’s maintenance of  her kingdom.  In short, scorn is both a 
criminal act and an agent of the state’s power.  As a governor of an earthly kingdom, 
Mercilla must execute punishment; she is unable to rely upon heavenly mercy. Instead, she 
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must fashion her courtiers into gentlemen through her rigorous application of the law.  She 
transforms Malfont’s tongue from a sign of transgression into a sign of admonition by 
piercing it with scorn, re-creating it as a warning to her subjects to avoid similar behavior.   
Once readers and courtiers alike have been properly tempered by the threat of 
Mercilla’s might, she is introduced as an emblem of mercy.  Spenser leaves his portrait 
deliberately ambiguous, however: positioned on and around her throne, Mercilla’s emblems 
of monarchy speak both to Mercilla’s divine mercy and her earthly justice, negotiating in 
their contradictions the applicability of mercy to the fallen world.  By allowing these two 
interpretations of Mercilla to co-exist in his text, Spenser marks, like Martin Luther, the 
inherent contradiction between the gospel’s call for ideal mercy and the practical need for 
law and earthly justice.211  Although Mercilla does not wield her sword, it lies ready at her 
feet.  Once the reader has been instructed by the complex didactic emblems of scorn and 
mercy, she can witness the exercise of justice, Mercilla’s administration of the secular sword 
against Duessa.   
The trial of Duessa invigorates the abstracted virtues of mercy and punishment, pity 
and scorn with activity, demonstrating the application and the limits of application of both 
functions of justice.  The trial is a stylized allegory of Seneca’s De Clementia: the defense, 
represented by Pittie, argues for the undeserved mitigation of Duessa’s punishment, while the 
prosecutor, Zele, representing Seneca’s vice of cruelty, argues for her execution. Mercilla’s 
reluctant execution of Duessa highlights the problem of accommodating justice to an earthly 
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subject: because she is a public magistrate, Mercilla cannot show Duessa Una’s Christ-like 
mercy; at the same time, however, as the embodiment of mercy, she cannot side wholly with 
Zele.   Mercilla is only able to reconcile scorn with pity by dividing her persons.  As a private 
individual, Mercilla demonstrates her mercy through her “piteous ruth” for Duessa, 
manifested in the tears she covers from view. As a monarch, Mercilla reluctantly condemns 
Duessa.  Spenser implies that Mercilla’s private person remains untainted by scorn, depicted 
as vengeance, while her public person is unstained by pity. 
 
 
Malfont: Spenser’s Rayling Rymer 
 
As the knights Arthur and Artegall enter the court of Mercilla’s palace, they 
encounter the figure of Malfont, the presumptuous poet who dared to publish slanders against 
the pure Mercilla. For his crimes, Malfont is punished publicly:  his tongue, the instrument of 
his trespass, is nailed to a post in the middle of Mercilla’s court.  Spenser describes the grisly 
scene in detail:  
 There as they entred at the Scriene, they saw 
Some one, whose tongue was for his trespasse vyle, 
 Nayld to a post, adjudged so by law: 
 For that therewith he falsely did revile, 
And foule blaspheme that Queene for forged guyle, 
Both with bold speaches, which he blazed had, 
 And with lewd poems, which he did compyle; 
 For the bold title of a Poet had  
He on himselfe had ta’en, and rayling rymes had sprad. 
 
 Thus there he stood, whylest high over his head, 
There written was the purport of his sin, 
 In cyphers strange, that few could read, 
 BONFONT:  but bon that once had written bin, 
 Was raced out, and Mal was now put in. 
 So now Malfont was plainely to be red; 
 Eyther for the evill, which he did therein, 
 Or that he likened was to a welhed 
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Of evill words, and wicked slaunders by him shed. (V, ix, 25-26) 
 
Concentrating upon the second stanza of the passage, modern scholars often read Spenser’s 
Malfont as an emblem of the poet’s anxiety about the reception of his “darke conceite,” 
flattening the allegorical significance of the evil speaker by arguing for Bonfont as a roman à 
clef. 212  According to this reading, Spenser narrates his struggles for recognition in the court, 
writing himself into The Faerie Queene by allegorizing his fear of offending his queen.  This 
interpretation hinges upon a reading of Bonfont’s crime as a misconstrued or unsanctioned 
poetic act, insisting that we see Spenser as only Bonfont and rarely, if ever, Malfont.213  I 
read Malfont’s crime and punishment as Spenser’s allegory of the benefits and liabilities of 
satire and scornful speech.  The image Spenser constructs is inwardly conflicted, insisting 
upon the criminality of satire while simultaneously arguing for its precipitating emotion, 
scorn, as a necessary but dangerous instrument of order and authority.   
Already punished by the time Arthur and Artegall enter Mercilla’s court, Malfont is 
constructed as a negative example of satire and an emblem of evil and unjust speech.  In its 
purest form, satire scorns the vicious members of society in need of correction, re-
substantiating virtue and promoting the salvation and well-being of the kingdom.   Properly 
executed and directed, satire embodies one of the highest goals of poetry, urging the 
reformation of its subject.  In his earlier satiric work Mother Hubberd’s Tale, Spenser affirms 
that satirists, like poets, aspire to a lofty goal: their “onely pride / Is vertue to advaunce, and 
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vice deride” (811-812). 214  Spenser elaborates and particularizes this portrayal of poetry’s 
reformist tendencies in The View of the Present State of Ireland.  While Eudoxius praises 
Irish poets for their ability to “set forth the praises of the good and virtuous” and to “beat 
down and disgrace the bad and vicious” (75),  Irenius argues that the moral center of these 
poets is skewed:  
Whomsoever they find to be most licentious of life, most bold 
and lawless in his doings, and most dangerous and desperate in 
all parts of disobedience and rebellious disposition, him they 
set up and glorify in their rhymes, him they praise to the 
people, and to young men make an example to follow. (76)215 
 
For Spenser, misdirected praise works in a way very similar to misdirected blame:  if 
executed poorly or for the wrong reasons, satire and blame turn quickly to slander.216  
Building a reading of Malfont that emphasizes the transgressive nature of his satiric speech, 
Spenser introduces the reader to Malfont through his instruments of bitter articulation: his 
tongue blazes bold speeches, compiles lewd poems, and spreads railing rhymes.  By marking 
the only self-titled poet in The Faerie Queene a railer, Spenser associates him with 
defamatory verse.  Throughout the epic, Spenser reserves the term “railer” for the speakers of 
misdirected invective and slander, most notably, for those vitriolic speakers who would abuse 
the power of admonition by scorning virtue instead of vice.217  Like the other railers 
                                                 
214
 References to Spenser’s poetry other than The Faerie Queene are to Edmund Spenser: The Shorter Poems. 
Richard McCabe, ed. (New York: Penguin, 1999). 
 
215
 Edmund Spenser, A View of the State of Ireland, edited by Andrew Hadfield and Willy Maley, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1997). 
 
216
 Spenser contrasts the satirist’s virtue with the slanderer’s ill intent later in Mother Hubberd’s Tale.  Unlike 
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condemned in The Faerie Queene for their inappropriate criminal vitriol, Malfont abuses 
satire and scorn when he directs it at the idealized Mercilla, transforming legitimate rebuke 
into slander, sedition and treachery.218   
Despite his likeness to the other railers in The Faerie Queene, Malfont is isolated as 
the only example of evil speech to be punished and silenced successfully in Spenser’s epic.  
More commonly, Spenser asserts that slanderers must be ignored, their defamation of good 
knights and ladies disregarded by the sober and grave heroes who encounter them.219  In rare 
instances, slanderers may be bound, their offending tongues bridled momentarily; in such 
cases, however, the evil-speakers inevitably escape—or are released by other allegorical 
evildoers—to continue to inflict verbal havoc on their virtuous targets.220  In contrast, 
Spenser silences Malfont for the duration of the episode.  He is condemned as a slanderer and 
is punished for his crimes.  Later, Spenser more clearly criminalizes Malfont’s poetics, 
overtly condemning him as “a welhed / Of evill words, and wicked slaunders.” His 
indictment of Malfont on these charges leaves the reader with an unambiguous condemnation 
of the poet and his slanderous treatment of Mercilla.221   
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Spenser’s allegory is not a complacent condemnation of all scorn, however.  In 
constructing such a public and visceral punishment for Mercilla’s slanderer, Spenser 
complicates his allegory to demonstrate not only the criminality of scorn, but also its utility 
as an instrument of justice. Through Mercilla’s punishment of Malfont, Spenser represents 
scorn as an attractive but dangerous instrument of justice, marking it as a problematic agent 
of the state.  In publicly punishing her defamer, Mercilla allegorizes what M. Lindsay Kaplan 
calls the “paradox of slander”: Kaplan claims that “state officials can only disparage, not 
contain, verbal dissent.  In effect, the only recourse against slander is to discredit it, that is, to 
slander it.”222  Mercilla allegorizes the push-pull embodied in scorning a scorner, utilizing 
public punishment and humiliation as an instrument of correction: she lays Malfont open to 
infamy in order to discredit his lies and to restore peace to her kingdom.  In short, Mercilla 
must employ the same methods she would condemn.  The historical contradiction does not 
escape Spenser, who bases his depiction of Mercilla’s punishment of Malfont on well-
established English law, relying upon the threat of public infamy as a method of curtailing 
criminal behavior.  With its roots in the Roman law of iniuria, early modern defamation law 
privileged the reputations of the English citizenry, attempting to guard against verbal assaults 
that would damage a respectable person’s credibility or bring contempt upon a dutiful 
subject.  To accomplish this, the English courts threatened the slanderer with counter-assault, 
subjecting those who falsely imputed others of a crime to infamy. A form of lex talionis, 
infamia sought to redress improper scorn by subjecting a convicted criminal to the same ill 
repute and ridicule to which he would have subjected his target.223  This paradox is 
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demonstrated particularly clearly in royal proclamations which sought to discredit the 
queen’s critics by labeling them traitors and heretics and exposing them not only to criminal 
charges, but also to the infamy of her subjects.  In the sixteenth century, multiple royal 
proclamations called in texts containing critical accounts of the Queen’s policies, describing 
these dissenting texts as libels against her majesty.224  On September 28, 1573, Elizabeth 
issued a proclamation, “Ordering Destruction of Seditious Books,” which condemned texts 
penned by “obstinate and irrepentant traitors” by citing their libels and slanders of her 
majesty.225  Three years later, Elizabeth went one step further, offering rewards for 
information leading to the arrest of libelers against her office, employing similar language of 
defamation to discredit her slanderers.226   
In his epic, Spenser constructs Mercilla in such a way as to harness the didactic 
powers of infamy while distancing its administrator from the ugliness of scorn’s 
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administration.  In order to ensure that his reader will view Mercilla’s verdict against 
Malfont as not only just, but poetically appropriate, Spenser emphasizes Malfont’s 
culpability for his punishment over Mercilla’s role in meting out justice. To argue this more 
effectively, Spenser divides Malfont’s narrative into two stanzas: the first stanza arraigns 
Malfont as a slanderous railer, the second punishes him. 
In the first stanza of the episode, Spenser builds his case against Malfont, poetically 
convicting the railer for his false slanders of Mercilla.  Emphasizing the poet’s vile trespass, 
foul blasphemy, and forged guile, Spenser charges Malfont with criminal slander:  
 Some one, whose tongue was for his trespasse vyle 
Nayld to a post, adjudged so by law: 
For that therewith he falsely did revyle, 
 And foule blaspheme that Queene for forged guyle, 
    Both with bold speaches, which he blazed had, 
And with lewd poems, which he did compyle; 
For the bold title of a Poet had 
He on himself had ta’en and rayling rymes had sprad. (V, ix, 25.2-9) 
 
Thinking himself a poet of “rayling rymes,” Malfont has slandered the virtuous Mercilla with 
his misdirected and inappropriate satire.  Spenser makes clear that Malfont’s presumption 
and his abuse of poetry have condemned him.  Specifically, the repetition of the transition 
“for” in the stanza demonstrates the causal relationship between his crime and his currently 
painful and humiliating punishment.  The repetition of conjunctions “And” as well as “both 
with” quickly builds Mercilla’s case against him, piling charge on charge in order to quell the 
reader’s sympathy and deflate Malfont’s authority.  Constructing the slanderer as the 
embodiment of unjust speech, Spenser refers to Malfont and his crimes with contempt 
throughout the stanza.  He emphasizes Malfont’s sinful behavior by repeatedly asserting 
what “he” has done to violate the law.  In contrast to this repetition, Spenser mentions “that 
Queene” only once in the episode. He textually separates Mercilla from the taint of Malfont’s 
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scornful speech to solidify her ethical credibility, which he reinforces further by removing 
her from the slanderer’s prosecution.  She is replaced by “law,” abstracted and impersonal.  
Mercilla is positioned as the target of Malfont’s slanders, his victim rather than his punisher. 
 In the next stanza, Spenser allegorizes the administration of Malfont’s punishment, 
attempting to demonstrate both the proper application of scorn and the careful impartiality of 
its enforcer. To avoid the appearance of partiality or revenge, Spenser absents Mercilla from 
the proceedings, portraying Malfont as the sole actor in the episode and his punishment as 
passively administered by an unnamed executioner.  Spenser sets up the causal relationship 
between Malfont’s slanders and his punishment immediately, fusing the poet’s crime to his 
public disfigurement with the transition, “Thus there he stood,” a phrase that links the first 
and second stanzas and motivates the reader to interpret the poet’s current situation as a just 
and inevitable response to Malfont’s guilt.  Reinforcing the causal relationship between 
Malfont’s crime and his punishment, Spenser narrates the poet’s devolution as one directly 
caused by his abusive actions towards his queen, repeating “now” throughout the stanza to 
mark the transformation from good poet to slanderer: 
  BON FONT: but bon that once had written bin, 
  Was raced out, and Mal was now put in. 
  So now Malfont was plainly to be red. (V, ix, 26.4-6) 
 
While Spenser leaves unstated the precise reasons for the poet’s devolution, earlier veiling 
the “purport of his sin” in mysterious “cyphers strange,” he insists that the poet’s new title is 
caused by his actions of the previous stanza. 
Importantly, Malfont is unlike other evil-speakers of The Faerie Queene in another 
important aspect:  he slanders an active monarch rather than a private citizen or a knight 
errant.  Throughout The Faerie Queene, Spenser clearly distinguishes between the danger of 
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slander as it applies to a private citizen and how it applies to an active monarch.  Confident in 
the limited ability of slanderers to taint their virtuous targets with their scornful derision, 
Spenser’s knights and ladies dismiss such misdirected admonition with heroic patience.  In 
book one, for example, Abessa and Coreca are characterized by their impassioned slanders of 
the virtuous Una: “they gan loudly bray… / Shamefully at her rayling all the way, / And her 
accusing of dishonesty, / That was the flowre of faith and chastity” (iii, 23.1-5).227   In 
response, Una simply ignores their misdirected slander directed at her, and Coreca, “when 
she saw her prayers nought prevaile,” returns home to stew over her perceived wrong in 
private (iii, 24.1).228  Likewise, Arthur, Amoret and Aemylia, when confronted with the 
railings and admonitions of Sclaunder, “endured all with patience milde” (IV, viii, 28.6).   
Though they are vexed by Sclaunder’s twisted version of the truth, they continue on their 
way, confident in their virtue.  Spenser here reflects the historical reality presented in English 
defamation law.  The slander of a private citizen was difficult, though not impossible, to 
prosecute in sixteenth-century England:  strict requirements detailed that the wronged party 
had to prove the intent of the slanderer, the harm inflicted by the slander, and the 
respectability of the audience to whom the slanderer was speaking. 229  In contrast to the 
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 Corceca rails three times during her encounter with Una (23.3, 23.6, 25.2).  A.C. Hamilton glosses her, 
Abessa and Kirkrapine as an allusion to Martin Marprelate. I would love to believe it, but I am uncomfortable 
applying that level of specificity to the allegory.  More accurately, they represent dissension broadly defined.   
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 In other instances, the target’s ability to dismiss slanderers’ railings is achieved with difficulty.  A 
microcosm of his larger quest, Guyon initially reacts to slander with violence, muzzling Occasion with a scold’s 
bridle.  Later, Guyon is provoked to ire by Cymochles’s “unknightly raylings,” which  kindled his “wrathfull 
fire” (vi, 30.6-7).   As he fully embodies temperance, Guyon ignores the railings of Atin and controls his 
passion: “But sober Guyon, hearing him so raile, / Though somewhat moved in his mightie hart, / Yet with 
strong reason maistred passion fraile, / And passed fairely forth” (vi, 40.2-5). His resolve is refigured with 
Grille, whose hoggish condition Guyon laments, but dismisses with his slander.  
  
229
 In his very thorough examination of cases, R.H. Helmholz posits three requirements that must be met before 
a slander would be declared an actionable offense under the Auctoritate dei patris, or the Constitution of the 
Council of Oxford, which served as the legal basis for early modern English defamation law.  To be guilty of 
defamation, a slanderer must 1) accuse his target of a crime (the definition of “crime” here can range from a 
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difficulty of prosecuting the slander of a private individual, the slander of a monarch was a 
fully actionable offense.   Unlike the reputations of Arthur, Amoret and Una, Mercilla’s 
name is not hers alone: as a monarch, she, like Queen Elizabeth, must protect herself from 
the threats of defamation in order to preserve her kingdom from disorder and unrest.   
In slandering his monarch, Malfont represents a threat to the authority of the state, 
clouding the distinction between virtue and vice, between legitimate and illegitimate power.  
Multiple political  handbooks and humanist texts detail the threat slander poses to a kingdom.  
Most notably, in his Education of a Christian Prince, Erasmus argues that action must be 
brought against any who would tarnish a kingdom by slandering a magistrate.  He claims that 
laws protect the sanctity of the prince and calls for the punishment of a man who “has 
diminished those qualities which make the prince truly great; if his greatness lies in the 
excellence of his mind and the prosperity which his wisdom brings to his people, then anyone 
who undermines these must be accused of lese majeste.” 230  In a similar manner, many 
decrees and proclamations mark the concerted effort by the English government to protect 
the sanctity of the monarch’s name and reputation—and by extension the peace and order of 
the realm.   In 1275, Edward I decreed in scandalum magnatum that the defamation of a 
magistrate or other state official was a punishable offense, an act that was reinvigorated by 
                                                                                                                                                       
specific sinful act to the imputation of a secular crime such as theft); 2)  must utter his statement with malicious 
intent to harm the body, livelihood or reputation of his target; 3) must be believed by “apud bonos et graves” or, 
among good and serious persons—a slander believed by a fool was no threat to the dignity of reputation (xxvi-
xli).  For more thorough treatment of slander law in the sixteenth century, see R.H. Helmholz, Select Cases of 
Defamation to 1600 (London: Selden Society, 1985). 
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 Erasmus emphasizes the importance of the distinction between the office of the prince and his person. 
protesting that a prince must avoid the appearance of revenge and personal investment in punishment, but also 
insisting that the sanctity of the state must be preserved from slander.  The distinction is not clear, however; 
Erasmus states that “the good prince will forgive no offences more easily and willingly than those which 
damage his personal interests…since vengeance is the mark of a weak and mean spirit, and nothing is less 
appropriate to the prince, whose spirit must be lofty and magnanimous” (88).  On the other hand, however, 
Erasmus marks the urgent need for  a prince to take action when his office is impugned (89). See Desiderius 
Erasmus, The Education of a Christian Prince (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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Richard II in 1379 to protect the kingdom from rebellion.231  On September 27, 1579, 
Elizabeth took the unprecedented step of calling in one book, Stubb’s The Discoverie of a 
Gaping Gulf, as “a false libel” because she deemed it likely to foment rebellion by “sounding 
in every subject’s ear both of the manifest lack of her majesty’s princely care (if she should 
mind to marry) and also of the undutiful offices and unnatural intentions of her 
councilors.”232  Such treatment of dissenters is not confined to Elizabeth’s proclamations, 
however.  Positioning “slanderous speeches” as a virulent threat to England’s peace, 
Ferdinando Pulton rehearses the country’s long but murky legal battles against slander and 
bitter defamers in his reformatory text, De pace regis et regni (1609).   Attempting to codify 
and disseminate a vernacular account of English law to the populace in order to educate them 
regarding proper behavior and actionable offenses, Pulton poignantly begins his account of 
vice and law by deriding slander and scornful speech, equating bitter words—which he sees 
as the “roote and principall cause” of discontentment in England—with fomenting rebellion 
capable of destroying the kingdom: 
though slanderous speeches, and menaces, be but words and 
may be taken only as a smoke, breath, or blast of wind, and so 
to vanish and be dispersed in the aire like dust; yet experience 
doth teach us, by the imbecilitie of mans judgement, and the 
corruption of his nature, they be used as firebrands of privat 
and open grudges, quarrels, conspiracies, and most other 
turbulent stratagems, and thereby a verbis ad verbera 
peruentum est.  And  we seldem heare of any ye said 
enormities effected, but they tooke their beginnings of 
menaces, threats, slaunders and other evill words.233   
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 The 1379 version of the decree, which prescribed the specific offices that were protected from slander under 
the previous proclamation, posits that slander must be contained to preserve the stability of English society: 
“Debates and slanders might arise betwixt lords, or between the lords and the commons…and whereof great 
peril and mischief might come to all the realm, and quick subversion and destruction of the said realm”  (qtd in 
Kaplan, The Culture of Slander 22). 
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 Tudor Royal Proclamations, 449. 
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 Ferdinando Pulton, De pace regis et regni (London, 1609), B1r-v. 
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Pulton asserts the infectious nature of scornful speech to be of paramount concern to the 
state, which stands to suffer from the conspiracies and stratagems devised and propagated by 
malicious slanderers.  
Emphasizing Mercilla’s harsh punishment of her slanderer, Spenser acknowledges the 
danger scornful speech poses to the kingdom and the urgency of silencing it.  Spenser 
empowers Mercilla to punish and contain verbal dissent and scornful speech, effectively 
silencing her slanderer by nailing his tongue to a post.  More than simply quieting his scorn, 
however, Mercilla’s punishment of Malfont transforms him from a slanderer into a mute 
symbol of her power.  She utilizes the punished Malfont as an vehicle by which she can 
exercise her authority, in effect, re-substantiating her power as queen from the ashes of 
transgression.  By publicly silencing Malfont, Mercilla reconstructs the evil-speaker as a text 
upon which she demonstrates her authority, attempting to reform her citizens by denouncing 
her slanderer.   
 
The Didactic Power of Scorn 
Malfont is not the only text written upon by monarchical authority in the canto, 
however.  While Malfont’s punishment asserts Mercilla’s power and authority, the giant Awe 
represents a positive affirmation of the respect subjects should show their monarch. 
Functioning as Mercilla’s porter, Awe guards the gate to Mercilla’s palace:  
[The] porch, that most magnificke did appeare, 
  Stood open wyde to all men day and night: 
Yet warded well by one of mickle might, 
  That sate thereby, with gyantlike resemblance 
  To keepe out guyle, and malice, and despight, 
  That under shew oftimes of fayned semblance, 
 Are wont in Princes courts to worke great scath and hindrance.  
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His name was Awe. (ix, 22.5-9, 23.1) 
 
Antithetical to Malfont’s derision of his monarch, Awe demonstrates the correct attitude of 
subjects towards Mercilla, his existence offering a preemptive rebuke to the railing of 
Malfont.  Awe educates the newcomers to Mercilla’s court in proper reverence and is 
portrayed by Spenser as a virtuous alternative to Malfont’s derision.  Awe is respectful and 
admiring of Mercilla’s virtue, while the railer is slanderous and hyper-critical of what he 
perceives to be his monarch’s vice.234  As an emblem of reverence, Spenser positions Awe as 
“the first requirement in preserving the integrity of Mercilla’s court as a palace of justice,” at 
the same time that Malfont demonstrates her might through his punishment.235  Awe acts as 
more than a reminder of courtly etiquette.  While he does not engage Artegall and Arthur as 
they enter the court of mercy—they have proven themselves against the enemies of Mercilla 
already 236—he does act as a intimidating porter to the court and an enforcer of peace and 
order.  While the gate to Mercilla’s palace claims to welcome “all men day and night,” the 
invitation is not without qualification:  the “gyantlike Awe” vets those who seek admission, 
admitting the virtuous, but turning away or punishing the dissemblers.  He sits at the gate, 
winnowing the true courtiers from the chaff.  More than blind reverence, Awe is able to 
discriminate between the morally poor and the virtuous and chivalric.  It is his ability to 
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 Awe here may indirectly reflect lese majeste: understood in early Roman law to imply one that is owed 
reverence, this law came to be associated more directly with the reverence owed to a monarch or ruler after the 
fourth century (89).   For more information on the roots of English defamation law and its link to early modern 
censorship practices, see Debora Shuger, Censorship & Cultural Sensibility (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2006). 
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 Michael F.N. Dixon, The Politicke Courtier: Spenser’s “The Faerie Queene” as a Rhetoric of Justice 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996), 142. 
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 T.K. Dunsheath notes that the three “hindrances to justice against which Awe guards Mercilla’s porch—
guyle, malice, and despight—are exactly the same three that Artegall and Arthur have just overcome. … In the 
logic of the poem, Artegall and Arthur have earned their admission to Mercilla’s Court.”  See  T.K, Dunseath, 
Spenser’s Allegory of Justice in Book Five of The Faerie Queene, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 
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judge character and to discern a person’s moral worth that proves Awe to be the ideal 
guardian of the court, one who protects Mercilla from both insincere flatterers and railers. 237    
Like Artegall’s enforcer Talus, Awe acts as the propagator of Mercilla’s public image and 
the executioner of her will, a position that associates him with the administration of scorn.  
Executing Mercilla’s justice through his brute force, Awe didactically instructs the populace 
to regard their monarch with sincerity, humility, and respect.  Through his scornful 
discrimination, Awe separates Mercilla from the moral decay that contaminates the rest of 
book five.   
Enabled by the discriminating work of Awe, Mercilla constructs her court as an 
earthly substitute for the edenic world of the Garden, separated from the dross of the Iron 
Age which both surrounds her and threatens to breach her walls.   Spenser portrays the 
courtiers crowding Mercilla’s palace as untouched by war and political corruption, 
representing pure and virtuous men in their innocence, unfamiliar with the corruption of the 
world. Apparently unexposed to the sin of violence, the courtiers stand “amazed” and with 
“unwonted terror half affray” to behold Arthur and Artegall as they enter the court in their 
warlike armor (24.3,4): 
 For never saw they there the like array, 
 Ne ever was the name of warre there spoken, 
 But joyous peace and quietnesse always, 
 Dealing just judgements, that mote not be broken 
 For any brybes, or threates of any to be wroken. (24.5-9) 
 
Spenser’s portrayal here recalls the lament for the Golden Age that begins the legend of 
justice: “So oft as I with state of present time, / The image of the antique world compare, / 
When as mans age was in his freshest prime, / And the first blossome of fair virtue bare 
                                                 
237
 Indeed, if we believe Dunseath, Awe acts as Mercilla’s unnamed executor (208). If this is the case, then it is 
Awe who transforms Malfont’s derision of Mercilla into a reassertion of her monarchical authority, effectively 
re-scripting the offender as an emblem of infamy and admonition.  
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(Proem 1.1-4).  As in conventional Golden Age myth, the pureness of Mercilla’s courtiers is 
constructed as a satiric rebuke to the present age.  In subtle contrast to early modern 
courtiers, Mercilla’s courtiers are pure because they are not sinful.  More specifically, his 
language makes his debt to Hesiod’s Works and Days clear:  Hesiod’s is the only Golden 
Age account to mark the bribery and governmental corruption of his contemporaries as 
consequences of the departure of Justice from the earth.238  In particular, Hesiod claims his 
current age is ruled by δωροφάγοι, or “gift-eaters” rather than righteous judges seeking to 
recapture a golden world.  Spenser reflects the negative construction of his source, portraying 
Mercilla’s “just judgements” as golden because they are impervious to the corruption that 
currently ensnares justice.  Despite his portrait of Mercilla’s innocent courtiers, Spenser 
insists upon the necessary place of justice and rebuke in her kingdom. 
Spenser refigures prior Golden Age myths, co-opting their ends of peace and 
innocence but challenging the easy means by which they achieve that end.  As the 
embodiment of justice and mercy, Mercilla presides over the peaceful and edenic world of 
her court in a manner consistent with her allegorical nature, but Spenser insists that this 
golden world, unlike those portrayed by Ovid and Virgil,  is sub lege. 239  Those classical 
accounts promoted mankind’s spontaneous goodness and virtue, thereby envisioning a 
society of mutual respect unencumbered by law; Spenser, however, leaves no doubt that 
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 When the last immortals “go from the wide-wayed earth back on their way to Olympos, forsaking the whole 
race of mortal men, … all that will be left by them to mankind will be wretched pain.  And there shall be no 
defense against evil” (ll. 198-201).  One effect of this departure is the increase in litigation and lawsuits as men 
scheme greedily “for other men’s goods.” (ll. 39) Richard Lattimore, trans. Hesiod: The Works and Days, 
Theogony and The Shield of Herakles, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).  
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 Virgil’s golden world of “Eclogue IV” avoids mention of the law directly, but asserts that its inhabitants 
survive upon the unforced and unconstrained fecundity of nature—he emphasizes the lack of labor in farming 
and shepherding. Virgil, Eclogues, Georgics, Aeneid I – VI, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, revised by G. P. 
Goold (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001), IV, 18-25.  By contrast, Ovid is more 
direct about the lack of law and rule in the golden world. 
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Mercilla’s courtiers achieve their virtue through her rule—and if Malfont is any indication, 
they still transgress.240  By constructing Mercilla as an active monarch, dispensing justice 
and, when needed, punishment, Spenser breaks with the most idealistic convention of Ovid’s 
account:  
Aurea prima sata est aetas, quae vindice nullo, 
  sponte sua, sine lege fidem rectumque colebat. 
  poena metusque aberrant, nec verba minantia fixo 
  aere legebantur, nec supplex turba timebat 
  iudicis ora sui, sed errant sin vindice tuti. 241 
 
Insisting that the Golden Age was ruled quae vindice nullo and sine lege, Ovid articulates its 
goodness and virtue as spontaneous and uncompelled: men are good because they want to be, 
not because they are fearful of punishments that would befall them if they are not.  Spenser is 
not as optimistic as Ovid.  Moving Golden Age myth from the abstract to the particular, 
Spenser constructs Mercilla as not only a simple emblem of mercy and justice, but also as the 
daily application of these virtues to a kingdom. 242   
As an executioner of justice rather than its abstract ideal, Mercilla must fashion her 
courtiers into virtuous citizens through her use of law and punishment.  While this image of 
active justice differs markedly from the passive portrayals of the feminine protagonists of 
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 The existence of Malfont complicates any easy categorization of Mercilla’s courtiers as absolutely pure:  for 
Hesiod, slander works as an innovation of the iron age, a sin which is born out of man’s envy and greed:  “The 
vile man will crowd his better out, and attack him / With twisted accusations and swear an oath to his story. / 
The spirit of Envy, with grim face and screaming voice, / Who delights in evil, will be the constant companion / 
Of wretched humanity (193-197). 
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 Ovid, Metamorphoses, Books I – VIII, trans. Frank Justus Miller, revised by G. P. Goold (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), I, 89-93.  George Sandys translates these lines in the 
seventeenth century as “The Golden Age was first, which uncompeld / And without rule, in Faith and Truth 
exceld. / As then, there was nor punishment nor feare, / Nor threatening laws in brasse prescribed were; / Nor 
suppliant crouching pris’ners shooke to see / Their angrie Judge: But all was safe and free.” George Sandys, The 
First Five Bookes of Ovids Metamorphosis (London, 1621), 4.    
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 For the historical allegory of Queen Elizabeth as Astraea, see Part II of Frances Yates’s wonderful study, in 
particular, “Queen Elizabeth as Astraea” in Astraea: The Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century (Boston: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1999) 29-87. 
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conventional myth—note that Nemesis and Aidos,243 Dike,244 and later Astraea,245 all forsake 
the earth rather than rule corrupted and corrupting mankind—Spenser’s bases Mercilla upon 
his own incarnation of Astraea, a version of the just virgin goddess who promotes peace 
through law.  In the Proem, Spenser stresses Astraea’s ability and agility as a monarch as a 
necessary component of mankind’s virtue:  
 For during Saturnes ancient raigne it’s sayd,  
That all with goodnesse did abound:  
All loved virtue, no man was affrayd 
Of force, ne fraud in wight was to be found: 
No warre was knowne, no dredfull trompets sound, 
Peace universall rayn’d mongst men and beasts, 
And all things freely grew out of the ground: 
Justice sate high ador’d with solemne feasts,  
And to all people did divide her dred beheasts. (9.1-9) 
 
In this account, humanity is virtuous, to be sure, but Spenser is less emphatic than his 
predecessors that such goodness is spontaneous.  He co-opts his source material to emphasize 
the lack of war and violence in the Golden Age, but leaves room for law and even 
punishment as a method of maintaining order and peace.  In direct contrast to those who 
write more conventional accounts, Spenser insists upon the utility of fear in dispensing 
justice, repeating “dred” throughout his Proem—first as a description of the fearful trumpets 
that signal war, then as a adjective for Astraea’s behests, and later describing 
Astraea/Elizabeth as “Dread Soverayne Goddess”—to discredit the idealized unrehearsed 
goodness of mankind in the Golden Age.  Hardly a construction of the Iron Age for Spenser, 
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 Translated from Hesiod by Harry Levin as “Shame” and “Indignation,” Nemesis and Aidos are the last of the 
immortals, leaving earth at the beginning of the iron age. Harry Levin, The Myth of the Golden Age in the 
Renaissance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 15.  
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 An innovation of the Stoic poet Aratus in his poem Phaenomena, Dike leaves even earlier than Nemesis and 
Aidos, fleeing the earth during the age of bronze. See Levin, The Myth of the Golden Age, 15. 
 
245
 Once Dike is positioned as a feminine force in the ages of man, Astraea is not far off; Virgil labels the 
fleeing deity as Virgo; Ovid is the first to call her Astraea. 
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society’s fear of scorn and punishment works to reinforce the law in all ages.  Astraea and 
her “dred behests” will be followed because, if they are not, the transgressors will be 
punished.  Spenser here seems to be revising his source material deliberately to showcase 
Astraea’s—and later, Mercilla’s—use of the law to maintain peace.  Through his description 
of Mercilla’s active participation in law and peace, Spenser calls the reader’s attention to the 
ways in which he alters Golding’s translation:  
Then sprange up first the golden Age, whiche of it selfe maintaind  
The truth and right of every thing unforced and unconstraind.  
There was no feare of punnishment, there was no threatning lawe 
In brazen tables nayld up, to keep the folk in awe. …  
They lived saufe without a judge in every realme and lande.246  
 
More than demonstrating the difference between Ovid’s sine lege and his own sub lege 
golden world, Spenser deliberately plays on Golding’s equation of positive law as a means of 
keeping subjects in “awe.” Transforming scorn from something to be avoided into a 
necessary component of a just society, Spenser reminds the reader of Awe’s role as 
Mercilla’s executioner by likening him to his allegorical equivalent, Talus.247   Although 
positive law is eschewed in Ovid, it is instrumental to justice in Spenser, who allegorizes the 
power of law through the two brutal enforcers Awe and Talus, the iron groom of Artegall 
who represents the embodiment of the unbending and unchanging law throughout the book.  
Spenser insists that, despite the “yron” of his body, Talus is not a product of the Iron Age, 
but was created in an earlier one.248  A gift to Artegall upon her departure to Olympus, Talus 
works as the unflinching enforcer of his master’s administration of iron-age justice, but 
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 Indeed, Talus is replaced by Awe in the episode: no mention of him occurs from the time the two knights 
cross the threshold of the palace of Mercilla until Artegall leaves Mercilla’s palace at V, xi, 36. 
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 Derived from the Greek Talos, Talus is a product of  the bronze age. Dunsheath, 52-54.  
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Spenser argues that he previously operated in this capacity for Astraea: “But when she parted 
hence, she left her groome / An yron man, which did on her attend / Alwayes, to execute her 
stedfaste doome” (I, 12.1-3).   Like Astraea, Mercilla cannot rely complacently upon the 
virtue of her populace to order her kingdom and promote peace.  Instead, she must fashion 
them into virtuous citizens through her “righteous doome” and her “just judgements.”249    
 By rewriting Golding’s Ovid, Spenser complicates the portrayal of perfect and 
spontaneous virtue present in conventional Golden Age myths to interrogate the use-value of 
scorn in the administration of justice.  In introducing Mercilla through representations of 
good and bad speech, Spenser affirms the didactic nature of awe and scorn, challenging the 
earlier myths’ dismissal of such methods.  The embodiment of evil speech, the punished 
Malfont serves as a warning to the newcomers of Mercilla’s court, directing their action and 
speech through the threat of pain and humiliation.  Awe provides a necessary counterpoint to 
the admonition of Malfont, working to affirm the courtier’s respect for Mercilla’s office.   
Emphasizing her desire to educate her courtiers in the ways of justice, Mercilla’s court works 
to blend Golden Age justice with a humanist perception of the virtue.  Embodying 
educational principles, such a humanist version of law insists that the laws enacted by an 
upright prince should be few in number, but should “conform to the ideals of justice and 
honour and have no other purpose than to advance the interests of all.”250 Aligning justice 
with education, Erasmus argues that the best laws promote the virtue of the population 
through example and instruction, stating that the first aim of a magistrate or a prince should 
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 Through theses epithets, Spenser aligns Mercilla with other emblems of active justice in The Faerie Queene, 
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be to induce men to virtuous thought and action.   To accomplish this, a “prince should 
promote the kind of laws which not only prescribe punishment for the guilty but also 
dissuade men from breaking the law.”251 Standing in for the reader, Arthur and Artegall 
correctly interpret the two emblems and proceed into the court with the appropriate caution 
and reverence.   
Despite their insistence upon the didactic nature of laws, both Golden Age myth and 
humanist treatises on government display anxiety as to the role of punishment in a subject’s 
education.  Like Mercilla, Erasmus demonstrates the tricky nature of scorn and rebuke in the 
pursuit of justice.  He firmly states that punishment debases men, arguing that laws should 
work “to deter men from law-breaking more by reasoning than by punishments;” and, 
because man is “the noblest of all creatures, it is only fitting that he should be induced to 
observe the law by rewards, rather than by threats and punishments.”252  Despite his 
assurance of man’s nobility, Erasmus goes on to make room for punishment as a legitimate 
deterrent to sin.  He argues that a variety of methods should be employed to reflect all 
manner of subjects.  While virtuous men respond to rewards, “men of thoroughly servile, or 
rather bestial, disposition must be tamed by chains and the lash.”253  London, appealing to the 
lowest members of society, attempted to fashion its citizenry through visceral and public 
punishments of transgressors, transforming the bodies of condemned men into admonitions 
to the living.  One common example of this type of education greeted early modern travelers 
entering London:  welcomed into the city by the heads of guilty men, newcomers were 
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warned against similar behavior.254  Malfont may be of such a servile disposition, warranting 
the display of his maimed tongue as a punishment for his transgression as well as a warning 
to others, who otherwise would attempt such transgressive behavior.  
 Through his insistence that the Golden Age benefited from law and the administration 
of corrective punishment, Spenser implies that man is not spontaneously virtuous or 
inherently good; rather, Spenser stresses that his virtue must be crafted by education and the 
rigorous application of the law.  Mercilla’s didactic use of Awe and the punished Malfont 
transforms law into instruction, mirroring the task of The Faerie Queene.    As Spenser aims 
to transform his reader into “a gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline” 
through his use of examples and pleasant fictions, Mercilla will fashion her subjects into 
perfect courtiers.  On a simple level, the mute tableaux of Awe and Malfont work to prepare 
Arthur and Artegall, stand-ins for Spenser’s readers, for the entrance of Mercilla.  Once they 
have finished their instruction and are prepared to view Spenser’s Mercilla with reverence 
and dread—the previous application of scorn having been signaled by Malfont’s painful 
piercing—readers are presented with the emblem of divine mercy.   
 
Mercilla’s Emblems of Justice 
Demonstrating the effectiveness of the didactic emblems of Awe and the punished 
Malfont, Arthur and Artegall enter the Presence chamber and, “bowing low before her 
Majestie, / Did to her myld obeysance, as they ought” and “meekest boone, that they imagine 
mought” (V, ix, 34.3-5).  Instructed to be humble by Awe and admonished from criticism by 
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Malfont, Artegall and Arthur prostrate themselves before Spenser’s ideal monarch.   A ruler 
of heavenly justice, Mercilla acts as the earthly deputy of Christ.  Spenser’s portrait of 
Mercilla is more ambiguous than this title would indicate.  While she may embody an ideal 
of Golden Age justice, she also is charged with accommodating that ideal to an earthly and 
fallen world.  Her justice is thus mediated.  She is a Golden Age judge grafted onto the Iron 
Age by her fallen subjects.  As part of justice, she, like Artegall, must struggle to apply of 
mercy and scorn in their due measures. 
Spenser introduces Mercilla by emphasizing her heavenly nature, positioning her as a 
monarch of Christ and his deputy on earth: 
All over her a cloth of state was spred, 
Not of rich tissew, not of cloth of gold, 
Nor of ought else, that may be richest red, 
But like a cloud, as likest may be told, 
That he brode spreading wings did wyde unforld; 
Whose skirts were bordred with bright sunny beams, 
Glistring like gold, amongst the plights enrold, 
And here and there shooting forth silver streames, 
Mongst which crept litle Angels through the glittering gleames. 
 
Seemed those litle Angels did uphold 
The cloth of state, and on their purpled wings 
Did beare the pendants, through their nimblesse bold: 
Besides a thousand more of such, as sings 
Hymnes to high God, and carols heavenly things, 
Encompassed the throne, on which she sate: 
She Angel-like, the heyre of ancient kings, 
And mightie Conquerors, in royall state, 
Whylest kings and kesars at her feet did them prostrate. (ix, 28-29)  
 
As A.C. Hamilton asserts, the imagery of Mercilla’s throne is both scriptural and classical, 
demonstrating the complementary Christian and pagan roots of the Golden Age through 
Spenser’s use of solar and angelic heraldry.  Employing conventional emblems of orthodoxy 
to describe Mercilla, Spenser likens her to both God and Jove, portraying her throne upon a 
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cloud, illuminated by the sun’s radiance.255  In doing so, Spenser represents her as God’s 
merciful representative on earth.  Specifically, Spenser insists that Mercilla’s transcendence 
is linked with her administration of her office, signaled by the angels who support her throne, 
encompassing her as they sing hymns to God.  The emblems surrounding the “Angel-like” 
Mercilla represent not only scriptural affirmations of her virtue, but also the virtue of her 
administration.  Positioned as the allegorical revision of Lucifera’s throne in the house of 
Pride, Mercilla’s seat of power emphasizes her heavenly nature: while Lucifera is 
characterized by her scorn and disdain of the earthly, signaling her untempered ambition, 
Mercilla embodies the virtuous administration of justice.   According to this reading, the 
emblems of orthodox power and authority that surround Mercilla reinforce her image as the 
new Astraea: the angels and sun encompassing her emphasize her divine office and position 
her as the deputy of God, while the rusted sword and chained lion at her feet work to impress 
upon her subjects her restrained, but ever-ready might.  According to this common reading, 
Mercilla’s heavenly attendants suggest that she is able to restore a type of divine harmony on 
earth through her mercy and proper administration of justice.256  One critic, Althea Hume, 
interprets the heavenly accoutrements depicted in Mercilla’s presence chamber as signaling 
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her status as the paragon of virtue: “it is Mercilla, not Isis, who embodies the full nature of 
the book’s virtue.”257   
Far from presenting an emblem of abstracted virtue as he does in the temple of Isis, 
Spenser defines his queen through her ability to dispense righteous justice to her active 
kingdom of transgressive subjects.  Because she governs impure subjects, Mercilla cannot 
rely solely upon mercy; she, on occasion, must couple her mercy with the force of scorn.  As 
a result, Spenser is forced to qualify Mercilla’s divinity, insisting that she is “Angel-like,” 
rather than wholly angelic.  While this epithet is by no means a slight to Mercilla, nor to the 
queen she represents, the repetition of “like” throughout the description—occurring four 
times in the passage—emphasizes Mercilla’s approximation of the divine on earth.  
Importantly, Spenser stops short of casting her as the daughter of God.  In this model, 
Mercilla, and her justice, is fundamentally earthly: Spenser stresses that she is the “heyre of 
ancient kings / And mightie Conquerors” rather than the reincarnation of Saturn.  As an 
earthly, rather than divine, monarch, Mercilla represents the application of justice rather than 
Justice herself: Spenser’s portrait of her revises traditional emblems of justice to create an 
allegory of monarchy that struggles to negotiate carefully the benefits and liabilities of mercy 
and scorn in the administration of justice, never settling for a tight solution that privileges 
one over the other. 
Through his portrayals of the rusted sword, bevy of allegorical virgins, and chained 
lion at her feet, Spenser creates an image of monarchy that has recourse to both scorn and 
mercy in the daily maintenance of her kingdom.  These allegorical representations positioned 
around Mercilla’s throne signal the necessity for balance between scorn and mercy.  Spenser 
implies Mercilla’s restraint through her godly reluctance to wield her force at the same time 
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that he insists scorn must be present in justice.  Mercilla’s occasional recourse to scorn 
presents her as a dynamic and complicated emblem of justice:  she is associated with 
monarchical authority, signaled by the sword of state positioned at her feet; likewise, she is 
associated with anger, demonstrated by the Litae’s pleas for temperance and pardon; finally, 
she is associated even with brutality, represented by the lion who growls beneath her. 
Spenser employs these dynamic emblems of monarchical order and justice to 
demonstrate Mercilla’s—and Elizabeth’s—active struggle to administer justice virtuously.  
All of the emblems positioned on or around Mercilla signify the process of dispensing justice 
through monarchical force, rather than an abstract conception of the virtue.  The first emblem 
of monarchical power Spenser includes in Mercilla’s portrait is her rusting and resting sword, 
denoting the present peace and tranquility of her kingdom but also threatening her enemies 
with the promise of her force and her authority.  Perhaps derived from a 1585 state portrait 
painted by Marcus Gheeraerts I that portrays Elizabeth holding an olive branch with a sword 
at her feet, Spenser’s portrayal of Mercilla and her sword reflects a historic ambivalence 
fostered by Elizabeth, who marketed herself as a monarch who privileged peace over war. 258  
In this, she differed from her father and half-brother, who wielded the sword of state as an 
emblem of their royal authority, signifying their power as kings and as disciples of the Word 
through the sword’s promise of wrath and violence.259  In contrast to their scornful and 
warlike portraits, Elizabeth was more often painted with the royal scepter, demonstrating her 
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 In the portrait, a crowned Elizabeth holds an olive branch in one hand and gloves and a fan in her other, 
signaling her peaceful reign and feminine demeanor.  Adding to the portrait of Elizabeth as a domestic queen,  a 
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peaceful administration of her kingdom.  In fact, she is only rarely portrayed with the sword 
of state at her feet, and, when she is, she holds feminine signifiers of peace to balance 
symbolically the violent instrument of force.260  By portraying Mercilla holding the royal 
scepter with the sword of state at her feet, Spenser likewise balances his portrait of the queen: 
 Holding a Scepter in her royall hand, 
 The sacred pledge of peace and clemencie, 
 With which high God had blest her happie land, 
 Maugre so many foes, which did withstand. 
 But at her feet her sword was likewise layde, 
 Whose long rest rusted the bright steely brand; 
 Yet when as foes enforst, or friends sought ayde, 
 She could it sternely draw, that all the world dismayed.  (39.2-9) 
 
In this passage, the present peace of Mercilla’s kingdom is matched by the ever-present 
threat of her anger.  The power of the monarch’s scepter—depicting her divine office and 
God’s approval of her rule—is matched by the power of the monarch’s sword—depicting her 
ability to protect scornfully her kingdom.  By constructing Mercilla this way, Spenser 
poetically revises Elizabeth’s portrayal of her own monarchical authority, assuming 
emblematic elements from conventional representations of justice.  Typically, Justice 
clutches in one hand measuring scales denoting the weighing of evidence, or, rarely, a 
cornucopia signifying peace; in her other hand, she holds her sword, demonstrating her might 
and power to administer her will fully. 261  In Cesare Ripa’s Nova Iconologia (1618), three of 
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 To my knowledge, Elizabeth was never depicted holding both the scepter and the sword (either at her feet or 
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the four figures of justice hold scales and swords: 262  Justice Rigorous, portrayed as a 
crowned skeleton representing the strictest interpretation of the law, is armed with both 
emblematic instruments; Inviolable Justice and even Justice Divine, portrayed on a cloud and 
backlit by the sun like Mercilla, are similarly armed.263  Only Justice, fully embodied and 
decked in jewels, is portrayed as empty-handed.  To create a unique emblem of monarchical 
justice, Spenser combines these emblems, emphasizing Mercilla’s mercy by removing 
Justice’s sword from her person, but also dismissing from his portrait the allegorical 
significance of Justice’s scales. 264  By replacing the scales that weigh “right and wrong” with 
a royal scepter that signifies monarchical authority, Spenser potentially associates Mercilla 
with corrective rather than distributive justice, marking her power and scorn of transgression 
as vital aspects of her role as monarch.265  Spenser reinforces this reading by describing 
Mercilla as able to draw her sword  so “sternly…that all the world dismayed,” highlighting 
the necessity of scorn in war and overtly reminding his audience that to be effective, mercy 
                                                                                                                                                       
Shall reap no gain where former rule still peace  
   hath taught to know. … 
My rusty sword through rest shall first his edge employ 
To poll their tops that seeks such change or gape  
   for future joy. (115) 
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 These emblems are available in Aptekar’s Icons of Justice, 56. 
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 Elizabeth actively co-opts the image of divine justice wielding a mighty sword in order to justify not only her 
claim to the throne, but also her supremacy of the Church of England:  the frontispiece of The Bishops’ Bible 
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must be balanced with a will to execute justice, even brutally.266  The placement of 
Mercilla’s warlike accessory also speaks to Spenser’s—and perhaps Elizabeth’s—anxiety 
regarding the role of scorn in justice, enabling the allegorical queen to distance herself from 
her use of wrath and force as she did with Malfont: she acknowledges its necessary 
application, but is able to keep such anger and violence from tainting her person, demeaning 
violence by placing the instrument of scorn at her feet, below her, but still within reach.267   
Spenser continues to describe Mercilla in ambivalent terms.  She is alternately a 
divine embodiment of perfect mercy and an earthly judge administering her fallen kingdom.  
In particular, Spenser’s inclusion of the Litae at the feet of Mercilla presents conflicting 
readings.  As Aptekar asserts, the specific classical root of Spenser’s Litae is unclear: they 
represent an amalgamation of Homer’s Litae—personified prayers for forgiveness and 
mercy—and Hesiod’s virginal Dikê, Eunomie and Eirene—abstract representations of 
justice, equity, and peace.268  Spenser’s combination of his classical sources—Homer’s Iliad 
and Hesiod’s Theogony—result in a portrayal of the Litae that both reinforce Mercilla’s 
divinity, positioning her as Jove—the divine judge of all subjects—but also challenge the 
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perception of Mercilla as perfect virtue.  According to the latter reading, they imply that her 
emotions and judgments may need to be softened, and her justice mediated still further by the 
Litae’s pleas for temperance. Spenser’s version of the Litae work to mitigate the wrath of 
mighty Jove on the behalf of men.  They are depicted as beautiful, saint-like intercessors:  
  And round about, before her feet there sate 
A bevie of faire Virgins clad in white, 
That goodly seem’d t’adorne her royall state, 
All lovely daughters of high Jove, that hight 
  Litae, by him begot in loves delight, 
  Upon the righteous Themis: those they say 
  Upon Joves judgement seat wayt day and night, 
  And when in wrath he threats the worlds decay, 
  They doe his anger calme, and cruell vengeance stay. (V, ix, 31) 
 
Spenser positions the Litae in the same place as he does Mercilla’s sword, initially 
introducing them as ornaments at Mercilla’s feet, heralding her divinity and virtue: “A bevie 
of faire Virgins … That goodly seem’d to adorne her royal state” (31.2-3).  Much like the 
angels who fly about her throne, the Litae are shown first as emblems of superfluous 
goodness, but also come to signify Mercilla’s need to balance her administration of justice 
with careful consideration of the law, equity and mercy. 269  
Begotten by Jove and the “righteous” Themis, Spenser’s Litae are associated with 
both divine justice and earthly corrective justice.  By combining these two mythological 
intercessors in his version of the Litae, Spenser emphasizes their mercy, temperance and pity 
for the unfortunate, creating an necessary complement to the scornful justice of the Iron Age.  
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On one hand, their paternity affirms the Litae as divine offspring, reconciling the pagan Jove 
and the Christian God through Spenser’s allusion to the four daughters of the Father: Justice, 
Truth, Fortitude and Peace.  On the other hand, Hesiod asserts that the Litae are born younger 
siblings to the Horae, begotten by Jove and Themis after the fall of Saturn.  Their lineage 
demonstrates the end of the perfection of the Golden Age on earth, marking the Litae as 
necessary mediators between the gods and man. 270  For Spenser, the Litae may emblematize 
the perfect dispensers of accommodated Justice: they are associated with both divine and 
earthly justice from their birth and are charged with the merciful task of cooling the effects of 
Jove’s anger and vengeance on earth.  Striving to protect mankind from the inevitable 
annihilation they would suffer if Jove were allowed to administer Justice according to 
mankind’s dessert, the Litae resemble Spenser’s Protestant conception of divine mercy, 
granting the Father’s children better than they merit.271  Given the heavenly reward that their 
sins would more appropriately earn, mankind could never enjoy paradise without such 
prayers.  The Litae prevent mankind from such a fate through their intercession.  Spenser 
does not leave the Litae in the heavens, however; he asserts that they are outsourced to 
earthly monarchs as well, positioned as suitors to their thrones: 
  They also doe by his divine permission 
  Upon the thrones of mortall Princes tend, 
  And often treat for pardon and remission 
  To suppliants, through frayltie which offend. 
  Those did upon Mercillas throne attend: 
  Just Dice, wise Eunomie, myld Eirene.  
  And them amongst, her glorie to commend, 
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  Sate goodly Temperance in garments clene, 
And sacred Reverence, yborne of heavenly strene. (32) 
 
Insisting that the Litae “did upon Mercilla’s throne attend,” Spenser’s inclusion of them in 
her Presence Chamber signals the poet’s possible qualification of the earthly monarch, 
cautioning the reader to examine more closely Spenser’s portrait of idealized justice.   
More so than the rusted sword at her feet, the Litae signal to the reader the ways in 
which Mercilla fulfills her role as a judge of perfect mercy and justice, but also insist that the 
reader remember the ways in which Mercilla is limited by the fallenness of her subjects.  
Trying to correct the sins and mitigate the suffering of those who “though frayltie … offend,” 
the Litae mirror the work of Mercilla, applying law, equity and mercy to the reformation of  
the flesh.  By doing so, the Litae, like Mercilla, attempt to recreate a golden world.  Mercilla 
and the Litae are not the same, however.  Unlike the angels and the personifications 
Temperance and Reverence who exist to commend the glory of Mercilla to those ignorant of 
her virtue (34.7-9), the Litae are described as taking an active role in her government, 
“attending” Mercilla’s throne.  Seeking the pardon of sins and remission of punishment 
where warranted, the Litae struggle to affirm mercy as a legitimate instrument of reformation 
in the Iron Age, attempting to promote mercy as a means of inculcating virtue and justice.  
Because they work within the moral decay of the Iron Age, however, they cannot show 
mercy to everyone.  The reader is left to suppose that the heinous nature of his crime and its 
threat to public order exempt Malfont from mercy, his “frayltie” offending Mercilla’s 
reputation and hindering her ability to administer justice “with indifferent grace” (IX, 36.4).  
They likewise are swept from the throne during the trial of Duessa—the voices of pardon and 
remission silenced by the corruption of her sin.   
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While Spenser positions scorn as an unrealized or absent threat of Justice in the two 
previous emblems, he further complicates his allegory in his third symbol of monarchical 
power, the chained Lion at Mercilla’s feet.  In contrast to the previous emblems, the 
restrained lion upon which Mercilla sits may signal her active application of scorn in the 
administration of justice.  As Aptekar compellingly asserts, the Lion at Mercilla’s feet 
represents simultaneously the righteous strength of Mercilla’s monarchical force and the 
hostile opposition to such authority: 272   
Thus did she sit in royall rich estate, 
 Admyr’d of many, honoured of all,  
 Whylest underneath her feete, there as she sate, 
 An huge great Lyon lay, that mote appall 
 An hardie courage, like captived thrall, 
 With a strong yron chaine and coller bound, 
 That once he could not move, not quich at all; 
 Yet did he murmure with rebellious sound 
 And softly royne, when salvage choler gan redound. (33) 
In this passage, the Lion can be interpreted optimistically as a symbol of raw, impassioned 
power tempered by idealized Mercy and Justice, but also can be read more cynically as 
Mercilla’s use of force.     
If the Lion beneath Justice symbolizes the “superseding of the Old Covenant by the 
New, Justice by Mercy,” then he refigures Isis’s dominion over the Crocodile—Spenser’s 
representation of “forged guile” and “open force”—reflecting the Lion’s status as a useful 
instrument of Justice (vii, 7.3,4).273  This reading would have its antecedent in the Lion of the 
legend of holiness, whose “bloodie rage” and “furious force” represent his raw power, which 
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is tempered by Una’s gentleness and the Lion’s pity for her undeserved plight (I, iii, 5.8-9).  
Mercilla’s Lion also cautions that the raw power of royal force should be restrained, lest it 
have recourse to cruelty or tyranny, possibly referring to Seneca’s admonition  to Nero: Quid 
enim interest, oro te, Alexander, leoni Lysimachum obicias an ipse lacers dentibus tuis? 
Tuum illud os est, tua illa feritas.274  These readings are by no means clear-cut, however.  If 
the Lion is meant to be read as tyranny, then the allegory appears to denote Justice’s own 
attempts at self-restraint, a reading not incompatible with the previous emblem of the Litae.  
Conversely, were the Lion to signify Justice’s use of force, Mercilla’s restraints speak to the 
volatile nature of brutality and violence.   
One point upon which Spenser insists, however, calls these readings into question: the 
Lion’s restraints demonstrate that he potentially poses a specific danger to the court and the 
state and must be contained by Mercilla.  Indeed, Spenser associates him overtly with 
rebellion.  According to this reading, the Lion is not an instrument of justice like the rusted 
sword or the Litae; rather, he is acted upon by Justice, becoming the captive of Mercilla and 
reflecting her use of scorn and mercy in her administration.  As Justice’s prisoner, the 
restrained lion reflects anxieties similar to those portrayed in the punished Malfont.  These 
two restrained transgressors represent the paradox of scorn: both are former emblems of 
transgressive action transformed through their punishment into vehicles upon which 
monarchical force can act.  Like Malfont, who is charged with slandering the office of his 
queen, the Lion also is associated with dissenting speech: he murmurs “with rebellious 
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sound,” threatening Mercilla and her kingdom with his “salvage choler.”275  To an extent, 
Mercilla is able to contain the Lion’s violence: although he is described as both “huge” and 
“great,” the Lion is positioned as a weak captive, submissive under Mercilla, unable to move 
amid the confines of his iron bands, causing his “hardie courage” to be made pale.  Even 
though she employs a less violent punishment than she does with Malfont, Mercilla still is 
able to contain the Lion’s royal roar, reducing it to a murmur that only hints “softly” at his 
savage anger.     
Like the punished Malfont, the imprisoned Lion at Mercilla’s feet demonstrates the 
inherent paradox exposed in portraying idealized Justice amid the moral decay of the fallen 
world:  in her attempt to reform her sinning subjects, Mercilla must utilize all the means of 
justice at her disposal—monarchical authority, wrath, and even brutal force—signaling the 
tension in the canto between the justice’s divine agent and its very earthly administration.  
Restrained by Mercilla’s “yron” bands, the Lion demonstrates that rebellion can only be kept 
at bay with Iron-Age instruments: the lion’s violence can be quelled only by Mercilla’s use 
of scorn.  The mute emblems positioned on or around the person of the queen speak subtly to 
her negotiation of scorn and mercy, statically signaling Mercilla’s struggle to accommodate 
divine justice to the fallen world.   In her trial of Duessa, which immediately follows this 
description of Mercilla, readers see the whole Mercilla, consisting of heavenly and earthly 
justice, Litae and Lion, in action. 
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185 
 
The Trial of Scorn and Mercy 
Representing the allegorical battle between scorn and mercy, the trial of Duessa is 
positioned as the poetic focus of the legend of justice and presents Spenser’s most complete 
statement regarding the instrumental value of these two emotions in dispensing justice.  
Through the trial performed in Mercilla’s court, Spenser animates the static, if ambivalent, 
allegory of Mercilla enthroned, demonstrating her active participation in justice and her 
negotiation of pity and scorn.  Recalling the language of Seneca’s De Clementia, Spenser 
opposes the allegorical construction of scorn, represented by the prosecution, to that of pity, 
represented by the defense.  Both allegorize the extremes of mercy:  while Zele is 
characterized as the scornful derider of vice who cruelly castigates the villainess Duessa for 
the crimes she allegedly has committed against Mercilla, the defense, begun with Pittie, 
argues for the mitigation of Duessa’s punishment on the grounds of her birth and sex.  
Seneca’s text prefigures this balance, speaking of perfect mercy by asserting that which it is 
not. On the one hand, mercy is not vengeance: clementia est temperantia animi in potestate 
ulciscendi vel lentias superioris adversus inferiorem in constituendis poenis.276  However, 
mercy also can go too far in the other direction, resembling pity: misericordia est aegritudo 
animi ob alienarum miseriarum speciem aut tristitia ex alienis malis contracta, quae 
addidere immerentibus credit.277 Flanked by the knights Artegall and Arthur who are to be 
instructed by the trial, Mercilla sits in judgment of scorn and pity, tasked with dispensing her 
brand of justice “with indifferent grace” (36.4) to a fallen and treasonous subject. 
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   The knights Arthur and Artegall are instructed in the ways of justice through the 
didactic trial performed before them.  Meant as an educational exercise, the trial of Duessa 
gives occasion for Mercilla to increase the storehouse of Arthur and Artegall’s knowledge of 
justice—and, indeed, presents one of the few instances in The Faerie Queene where Arthur is 
presented as a student rather than a savior.  To this end, she invites them to take part in the 
trial so that they might “understand” and “witnesse forth aright” the case before them 
(37.4,5), learning how “lawes oughte to be fashioned unto the manners and condition of the 
people to whom they are meante”:278 
 Taking them up unto her stately throne, 
 Where they mote heare the matter thoroughly scand 
 On either part, she placed th’ one on th’ one, 
 The other on the other side, and neare them none. (37.4-9) 
 
By placing them on either side of her throne, Mercilla refigures the scales in which she, 
marked as Justice personified, will balance the pity argued of the defendant and the scorn 
urged by the prosecution.279  Mercilla elevates the two knights onto her throne in order that 
they too will be able to judge reasonably the case before them: but, over the course of the 
trial, the two knights will come to reflect the two extremes of mercy being argued.  Arthur, 
with “great ruth” will side with Pittie, while Artegall, forever scornful of transgression, will 
side with Zele (46.6).  Mercilla alone will strike the proper balance.  Showing  the two 
knights their “doctrine by ensample” rather by “rule,” Mercilla perfects Artegall and Arthur 
in the administration of justice.280   
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The Defense: 
Embodying Seneca’s conception of pity, Duessa’s affirmative defense consists 
wholly of emotional appeals, articulated to mitigate the sentence against her rather than to 
prove her innocence. Before she ever speaks, Duessa is regarded as an object of pity, the 
guilt of her sins overwhelmed by her beauty, rank, and wretchedness:  
 Then was there brought, as prisoner to the barre, 
 A Ladie of great countenance and place, 
But that she it with foule abuse did marre; 
Yet did appeare rare beautie in her face,  
But blotted with condition vile and base, 
 That all her other honour did obscure, 
 And titles of nobilitie deface: 
 Yet in that wretched semblant, she did sure 
 The peoples great compassion unto her allure. (38)   
 
In this passage, the conflict between Duessa’s original virtues and her present corruption is 
poetically realized by Spenser’s consistent use of contradiction: he begins four of nine lines 
with transitions, each signifying a change in perspective.  His description of her begins in 
praise of Duessa’s beauty and rank, moves to condemnation of her sins, returns to praise of 
her beauty, counters the assertion with her “condition vile and base” and then closes with 
Spenser’s argument that, despite—or perhaps because of—her crimes, she is pitied for her 
wretchedness.281  Building upon the compassion elicited from her appearance, Duessa 
mounts her defense to argue, as Michael Dixon asserts, “the indecorum of treating her as an 
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object of punishment rather than ‘great ruth.’”282 To achieve that goal, she calls allegorical 
witnesses that plead for mitigation and pardon under a dubious interpretation of the laws of 
equity rather than her innocence according to the laws of justice.  She begins her case with 
Pittie, who “with full tender hart” argues for compassion from the judges before her, and 
augments her claims with those of Regard of womanhead, Daunger, who “threatens hidden 
dread,” Nobilitie of birth, “that bread / great ruth through her misfortunes tragicke stowre” 
and closes with the arguments of Griefe, who couples her pleas with tears for Duessa (45.2-
9).  Indeed, some of her arguments work:  after hearing her case, Arthur is “inclined much 
unto her part” (46.3).   
Spenser’s description of Arthur’s pity for Duessa is derived almost certainly from 
Seneca’s conception of misericordia in De Clementia, where he argues that, a sign of weak 
nature, unreasonable pity should be avoided by truly wise men.283  Momentarily falling from 
virtue into what Thomas Elyot calls “vain pity,” the Briton Prince is persuaded by the 
arguments of Pittie and Nobilitie of birth, who argue for the tempering of Duessa’s 
punishment. 284   Characterized by his waning indignation, Arthur is moved “in tender hart” 
to pity her “dreadfull fate” (46.1,4), his anger at her sins abated by his “great ruth” for her 
wretched plight (46.6). Such unmanly and unreasonable pity weakens the natural “courage” 
of Arthur, and, as Seneca argues, is brought about by the plight of others, with no 
consideration of the cause or the righteousness of such suffering.285  Whereas mercy is 
governed by justice and equity, pity seeks to replace justice with a compassion that would 
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pardon all offense regardless of what is fair and right.  Arthur’s pity for Duessa must be 
countered and corrected by Zele, who represents in his scorn of transgression the opposite 
vice, cruelty.    
 
The Prosecution: 
In contrast to the affirmative defense articulated by Pittie and Nobilitie of birth, who 
make no attempt to mask their client’s guilt but instead appeal to the judges’ pity, Zele’s case 
against Duessa represents justice’s scorn of transgression.  Informed by a prosecutor’s moral 
and legal authority, Zele works to disclose Duessa’s sins in order to procure a guilty verdict 
against her.   Defined by Thomas Becan as “anger meddled with and mixed with love, ” zeal 
embodies the power of godly scorn and righteous indignation to reform vice.286  Spenser 
seems to agree, introducing his Zele in complementary terms and aligning him with 
legitimate anger. Spenser justifies his occupation and praises him for his insight: 
Then up arose a person of deepe reach 
  And rare insight, hard matters to revele. (39.1-2) 
 
Here, Spenser charges Zele with the hard task of bringing to light the sins he discovers, 
divulging wrongdoing to the world that the perpetrator might be discovered and corrected.  
His “deepe reach” and “rare insight” make him ideally suited for the job of revealing “hard 
matters” that would otherwise be concealed and lie beyond the scope of justice and 
reformation. 287  By doing so, he exemplifies zeal. Spenser’s description of his allegorical 
prosecutor resembles Bishop Sandys’ encouragement to punish the sinful: “It is not sufficient 
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to mislike sin,” he argues, “one must proceed against it, zealous in God’s cause.”288  Sandys 
affirms the necessity of a thorough punishment of vice, arguing that “if inequity do abound 
for want of punishment, they which have authority … to repress sin, must answer for it.”289  
Despite his insistence that magistrates and governors are responsible for putting down vice, 
Sandys remains vague about what type of reproof will best serve the purpose of reformation.  
By simply asserting that one should “proceed” against vice, Sandys leaves unanswered the 
question which also plagues Spenser: what is the best method and manner of reproving vice?    
Zele’s actions against Duessa attempt to puzzle out the same question.  Proceeding against 
vice, Zele attempts to make the difficult easy and the opaque clear in order to reform 
Mercilla’s subjects.  Because of Zele’s actions, Malfont’s crime, once veiled in slander and 
unknown to his judge, is now “plainely red,” exposing him and his crime to the infamy of 
Mercilla’s courtiers so that they may be instructed.  Zele intends to do the same with Duessa, 
whose guilt the reader need not doubt. 
As a prosecutor of crimes against the state, Zele is linked with justice’s scorn of 
transgression; his ability to “charm his tongue,” more specifically links Zele with satire.  
Spenser’s description of the prosecutor associates Zele with a great facility of language, 
constructing Zele as more than a good orator: 
That well could charm his tongue, and time his speech 
  To all assayes; his name was called Zele. (39.3-4)  
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On a narrative level, Spenser asserts that Zele knows what to say, when, and to whom, 
judging from the occasion the appropriateness of his speech and style.  Interpreted more 
skeptically, however, Spenser’s insistence that Zele is able to “charm his tongue” to procure 
a verdict likens the speech of the legitimate prosecutor to that of the malevolent scorners 
wreaking satiric havoc in The Faerie Queene.  Most overtly, Zele’s tongue reminds the 
reader of the discordant and railing tongues of villains throughout The Faerie Queene: while 
Malfont’s tongue figures prominently in this study, Occasion, Ate, Sclaunder, and the Blatant 
Beast are all introduced through their destructive instruments of criminal articulation.290  
These vice-spewing tongues, who figuratively attempt to destroy their targets by inflaming 
their passions or destroying their reputations with slander, have their historical root in earlier 
“incantational satire,” a mode of discourse among Celtic bards that sought to cause the real 
destruction of the poet’s target through satiric curses, rhythmic chanting and magical 
incantations, a mode Spenser evokes through his use of the verb “charm” to denote Zele’s 
oratorical mastery.291  The early Celtic satirist was said to chant bitter verses of disdain, 
repeating the name of his enemy in order cause his opponent bodily harm or, as Mary Claire 
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Randolph argues, “word-death.”292  Spenser links harmful tongues to magical incantation 
throughout The Faerie Queene, beginning as early as the first canto: Spenser introduces his 
readers to Archimago, who, in a manner very similar to that of Zele, could “file his tongue as 
smooth as glas” (I, i, 35.7).  Like Zele’s ability to “charm his tong” in order to procure his 
judge’s disdain of Duessa, Archimago’s magical speech represents the destructive qualities 
of oratory and satire.  Zele and Archimago present two sides of the same coin: they represent 
the very real harm of scorn, but while Zele represents the legitimate use of scorn in justice, 
castigating his target in order to enumerate her crimes and discover her guilt, Archimago is 
associated with the slander of perfect divine virtue.293  As Spenser proceeds in his description 
of Zele’s methods of achieving justice, however, the initial gulf between the righteous scorn 
of transgression and cruel slander begins to contract.   
Initially, Zele’s prosecution of Duessa resembles that of his monarch: he distances 
himself from his use of scorn by casting Duessa as the author of her own punishment.  In 
doing so, Zele attempts to efface his role through his emphasis upon Duessa’s obvious guilt 
and the righteousness of her punishment.  As Spenser does in his arraignment of Malfont, 
Zele constructs Duessa as the sole actor of her punishment, presenting her crimes and sins as 
evidence of her wickedness.  Zele is supported in this by Spenser, who credits providence 
with the discovery of Duessa’s “cursed plot” and insists upon the righteousness of the 
conspirator’s punishment.   Spenser asserts that, in plotting against Mercilla, “th’actors won 
the meede meet for their crymes. / Such be the meede of all, that by such mene / …false 
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Duessa now untitled Queene, / Was brought to her sad doome” (42.5-6.7-8).  Equating the 
means and the discovery of her plot through his alliteration and internal rhyme structure, 
Spenser demonstrates that Duessa has brought herself to her “sad doome.”   Such tight and 
exclusive association between the criminal, the crime and the punishment attempts to efface 
Zele’s complicity in her prosecution and reiterate his scorn as a justified and morally 
appropriate response to her actions.  Like Malfont, Duessa appears to damn herself rather 
than appearing to be damned by Zele’s scorn.  Zele indicts her finally “for vyld treasons, and 
outrageous shame, / which she against the dred Mercilla oft did frame” (40.8-9), presenting 
damning evidence of Duessa’s own making.  Zele employs the testimony of her accomplices 
Blandamour and Peridell to solidify her guilt, letting her own actions damn her in the eyes of 
the judges.  To this evidence, Zele adds the testimonies of the weighty authorities Kingdomes 
care, Authority, Nations, Religion, and Justice.  Calling upon her collaborators and the ethos 
of abstract virtues, Zele builds a compelling case for Duessa’s guilt. Indeed, Duessa makes 
little attempt to refute the charges presented; instead, she pleads powerfully for pity and 
compassion to mitigate the sentence before her.  These appeals to unreasonable and unjust 
pity must be countered by Zele, who appeals to the opposite vice in order to enforce her guilt 
among the judges.  
More overtly employing the language of satire, Zele embodies the scorn of both a 
prosecutor and a satirist:  he scornfully arraigns Duessa for her sins in order to expose her to 
infamy, urge her prompt execution by the state, and to quell the pity of the judges who might 
be tempted to mitigate her sentence.  While the incantational satire of early Celtic bards 
attempted to kill a man through words alone, Zele seeks to counter Duessa and the pity she 
engenders through his ability to “procure” her destruction (39.9).  Although ultimately he 
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will argue for Duessa’s execution at the hands of the state, here, his violent upbraiding also 
works to counter another foe, the potential pity of the judges: 
  He gan that Ladie strongly to appele 
  Of many haynous crymes, by her enured, 
  And with sharpe reasons rang her such a pele, 
  That those, whom she to pitie had allured,  
  He now t’abhorre and loath her person had procured. (39.5-9) 
 
The violence of Zele’s language reflects satire’s penchant for flailing its victim in order to 
demonstrate its authority and re-substantiate virtue.   Zele’s corporal language juxtaposes the 
prosecutor’s rational and legal reasons for procuring a guilty verdict with the language of 
violent rebuke in order to quell the judges’ weakness:  while rational, his reasons are 
“sharpe” and he uses them to ring “her such a pele.”   Like Artegall and Talus’s punishment 
of Sanglier, Pollente, and Munera, Zele’s linguistic battery of Duessa is administered to 
amend the judges’ unreasonable pity of the villainess rather than to bring about the criminal’s 
reformation.  He berates Duessa to instruct the knights in the dangers of indulging their pity 
of transgression, encouraging them to view Duessa skeptically, to “abhorre and loath her 
person.”  To emphasize this goal, Spenser’s description of her arraignment positions Duessa 
as an instrument of Zele rather than the ultimate goal of justice: although she is the one on 
trial, Duessa is made another agent by which he will instruct the foreign knights in the ways 
of justice.  Like his description of Malfont, Spenser continually marginalizes Duessa and her 
crimes, subordinating the specifics of her behavior and prosecution in order to privilege the 
education of Arthur and Artegall: 
Strongly did Zele her haynous fact enforce, 
  And many other crimes of foul defame 
  Against her brought, to banish all remorse, 
  And aggravate the horror of her blame. (43.1-4) 
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Zele seeks not to reform Duessa, but to convert the judges’ compassion for her into a more 
actionable hatred and loathing of her sins.  He “strongly” berates her for her vices, reminding 
her audience of her “crimes of foul defame” in order to remove their pity for the vile 
transgressor and to prevent their pardon of her sins.   
Enumerating her sins in order to defame her, Zele’s arguments here align the 
prosecution with satire’s punitive employment of infamy.294  Resembling Mercilla’s 
treatment of Malfont, Zele will re-substantiate his authority by transforming Duessa from an 
emblem of criminality into a vehicle upon which he may exert his scorn.  Unlike Mercilla, 
however, Zele is prone to cruelty:  he aggravates “the horror of her blame” to argue for the 
ultimate fairness and rectitude of rigorous justice over subjective and fraudulent pity.295  To 
achieve his goal of banishing the judges’ remorse of her, Zele scornfully acts upon Duessa, 
subjecting her to the wrath of the law and his own rigorous interpretation of it.  When his 
appeals to authority, her certain guilt, and the dangers of pity prove unable to counter Pittie’s 
emotional argument, Zele changes tactics. 
To instruct Arthur to shun unreasonable pity for Duessa, Zele adds cruelty to his 
“earnest fervour,”  transforming his scornful speech of Duessa to “despight,” erasing the 
moral distance between himself and the criminal railers who people The Faerie Queene.296  
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Faced with Arthur’s “great ruth,” Zele must  “augment” his rebuke of Duessa to convince the 
Prince of the heinousness of her crimes and the justness of her strict punishment (46.8-9).  By 
doing so, Zele embodies Seneca’s definition of cruelty: Crudelitas, quae nihil aliud est quam 
atrocitas animi in exigendis poenis.297  The cruel, Seneca argues, are qui puniendi causam 
habent, modum non habent.298   However much Seneca would rebuke him, Zele exhibits 
harshness that works.  He is able to persuade Arthur to scorn Duessa by calling his second set 
of witnesses against her. Zele’s relentless and ruthless pursuit of justice highlights the 
problem of administering justice in the fallen world to fallen subjects:  while godly anger 
must remain untarnished by personal vengeance, concerned instead with the public moral 
good, the administration of punishment is unavoidably personal.299  On one hand, godly 
anger is useful to justice, checking the spread of sin; on the other hand, anger, however 
godly, tarnishes justice’s impartiality.  Christianity charges justice to punish the sin and not 
the sinner, placing Christian judges in a quandary as to how best to curb the vice of a 
kingdom: through Christian mercy, which would forgive crime against the state, or through 
cruelty, which would punish criminals.  
To correct Arthur’s unreasonable sympathy, Zele examines Duessa with cruelty.  
Beginning with the discord-loving Ate and culminating in the sinful Murder, Sedition, 
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Incontinence of lyfe, Adulterie and Impietie, Zele’s witness list embodies the vices of the 
private and the public spheres.  Like Zele’s previous use of scornful speech, this tactic is 
successful because it implies, on a superficial level, that Duessa is responsible for her current 
situation, that “her own actions are witness against her, that she brings on her indictment as a 
result of her own crimes.” 300  Having conjured the spirit from hell, Duessa opens herself to 
be condemned by Ate.  On another level, however, Zele’s choice of witnesses compromises 
his own credibility: in his fervor to prove “Duessa’s guilt, Zele paradoxically aligns himself 
with the very crimes he seeks to condemn.”301   Zele’s calling of Ate, as well as the 
allegorical vices which come to the stand after her, complicates any reading of Duessa and 
Zele as mere criminal and prosecutor:  Spenser deliberately blurs the lines between these two 
poles to order to challenge Zele’s use of cruel scorn in his attempt to procure his verdict.  
Derived from Homer’s goddess of discord, Ate is directly associated with duplicity 
and falsehood, her forked tongue making her a particularly unreliable witness for the 
prosecution.  The hell-born Ate embodies the crimes of slander and scornful speech: she 
sews the “seedes of evill wordes and factious deedes,” which, when ripe, grow into  
“Tumultuous trouble and contentious iarre” (IV, i, 25.5,8).    In keeping with her demonic 
character, Ate slanders Duessa not in the interests of justice, but in order to cause further 
discord: 
 She, glad of spoyle and ruinous decay, 
 Did her appeach, and to her more disgrace, 
 The plot of all her practice did display. (47.5-7) 
 
 Ate does not serve the aims of justice, but rather, turns the trial of Duessa into a circus for 
her discord.  Darryl Gless associates Ate convincingly with duplicity and anarchism, seeing 
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her orthodox turn here as disingenuous and troubling for the prosecution.302  While their 
motives still differ markedly—Zele is cruel in order to preserve the state from the ruin that 
would befall it should treason go unanswered while Ate merely enjoys the discord of the 
moment—Spenser suggests that the tactics of Zele and Ate are the same.  Both are described 
as displaying the crimes of Duessa in order to disgrace her, accusing her in order to subject 
her to infamy.  In order to procure a guilty verdict against Duessa, Zele, an agent of ideal 
justice, paradoxically aligns himself with an agent of injustice.    
In addition to demonstrating Zele’s unmitigated scorn of Duessa, Spenser’s inclusion 
of Ate’s testimony at her trial also speaks specifically to Zele’s fervent argument against pity.  
The reader will recall that not only is Ate associated with slander and untruth, making her a 
dubious choice to put on the stand, she is also associated with a sort of willful theological 
despair, because she is exempt from the mercy of the Father: 
  … even th’Almightie selfe she did maligne, 
  Because to man so mercifull he was, 
  And unto all his creatures so benigne, 
  Sith she her selfe was of his grace indigne. (IV, i, 30.2-5) 
  
In his attempt to rebuke Arthur’s pity and to indict Duessa on the charge of treason, Zele 
calls upon the slanderer of divine mercy.  Jealous of the mercy afforded to man, Ate maligns 
God and his works to exact her retribution.  Spenser’s use of “indigne” characterizes Ate as 
righteously undeserving of divine grace and mercy, having committed crimes against God 
and his creation, but also resembles “indict,” reinforcing her status as a criminal.  Herself 
undeserving of grace and mercy, Ate is put in the service of scorn and cruelty. Zele produces 
Ate, who is on the errand of the devil rather than of God, and demeans the proceedings with 
her presence.  
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 Zele produces more witnesses to corroborate Ate’s testimony: the allegorical vices he 
calls work to augment Duessa’s guilt, charging her with a variety of offenses, from the public 
crimes of murder and sedition to the private vices of inconstancy, adultery and impiety.  
While the reader has no reason to doubt Duessa’s guilt, having been witness to her crimes 
and vices throughout the epic, Zele’s use of these vices’ testimonies calls into question his 
prosecutory ethos.  More than mere prosecutorial overkill, Zele’s tactics border on the 
slanderous and decidedly damage his ethical credibility as an agent of the state.  Spenser 
appears to highlight their unfitness as witnesses, introducing each through the sin they 
embody, the same which they accuse Duessa of committing: most hypocritically, “Abhorred 
Murder,” who still carries her bloody knife, condemns Duessa as a murderess (48.2) and 
“lewd Impeitie” accuses her “sore” of the same (48.9).  The witnesses called before the bar 
reinforce the violence of Zele’s speech, enlarging his attack against Duessa, transforming it 
from a prosecution of treason to an indiscriminate verbal assault. Enlarging the charges and 
allegations against her to include all the public and private sins handled in The Faerie 
Queene, Zele wins his case by calling her whole character into question rather than arguing 
for her culpability of a specific crime.303   
 Through these tactics, Zele persuades Arthur to abandon his unreasonable pity of 
Duessa, converting his ruth into scorn of her crimes.   Convinced by Ate and the personified 
vices before him, Arthur repents his former state: 
  All which when as the Prince had heard and seene, 
  His former fancies ruth he gan repent, 
  And from her partie eftsoones was drawne cleene. (49.1-3)  
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Spenser asserts Arthur’s conversion from pity as a direct result of the testimony of Impietie, 
transitioning from her “sore” condemnation of Duessa to Arthur’s repentance and subsequent 
scorn of Duessa.  Unlike his ineffectual pity, Arthur’s scorn is active, enabling him to deem 
Duessa guilty.  In contrast to Arthur’s former pity, Artegall is described as having never 
faltered in his scorn of Duessa and her crime, having learned the potential danger of pity 
from his confrontation and imprisonment by Radigund.  Spenser’s language reflects the 
Knight of Justice’s affinity with the prosecution.  He is characterized “with constant firme 
intent / For zeale of Justice was against her bent” (49.3-4).  Textually aligned with Zele, 
Artegall is “constant” and “firme” in his scorn of Duessa, and does not need to be corrected 
by the prosecutor.  Spenser insists, however, that while the two knights have learned scorn, 
they have not yet learned justice. 
 
The Verdict: 
 Although scorn wins the day, causing Mercilla to rule that Duessa must die for her 
crimes, Spenser admits qualification.  Unlike the prosecutor who employs cruelty to procure 
his verdict, Mercilla judges with as much mildness as circumstances allow.  Spenser 
describes his ideal judge in terms of not only her verdict but her emotions: 
But she, whose Princely breast was touched nere 
  With piteous ruth of her so wretched plight, 
  Though plaine she saw by all, that she did heare, 
  That she of death was guiltie found by right, 
  Yet would not let just vengeance on her light: 
But rather let in stead thereof to fall 
Few pearling drops from her faire lampes of light; 
The which she covering with her purple pall 
Would have the passion hid, and up arose withall. (50)    
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Spenser poignantly separates Mercilla from the scorn and cruelty of Zele and the two visiting 
knights, with his introductory phrase “But she.”  By textually contrasting their “zeale for 
Justice” with her mildness and reluctant execution of Duessa, Spenser sets her apart as the 
proper measure of pity and scorn.  In contrast to Arthur and Artegall, Mercilla guards against 
the excesses of pity and scorn, confining both to her person rather than her office.  This 
portrait of Mercilla corrects Arthur’s uncontrolled “great ruth” that would pardon a traitor 
and conspirator against the crown, with the private and reasonable “piteous ruth” that laments 
Duessa’s “wretched plight” but refuses to be influenced unduly by pity.  By doing so, 
Mercilla embodies Seneca’s distinction between pity and mercy: Misericordia non causam, 
sed fortunam spectat; clementia rationi accedit.304  Likewise, she refrains from seeking 
vengeance on Duessa for her personal attack—while Spenser judges that such vengeance 
would be “just,” Mercilla guards against its influence regarding Duessa’s punishment.305   
Spenser insists on the difference of the two emotions, however.  Although pity is lauded as 
virtuous as long as it is restrained from action, vengeance is only virtuous when it is not 
indulged.  Mercilla must “preserve inviolated right” and not depart “from the doome of 
right,” but she cannot relish her victory over her scorner (x, 2.3,7).  She must mourn 
Duessa’s fall, not celebrate her demise.  Finally, as if eager to close the proceedings, she 
rises, and the canto closes abruptly. 
In the end, Spenser constructs Mercilla’s mercy as a private virtue of a Christian 
monarch: although he judges Mercilla’s feelings of mercy to be essential for her own 
salvation, mercy cannot be utilized in the justice of the state.   As Mercilla does not let her 
                                                 
304
 “Pity regards the plight, not the cause of it; mercy is combined with reason.” Seneca, De Clementia, II, v.1 
 
305
 Again, this proceeds according to Seneca’s commandment that difficilius est enim moderari, ubi dolori 
debetur ultio, quam ubi exemplo. [moderation is more difficult when vengeance serves the end of anger rather 
than of discipline.] Seneca, De Clementia, I, xxi.2. 
202 
 
pity or scorn of Duessa influence her ruling against her, instead basing her judgment on 
“right” and reason, she personifies Justice.  As she admits the place of pity privately, hiding 
her passion behind her robe of state, she embodies Mercy, but one accommodated to the 
needs of earthly justice.  Scorn and mercy are both confirmed as essential but dangerous 
instruments of justice, applicable in due measure and with pure intent. 
 The allegorical purpose of Mercilla’s decision to execute Duessa has never been 
compellingly argued, with modern critics attempting to make sense of the contradiction of 
her status as embodied mercy and her scornful verdict by a variety of arguments.  One claims 
that Spenser’s allegory demonstrates the author’s commitment to early modern political 
theory;306 another suggests that he argues the limits of equity in justice;307 and still another 
argues her allegorical purity despite her verdict by engaging in scholastic hair-splitting.308   
In contrast to these readings, I would argue that her denunciation and eventual execution of 
Duessa reinforce Spenser’s construction of Mercilla as an emblem of active justice.  Faced 
with the fallen and transgressive nature of Duessa, she must portion out the proper degree of 
mercy afforded to the unrepentant villainess, balancing mercy, which would forgive the 
crimes committed against her, with scorn, which would admonish her and warn others 
against attempting a similar plot.  Mercilla administers an accommodated justice to her 
transgressive subjects.  Unable to embody perfect divine mercy amid the moral decay of the 
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legend of justice, Mercilla dispenses tempered scorn and private pity in order to fashion her 
courtiers into gentlemen. 
By dispensing appropriate justice to Duessa, Mercilla builds upon and revises Una’s 
merciful arraignment of the villainess earlier in the epic.  While in book one she is allowed to 
live because to sentence her to death would resemble immoral scorn and revenge, thereby 
hindering Redcrosse Knight’s salvation, Mercilla condemns Duessa to death, forced to act by 
“strong constraint” (x, 4.6). Mercilla administers her justice reluctantly, exempt from sinful 
despight and vengeance.  Her scorn of Duessa is tempered by her tears and her “more than 
needfull naturall remorse” (x, 4.8).  Such accommodated justice relegates mercy to a private 
virtue, deeming it unable to minister to the needs of the Iron Age.   In the end of canto nine, 
Spenser has affirmed Justice as a secular and public virtue, separating its aims of social order 
and peace from Christianity’s focus upon salvation.     
As if anxious about the allegory he has just presented, Spenser associates Mercilla 
with both mercy and justice in his introduction to canto X, in a passage often cited as 
Spenser’s self-conscious attempt to affirm Mercilla’s reputation as an emblem of heavenly 
Christian mercy and to make orthodox her uncomfortable execution of Duessa.  Rather than 
erase the contradictions of the previous canto, my reading embraces Spenser’s ambiguity to 
demonstrate the reluctant necessity of scorn in the fallen world: 
 Much more it praysed was of those two knights; 
 The noble Prince and righteous Artegall, 
 When they had seene and heard her doome a rights 
 Against Duessa, damned by them all; 
 But by her tempred without griefe of gall, 
 Till strong constraint did her thereto enforce.  (X, 4.1-6) 
 
Faced with the urgency of the threat and the necessity of action, Mercilla reluctantly 
condemns Duessa “without griefe of gall,” demonstrating that mercy, while an admirable 
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Christian virtue may not be the best way to run a kingdom.  By executing Duessa’s 
punishment free from the influence of pity or vengeance, Mercilla personifies Justice, rather 
than mercy, modeling the public virtue for “noble” Arthur, who was blinded by pity, and for 
“righteous” Artegall, who was tainted by his zeal for punishment.   
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have focused upon Spenser’s complex and contradictory 
interrogation of justice as a virtuous mean between pity and scorn.  While Spenser portrays 
Mercilla as a praise-worthy administrator of her kingdom, capable of refining both pity and 
scorn into useful tools of justice, his portrait of the queen embraces the ambivalence inherent 
in such alchemy.  In the next chapter, I will turn to a poet who likewise struggles to puzzle 
out the precise role of the Christian satirist in society, engaging both what is useful and 
corrupting about satire.  In his satiric verse, John Donne highlights the tension between the 
satirist’s attraction to and repulsion from the dens of vice he would so vehemently denounce.    
Through his satiric literature, Donne repeatedly constructs the satirist’s attempts to reconcile 
the goals of the active life with those of the contemplative life.  Unlike Mercilla, who affirms 
the utility of scorn and satire in her administration of justice, Donne’s speaker is much more 
pessimistic about the possibility of reforming the corruptions of society, always on the verge 
of retreat from the sinful infection that threatens his soul.   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
“Shall I leave all this constant company / And follow headlong, wild uncertain thee?”: 
Images of Participation and Retirement in Donne’s Satires 
 
Per Rachel ho servito e non per Lae 309 
 
Underwriting M. Thomas Hester’s otherwise exemplary study of John Donne’s 
Satires is the argument that the five poems fulfill a unified, five-act structure that asserts the 
satirist’s moral and ethical education.  Narrating the satirist’s progression from ignorance to 
sophistication through his analysis of the five poems, Hester claims that Donne creates a 
“dramatic portrait” of the satirist’s “journey from innocence (I) to darkness and despair (II), 
and finally to self-knowledge (III), suffering and God-given knowledge (IV), and obedience 
(V).” 310  For Hester, the sequence culminates in Satire V, in which the speaker “dramatizes 
the active completion of his education in the ethos of prophetic zeal,” signifying “the triumph 
of the satirist.”311   Hester’s claim that Donne’s Satires should be interpreted as a group 
presenting a coherent and comprehensive argument for the application of satire to society 
should be met with caution, however.  Collectively, the satires do not execute a cumulative or 
narrative argument for the satirist’s active use of his art; instead, they meditate upon the 
benefits and liabilities of the satirist’s participation in the corrupt society he seeks to reform.   
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Taken together, the satires do not narrate the speaker’s neat progression from 
ignorance to sophistication, nor do they consistently argue for the satirist’s engagement in 
early modern English society; rather, Donne posits that the social and moral consequences of 
satire are ever-changing and unstable.  The speakers of Donne’s satires—and I would apply 
the same caution to a reading that relies upon a singular speaker that I apply to an 
interpretation that presents the Satires as a unified argument—present a disordered world 
threatening to corrupt the satirist, who struggles to maintain his moral authority in the face of 
obvious sinfulness.   Manifesting the satirist’s anxiety, the poems present their speakers torn 
between their call to reform society through their active engagement and participation in its 
corruptions, and their desire to ensure their own salvation by retreating from such sinful 
temptations.  In his satires, Donne does not wholly endorse either the active life of 
statesmanship or the contemplative life of knowledge and solitude, choosing to explode such 
neat binaries.  Each poem strains towards a resolution that is always out of the reach of the 
speaker, presenting the struggle for balance and proportion as the ultimate goal of satire.  
Returning to this problem again and again, Donne re-envisions and re-interrogates the 
conflicted purpose of satire in each of his works.  Satires I (“Away thou fondling motley 
humorist”), II (“Sir: though (I thank God for it) I do hate”), IV (“Well: I may now receive, 
and die”) and V (“Thou shalt not laugh in this leafe, Muse”) present their speakers as 
participating at some level in the society that would corrupt them, while Satire III (“Kinde 
pitty chokes my spleene”) presents its speaker’s retirement from the world. Yet all Donne’s 
satires express anxiety with the speaker’s choice.     
Before I discuss further the implications of Donne’s participation in and 
disengagement from society, I would like to unpack the particulars of Donne’s use of the 
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term as it relates to his satiric verse and his audience.  Donne’s conception of community is 
not monolithic.  Rather, his portrayal of society fluctuates greatly in his poetry: on one 
extreme, Donne’s conception of “society” seems to be limitless, implying a wide-ranging and 
inclusive view of all of mankind; on the other extreme, he appears to particularize his 
audience to a singular wise reader.  Between all and one, however, Donne constructs a 
variety of different societies and audiences in his Satires: these poems attempt to correct the 
corruptions of the City, as in Satires I and II, of the Inns, as in Satire V and the beginning of 
Satire III, and of the Court, as in Satire III and IV.   In the satires, the communities in which 
Donne’s speakers participate, or refuse to participate, are not always the same.   
Likewise, it is inaccurate to refer to Donne’s coterie audience as monolithic or 
immutable.  With the exception of his Anniversaries, his elegy of Prince Henry, and a few 
lyrics, Donne refused to print his poetry, choosing instead to circulate his verse in manuscript 
among a small but fluid coterie of intimate acquaintances. “Donne’s restriction of his 
contemporary readership was a deliberate act,” Arthur Marotti asserts, designed to appeal to 
“a succession of social environments in which he functioned between his arrival in London in 
the early 1590s and his ordination in 1615.”312  According to Marotti, the Satires were 
confined to the coterie and withheld from public view; in support of his claim to their 
exclusive readership, Marotti cites a note penned by Francis Davison, the editor of the 
miscellany A Poetical Rhapsody (1602), who included the poet’s “Satires, Elegies, Epigrams, 
etc” under the heading “Manuscripts to get.”313 Despite Marotti’s implication that Donne 
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enjoyed a relatively stable poetic circle, it seems possible, if not likely, that membership in 
Donne’s coterie, like those of other authors, may have been quite fluid. 314  According to 
Harold Love, “a reader sympathetic enough to the aims of the group to be interested in the 
texts that were circulating within it would probably not find it difficult to be accepted in the 
network.”315 Indeed, a list of members in Donne’s coterie remains elusive:  we can only 
surmise from his verse letters and biography which of his contemporaries were able to read 
his verse.316  This situation is doubly true of Donne’s early verse, written during and 
immediately after his attendance at Lincolns’ Inn.  There, according to Marotti, Donne 
enjoyed a “receptive audience of peers” who shared in Donne’s value system, social 
ambitions, and frustrations.317  Donne’s poetry does more than affirm his audience’s 
conceptions and values, however.  His poetry demonstrates Donne’s fundamental anxiety 
about his readership.  Donne’s verse, particularly his potentially volatile satiric poetry, 
reflects the author’s anxiety regarding the transmission of his texts and his readership. He 
makes numerous overtures to his coterie to restrict the circulation of his poetry, anxious that 
his verse be prevented from a wider, more diffuse, readership. 318  We now know that the 
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satires enjoyed a larger circulation than some of his other poetry; for example, his Songs and 
Sonnets.  But, how intimate and permeable his coterie actually was remains outside our ken.  
The manuscript evidence remains an inconclusive guide.  
  The cloudy manuscript history of Donne’s satires leaves doubt that they were ever 
intended to be read as a unified dramatic portrait detailing the satirist’s progress from 
ignorance to triumph.  Despite Donne’s staunch protection of his verse, no authorial 
manuscript of his Satires survives, leaving the precise form and sequence of the poems a 
mystery.  The Group I manuscripts, commonly employed by editors of Donne’s works as the 
authoritative manuscripts for much of Donne’s other poetry, do not offer a comprehensive 
reading of the satires: W. Milgate posits that the elusive original manuscript “X,” from which 
H49, D, SP, Lec, and C57 manuscripts derive, omitted Donne’s fifth satire (“Thou shalt not 
laugh in this leafe, Muse”). 319  Moreover, the Group II manuscripts, made up of TCC, TCD, 
N, A23 and L74, offer no conclusive sequence of the satires:  TCC and its copy, A18, omit all 
of the satires; TCD and its copy, N, order the satires as I, III, IV, V, Satire 6 (“Sleep, next 
Society”),320 II, while A23 contains only a partial copy of Satire IV but all of Satire V; finally, 
L74, a derivative text of their now lost common ancestor, “Y,” positions the satires in yet 
another order: III, IV, V, II, The Bracelet, Satire 6 (Sleep, now Society), and I.  Lastly, the 
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Group III manuscripts, which Milgate argues do not constitute a distinct grouping with a 
common ancestor but a collection of various, often corrupted manuscripts and miscellanies, 
contain twenty different manuscripts.  Of those, W (the Westmoreland MS), A25, Q and D16  
are considered the most authoritative, but the evidence is inconclusive.  These four alone are 
uncorrupted and position the satires in what is now considered their accepted order: I, II, III, 
IV, and V.321  The profound variations between manuscript groups, as well as the flexibility 
afforded by Donne’s commitment to scribal publication, demonstrate the interpretive fluidity 
of Donne’s Satires: unified only by their form, the collective satires do not present Donne’s 
satiric mission statement, but rather offer their reader a series of disparate, de-centered 
meditations on the role of the satirist in society.322    
Hester’s reading of Satire V as the conclusion of Donne’s satiric duty implies 
Donne’s preference for the active life of public and civic duty to the commonwealth, a 
preference that, in my opinion, the poems do not support.  Rather than present the active life 
of social engagement as the culmination of experience, the poems insist upon the satirist’s 
perpetual need to balance such charitable engagement against the godly contemplation of 
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retirement.   A de-centered reading of the Satires will enable the reader to unpack more 
completely the conflict Donne presents between these two lifestyles, evaluating each satire as 
a singular poetic statement and the group as evidence of Donne’s anxious reiteration and re-
thinking of the benefits and liabilities of each choice.  Indeed, Donne does not stop engaging 
the profits and limits of society and privacy once he has completed his satiric verse:  the 
same concerns inform his Songs and Sonnets, where it is reformulated as the lovers’ 
retirement from the prying eyes of the public; his Anniversaries, where he struggles to assert 
the correspondences of the world and man while at the same time charting its decay and 
corruption; and his Devotions upon Emergent Occasions, where he affirms his connection to 
society (“ask not for whom the bell tolls”) while also ruminating upon his own isolation and 
singularity.323 
This chapter argues for a critical re-evaluation of Donne’s Satires.  Until recently, the 
Satires have been devalued in favor of Donne’s more well-known Songs and Sonnets and 
divine poetry, having suffered from critical neglect largely because of their ambiguous and 
conflicted notions regarding the goal of satire.  Donne’s satiric verse attempts to puzzle out 
complex notions of community and privacy in early modern English society, ideas that 
intersect with and diverge from our assumptions about Donne’s manuscript coterie, about the 
conceptions of the active and contemplative life, and about the role of charity in admonition.   
In order to better engage these, as well as other questions posed by his Satires, I intend to 
sketch briefly the satirist’s anxious re-engagement with both the active and contemplative 
lives in Satires II, III, and V, but concentrate upon Satires I and IV, the two poems that 
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overtly dramatize the satirist’s struggle to reconcile the charity of social and civic 
engagement with the godliness of retirement and separation.  
 
Satires II, III, and V 
None of Donne’s satires presents a wholesale endorsement of either the active or 
contemplative life.  Rather, they dramatize the profit and liability of either choice, 
positioning the two lifestyles as best executed in moderation, fulfilling the Christian duties of 
both Lea and Rachel.324  While in Satire III, he expresses the desire to retreat inward to 
ensure his own salvation, he cannot wholly abandon his public duty as a Christian satirist.  
Conversely, in his most engaged and topical satires, namely Satires II and V, Donne’s 
exasperated speaker always seems on the verge of giving his satire up in favor of 
retirement.325    
Donne’s Satire III presents a speaker withdrawn from the corruptions of the world, 
meditating upon his satiric task as it relates to his own salvation and to the wretched and 
contentious state of religion in England.  Throughout the poem, Donne’s speaker adopts a 
meditative stance, turning inward to examine his own “soules devotion” to his “Mistresse 
faire Religion” (III, 6,5).326 In contrast to the narrative situations posed in his other two 
satires, Donne does not construct Satire III as a dramatic narrative, nor does he provide his 
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poem with a stated or implied audience. 327   Donne’s omission of these narrative strategies 
emphasizes the speaker’s detachment from the world and his retreat inward: attempting to 
work out his own salvation, Donne’s speaker satirizes the world’s Christian sectarianism in 
order to “Seeke true religion” (III, 43).  Until he is able to puzzle out which church is she, 
Donne’s speaker advocates a mitigated skepticism, ironically advancing retired inaction as 
the only possible virtuous action.  He encourages himself to “doubt wisely; in a strange way / 
To stand inquiring right, is not to stray… On a huge hill / Cragged, and steep, Truth stands, 
and hee that will / Reach her, about must, and about must goe” (III, 77-81).   
Despite its construction as a meditative satire and its emphasis upon the speaker’s 
quest for salvation, Satire III cannot wholly eschew the concerns of the world.  Indeed, the 
speaker does not assert that a complete disavowal of earthly concerns would be preferable.  
Donne constructs his speaker as an everyman figure, his quest for Truth universally 
applicable to his readers.  Moreover, his conceptions of religion are almost exclusively 
communal, concerned with the earthly manifestation of religion as much as with the 
heavenly: while the speaker internalizes his quest for Truth, he also envisions the world’s 
Christian denominations as social and political constructions of men.  Donne ends his poem 
affirming the problematic nature of community.  He concludes Satire III with the observation 
that “As streames are, Power is” (III, 103), advising his readers that, while they will never be 
separated wholly from the world, they should avoid being shaken about by temporal and 
earthly concerns that threaten to destroy them: 
  … those blest flowers that dwell 
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 At the streames rough head, thrive and do well, 
 But having left their roots, and themselves given  
 To the streames tyrannous rage, alas, are driven  
 Through mills, and rockes, and woods,’and at last, almost 
 Consum’d in going, in the sea are lost: 
 So perish Soules, which more chuse mens unjust 
 Power from God claym’d, then God himselfe to trust. (III, 103-110) 
 
With this final image, Donne both confirms and contradicts the poem’s meditative stance.  
On one hand, the image offers retirement as a welcome protection against the stream’s 
“tyrannous rage,” portraying the calm head of godly contemplation as a preferable alternative 
to the “mills, and rockes, and woods” of the world.  On the other hand, the image stresses the 
political entanglements of faith with worldly power.  Through his last image, Donne enlarges 
the audience of his satire to include the powerful political and religious figures of England, 
rebuking them for their own distance from godliness as well as their displays of favoritism 
and nepotism in advancing their closest friends and followers.  Signaling that neither reading 
is sufficient, Donne allows both to coexist in his poem, leaving unanswered the question of 
whether the active life or contemplative life is more godly.   
In Satire V, Donne turns again to this metaphor of the river in a satire concerned not 
overtly with faith, but with the legal corruption of the English courts and Inns.  In this satire, 
Donne’s speaker most resembles Donne himself: he adopts an autobiographical persona 
“authorized” by Thomas Egerton to “know and weed out” the sin of the judicial system (V, 
34).  Throughout the satire, Donne’s speaker portrays himself as a political insider “who has 
the means, the opportunity, and the place to activate reform.”328  Despite his “insider” status, 
the speaker expresses his misgivings about his ability to transform such corruption into 
virtue: referring to Castiglione and his Book of the Courtier, he sarcastically quips, “hee 
being understood / May make good Courtiers, but who Courtiers good?” (V, 3-4).   Indeed, 
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the speaker posits that the corruption of the system is self-consuming and self-destructive: 
“man is a world; in which, Officers / Are the vast ravishing seas; and Suitors, / Springs; now 
full, now shallow, now drye; which to / That which drownes them, run” (V, 13-16).  Later, 
describing the waters of state that flow from Elizabeth to the tributary branches of judges, 
magistrates, officers and suitors, Donne more overtly marks the detachment of the monarch 
as blameworthy.  After painting a portrait of the greed and corruption that pervades the 
English jurist system, affecting all of its members, from the lowest suitor to the highest 
officer of the court, Donne’s speaker questions, 
 Greatest and fairest Empresse, know you this? 
 Alas, no more then Thames calme head doth know 
 Whose meades her armes drowne, or whose corne o’rflow: 
 You Sir, whose righteousnes she loves, whom I  
 By having leave to serve, am most richly 
 For services paid, authoriz’d, now beginner 
 To know and weed out this enormous sinne. (V, 28-34)  
 
Donne’s imagines the Thames descending from the “calme head” of Elizabeth to the corrupt 
tributaries, portrayed as the destructive “armes” of the river that threaten English crops, the 
source of life and livelihood for the city.  While Elizabeth superficially escapes 
responsibility—indeed, both Milgate and A.J. Smith read this passage as clearing Elizabeth 
of wrongdoing—Donne implies that she is culpable: the speaker is “torn between idealizing 
Elizabeth in the customary fashion and accusing her of criminal neglect.”329  Like the satirist, 
Elizabeth has a responsibility to reform the corruptions in her land, and, while she gains 
some moral seriousness by appointing the righteous Egerton—Donne’s “You Sir”—her 
detachment is positioned by the satirist as reprehensible.   
Nonetheless, Donne’s speaker assumes similar distance from the system he 
reproaches with his own ironic detachment, as well as with his caustic and exasperated tone.  
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Based upon Juvenal’s Satire XIII—to which Donne directly refers when he denounces 
Elizabethan England as an “Age of rusty iron” (V, 35)—Satire V constructs a speaker 
buffered by irony: while Juvenal’s satire is directed at the corrupt hypocrite Calvinus, 
Donne’s speaker gives only hypothetical advice to an indirect audience.  He is shielded by 
his own irony and the satires’ real audience, the Lord Keeper, whose righteousness casts 
Donne’s satire as unnecessary.   
 Donne employs a similar use of irony and detachment in Satire II.  On its surface, 
Satire II demonstrates its speaker’s disgust with the linguistic corruptions brought about by 
the fall of man; in opposition to them, Donne’s speaker offers his satire as charity.  At the 
poem’s conclusion, Donne’s speaker positions his satire as a charitable “good worke,” but 
must acknowledge that such charity is “out of fashion now” (II, 110).   While the satirist’s 
rebuke of linguistic and legal sins may indeed be charity, it is a charity the world does not 
seem to want.    
In his attempt to cleanse the world of its symptoms of the fall, the speaker of Satire II 
employs a variety of methods: some sins he asserts as pitiable, worthy of the satirist’s reform, 
while others he argues can be cured only by amputation, cutting off the sinful limb to 
preserve the whole.  The poem separates the pitiable threat posed by the poets, who “punish 
themselves” by  prostituting their wits to patrons and claiming the regurgitated work of better 
minds as their own (II, 39), from the graver threat of the corrupt lawyer Coscus, who 
threatens all of England with his selfish abuse of the law.  The speaker separates himself 
from the first group (the materialistic, bad poets who do “no harme” to the poets they 
imitate), employing the arguments of the misomusoi ironically to rail against his 
contemporaries’ abuse of language (II, 31).  Already marginalized by their economic status, 
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these sad poets must be reformed and reabsorbed into society.  Despite his charity to these 
members of the population, Donne’s speaker cannot so easily dismiss the threat of Coscus.  
Against his particular corruption, the satirist must exercise his “just offence” (II, 40).   
Envisioned as the abuser of poetic as well as legal language, Coscus threatens to corrupt not 
only the legal system with his sinfulness but the innocent populace as well.    Donne’s satirist 
will reserve his charity for Coscus’s victims.  It is to this category that the speaker feels an 
affinity and a responsibility.  After he introduces Coscus and narrates his crimes, Donne’s 
speaker identifies himself as one of Coscus’s victims, demonstrated by Donne’s reliance 
upon the plural possessive “our,” which replaces the more satirically penned distinction 
between “I” and “they” of the first half of the poem.   
While Donne constructs his speaker’s engagement as motivated by charity, he implies 
that such participation may be corrupting.  In contrast to the charitable community asserted 
by the satirist, Coscus’s corruption is portrayed as thriving in “unwatched” privacy (II, 98).  
Away from the eyes of the public, Coscus, as well as his equally sinful clients, is able to 
indulge in his debauchery.  Presenting both social participation and privacy as equally 
capable of corrupting the soul, Donne’s second satire concludes pessimistically.  Attempting 
to argue for the legitimacy of his satire and its service to its audience, Donne actually 
undercuts his satire’s authority, reducing its charity to mere negation.  At the end of the 
poem, Donne is assured only that he is not guilty of libel, asserting that his “words none 
drawes / Within the vast reach of th’huge statute laws” (II, 111-112).   
 In these three satires, Donne positions his speaker as deeply torn between an active 
life of civic responsibility—typified by the satirist’s employment by Egerton in Satire V and 
his sense of charity to his countrymen in Satire II—and a life characterized by godly 
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meditation as it is presented in Satire III.  This conflict is dramatized more overtly in Satire I 
and Satire IV, where his speaker must weigh his public and private duties as a Christian 
satirist.  Again, however, Donne refuses to satisfy his reader’s desire with a neat and easy 
resolution.  When asked which is preferable, the active life or the contemplative one, Donne 
answers with a resounding “both.”  
 
Images of Privacy and Participation in Satires I and IV 
 
 Revising and building upon the events of Horace’s Satire I.ix, Donne’s first and 
fourth satires are unified by their overtly ambivalent engagement with society.  In these two 
satires, Donne dramatizes satire’s struggles to participate in a society it would rail upon. 
Donne’s Horatian speaker is pulled into corruption by his moral duty as a satirist, but, as he 
rails at the vice he discovers, he desires to retreat sinful company in order to ensure his own 
preservation.  In Satire I, when Donne’s speaker abandons the “constant company” of his 
books to wander the streets with the “fondling motley humorist,” not only is his attempt to 
evangelize satirically to his companion portrayed as naïve and ineffectual, but the speaker 
hints that such engagement might imperil his salvation (I, 1, 11).  The most elaborate of 
Donne’s court satires, Satire IV is also the most unclear.  Throughout Satire IV, Donne 
emphasizes the limitations of the speaker’s satire: he is unable to effect reformation through 
his satire, and, indeed, his participation in the vice-ridden society of the court threatens his 
physical freedom, life, and even his salvation.  Because the speaker’s motivation for going to 
court is unclear in the poem, the godliness of his satire is deliberately opaque.  As a result, 
the speaker’s efforts are misinterpreted, becoming associated not with reformation, but with 
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slander and libel.  Given the hostility and corruption of the court, the satirist turns inward, 
confining his satire to the singular audience of the reader.   
Through both Satire I and IV, Donne takes up the broad strokes of Horace’s Satire 
I.ix:  the speaker encounters a garrulous courtier, who proceeds to harass the speaker, 
delaying him with gossip and self-flattery.330  The drama of both Donne’s and Horace’s 
satires occurs in the speaker’s attempt to shake off his unwelcome companion in favor of 
constant solitude:  in the end, Horace’s speaker is restored to privacy by an orderly justice 
system and Donne’s speaker must ransom himself from the treacherous talker’s company, 
able to escape only by the “prerogative” of his crown (IV, 150).  However, while the poems 
appear similar in their broad outlines, the tone and urgency of the three poems are vastly 
different.  Horace’s satire presents an ordered and just view of society.  His speaker benefits 
from his confident moral authority, safe from the effects of the garrulous would-be courtier, 
who is marginalized by his lack of position.  Donne remains loyal to this worldview in his 
first satire, which is loosely based upon the model Horace sets out.331  In Satire I, the world 
of the motley humorist and the authoritative but reclusive speaker is fundamentally just:  the 
humorist, adulterous in his “marriage” to the speaker, in turn, is cuckolded by his lover, 
whose lovers beat him and drive him into the street.  The humorist ends the poem where he 
began, in the speaker’s “standing wooden chest” (I, 2).  These roles, however, are flipped in 
Satire IV, where Donne depicts the Elizabethan court as a scene of sinister falsehood: while 
the courtier who accosts Donne’s speaker is portrayed as an insider of sorts (in-the-know 
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regarding courtly gossip and acquaintance), Donne is unsure of his own position and 
authority.  He does not benefit from the moral confidence of Horace’s speaker.  Rather, 
Donne’s revision emphasizes the speaker’s own struggle to administer his satire to his 
unwanted companion, who associates satire with criminal defamation.    
Importantly, neither Horace nor Donne presents successful satirists: despite Horace’s 
unquestioning portrayal of his satirist’s authority, his speaker, like those of Donne, ultimately 
is unable either to extricate himself from the bore, or to reform him. His speaker is only freed 
by the intervention of his companion’s legal opponent—an intervention Horace’s speaker 
attributes to Apollo: sic me servavit Apollo.332   In Horace’s providential world, the satire still 
works:  the ethical consequence of the speaker’s satiric handicap is confined to the speaker’s 
temporary annoyance—an annoyance the poem casts in exclusively comic terms.   Oddly, in 
Donne’s Christian world, providence is not always so reliable.   The satiric speakers’ desire 
to participate in society is met with mixed results, ranging from the troubled annoyance at a 
companion’s social and moral indiscretion to the physical and moral dangers of 
imprisonment and damnation. In stepping out their doors into the corrupt and corrupting 
world, Donne’s speakers take their chances. 
 
“Away thou fondling motley humorist” 
Satire I dramatizes the contradictory impulses of satire.  While it embodies the 
religious and civic duty of the poet to serve his society by instructing its members in virtue, 
satire also hints that such engagement may result in the satirist’s sinful contamination.  Satire 
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I overtly engages the risks and benefits of the satirist’s participation in the corruption of 
society, revising its classical model to emphasize the poet’s reclusive tendency and to insist 
upon the satirist’s attempts to educate and reform the motley humorist.333  In Satire I, the 
speaker’s castigations of the motley humorist are portrayed as charitable acts that embody the 
Christian poet’s obligation to the commonwealth.  For Hester, the speaker is compelled by 
his humanist studies and his faith to abandon his retirement in order to accompany the fop, 
his charity enacting what Hester terms the “folly” of reformation. According to this 
interpretation, “the focus of the first poem is on the way the duty of the Christian scholar 
leads him to satire” as a fulfillment of his charitable duty. 334  Hester’s reading privileges the 
satirist’s public duty as morally superior to his own salvation, sacrificing the moral tension 
upon which, I argue, the poem repeatedly insists—the tension between the poet’s private 
relationship with God and his public duty of charity and prophesy. In my view, Donne’s 
poem presents satire not as the answer but as the question: how can the satirist serve both Lea 
and Rachel?  
Donne emphasizes his speaker’s ambivalence between his desire for retirement and 
his desire to fulfill his Christian duty throughout the poem.  He revises his Horation model, 
which presents a straightforward lampoon of the garrulous talker, to construct a satire that 
attempts to puzzle out the potential dangers of both solitude and society.  When the poem 
begins, Donne’s speaker is already conflicted about his isolation.  Confined in his “standing 
wooden chest,” he is interrupted by the motley humorist who would end his studies and drag 
him into the world (I, 2).  Surprisingly, however, Donne’s speaker does not send his intruder 
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away.  Rather, he agrees to accompany him into the street although he seems to have no 
errand that would carry him abroad.  Once among the people of the streets, the satirist rails at 
the vice his indiscriminate interlocutor would indulge, yet charitably and patiently—some 
critics assert, naively—welcomes his corrupt companion back into the fold after he 
repeatedly transgresses.  At the poem’s conclusion, the speaker and his companion have 
returned to retirement, having been beaten, the humorist by his rivals, the satirist by the 
humorist’s neglect.   
Although the speaker initially condemns his pesky visitor for intruding upon his 
solitude, his instinctual annoyance at the fop’s intrusion is mediated by the speaker’s sense of 
charity.335  The speaker’s language presents his own retirement as a contradiction: it is 
constructed first as a pleasurable withdrawal from the annoyances of the world, but later as a 
violation of Christian and humanist duty: 
 Away thou fondling motley humorist, 
 Leave mee, and in this standing wooden chest, 
 Consorted with these few bookes, let me lye 
 In prison, and here be coffin’d, when I dye. (I, 1-4)  
 
The speaker demands that the fop leave him, brusquely sending him rudely “Away” in order 
to preserve his retirement.  Despite this commandment, the speaker presents his solitude as a 
paradox, equating his cloistered retirement with images of the ultimate privacy of the dead 
and imprisoned.  Positioned in his “standing wooden chest”—interpreted by modern critics 
almost universally to refer to Donne’s small room at Lincoln’s Inn—Donne’s speaker 
hyperbolically separates himself from the outside world, demonstrating his detachment by 
asserting his easy transition from life to death.   He asserts his preference for a cloistered life, 
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urging his companion to leave him to his studies: “let me lye…and here be coffin’d, when I 
dye.” By eliding his current voluntary isolation with his eventual involuntary leaving of the 
world, the speaker embodies a kind of monastic contemptus mundi.  Later punning upon 
“grave divines,” the speaker’s word-play attempts to lighten the tone of such retirement while 
affirming his inaccessibility and detachment from the outside world. Similarly reinforcing his 
isolation, the speaker likens his room to a prison, an image that recurs throughout the poem 
in a variety of contexts but here may refer to the prison of the soul in the body as well as the 
physical confinement of the speaker.336   Again, Donne juxtaposes his speaker’s willing 
retirement from the active life against images of involuntary isolation.  These images of 
death and prison may urge the reader to think of such isolation, as Joshua Scodel notes, as 
“an oppressive, death-like constriction upon worldly engagements.”337  According to 
Scodel’s reading, Donne presents a profound critique of such stoical withdrawal in his 
portrayal of his speaker’s self-centered isolation.  However, while he admittedly seems to 
view such cloistered isolation as the sign of an incomplete life, Donne’s speaker cannot be 
said to dismiss wholly the value of retirement.338   
The texts present in the speaker’s study also complicate any strict interpretation of 
Donne’s dismissal of or preference for retirement.  Culled from a educational program 
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typical of the Inns of Court, the speaker’s diverse booklist promotes his intellectual 
engagement with the commonwealth while it simultaneously physically isolates him from it: 
 Here are Gods conduits, grave Divines; and here 
 Nature’s Secretary, the Philosopher; 
 And jolly Statesmen, which teach how to tie  
 The sinewes of a cities mistique bodie; 
 Here gathering Chroniclerers, and by them stand  
Giddie fantastique Poets or each land.  
Shall I leave all this constant company, 
 And follow headlong, wild uncertain thee?  (I, 5-12) 
 
Preferring ideas rather than people, the satirist seeks the “constant company” of his books 
that line his cell.  He “consorts” with his books rather than with men.339  Donne’s word 
choice here hints that the catalog of his library mimics the society he would find in the streets 
of London:  the speaker’s booklist promotes his moral and civic responsibility to society in 
varying degrees, from the high-minded to the pejorative.340 As the speaker moves down the 
chain of scholarship from the heavenly to the natural, and finally to the earthly, Donne’s 
descriptions become increasingly ambivalent.  Although he asserts that the speaker’s 
knowledge originates with God—the speaker later asserts that “With God and the Muses I 
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conferre” (I, 48)—the latter portion of his booklist “reveals his fascination with the rich 
variety of the ostensibly rejected world,” as Joshua Scodel claims.341   
Initially, the speaker studies works of divinity. Specifically, he reads the work of 
“grave divines” who encourage the proselytizing of God’s word on earth, a divine 
accommodation Donne implies with his description of them as “God’s conduits.”  Next, 
Donne’s speaker reads natural philosophy, referencing “Nature’s secretary, the 
Philosopher”—perhaps specifically alluding to Aristotle, to whom Eusebius refers as 
“nature’s private secretary” and whom Thomas Aquinas dubs “the philosopher.”  The 
recording and observation inferred by the title “nature’s secretary” may challenge an 
argument for the speaker’s clear preference for the principled and removed study of science, 
abstracted from the messiness of experience.  Donne’s speaker demonstrates a similar  
ambivalence regarding political philosophy.  Further down the list, the texts of “jolly 
Statesmen” instruct their readers to involve themselves in matters of the commonwealth, “to 
tie / The sinewes of a cities mistique bodie.”   Although Milgate argues that Donne makes 
room for a skeptical reading by portraying the statesmen as “jolly,” the civic duty he alludes 
to here cannot be dismissed as simply facetious—Donne’s education at the Inns of Court 
would have insisted, to some extent, upon the application of his studies. The education a 
young man received at the Inns was wide-ranging, but was ideally pointed towards service.342  
According to one contemporary source, such study would make him “fyt for the warres and 
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 Scodel, “None’s Slave,” 369. 
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 It must be said that many young men attended the Inns with little aim of entering into the legal profession.  
According to Wilfred R. Prest, “During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries a stay at the inns was 
part of the conventional gentlemenly education … whether or not [such gentleman were] destined for the bar.”  
See Wilfred R. Prest, The Inns of Court under Elizabeth I and the Early Stuarts (1590-1640) (Totowa, New 
Jersey: Rowan & Littlefield, 1972), 23. 
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fyt for peace, meete for the courte and meete for the countrey.”343 Likewise, the “gathering 
Chroniclers” Donne reads may imply the legitimate work of history and historians, credited 
with instilling virtue in young men through stories of valorous Briton kings and knights, but 
may also refer more dubiously to those “lay Chronigraphers,” who, according to Nashe, 
“write of nothing but of Mayors and Sheriefs, the deare yeare and the great Frost, … for they 
want the wings of choise words to fly to heaven.”344  Donne ends his study with the work of 
“Giddie fantastique Poets,” affirming the role of imaginative literature in liberal study in a 
reference that may refer to the long tradition of such literature produced by men of the 
Inns.345  Again, however, his description of the poets as “giddie” is ambivalent: it affirms the 
wandering mind of the scholar, free to think and range abroad while physically retired, but it 
also links the poetry on his shelves to the motley humorist he would condemn.346  In a verse 
letter to Roland Woodward, Donne would return to the conflicted image of “giddie” 
retirement:  “So works retiredness in us; to roam / Giddily, and be everywhere, but at home, / 
Such freedom doth a banishment become.”347 
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 Quoted in Kenneth Carleton, “Liberal Education and the Inns of Court in the Sixteenth Century” in British 
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 McKerrow, The Works of Thomas Nashe, I: 194. 
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 One here is reminded of the encomium of the authorial talent to be found in the Inns Jasper Haywood 
contained in his preface to his translation of Seneca’s Thyestes (1560): he urges Seneca to choose his next 
translator from among the authors of the Inns: “Go, where Minerva’s men / And finest wits do swarm whom she 
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for to write, / And all their works with stately style and goodly grace t’indite” (ll. 83-88).  Quoted in Jessica 
Lynn Winston, “Literature and Politics at the Early Elizabethan Inns of Court” (PhD diss., U. of California, 
Santa Barbara, 2002), 5. 
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 Donne’s speaker will admonish the humorist a little later in the poem for his “giddinesses” (I, 51).  In the 
next satire, Donne more vehemently disparages the work of bad poets, associating their poor imitations of good 
texts with excrement (II, 30).   
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 Letter To Mr. Roland Woodward, “Like one who in her third widowhood doth profess” in The Satires, 
Epigrams and Verse Letters, ed. W. Milgate (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), ln. 28-30. 
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As this short list implies, Donne’s descriptions of these texts are open-ended, 
allowing for two very different readings to co-exist.  As Milgate argues, the texts are part of a 
program of service, encouraging young men to educate themselves in ways that will allow 
them to serve the commonwealth as they mature.  Describing the milieu commonly found in 
the Inner Temple, Gerard Legh asserts that there, one sees “the store of gentlemen of the 
whole realm, that repair thither to learn rule, and obey by law, to yield their fleece to their 
prince and commonwealth.”348  Conversely, however, the booklist also implies its own sort 
of literary giddiness.  As Goddred Gilby, a student of the Inns stated, lamenting the 
aimlessness of his study, “We the youth of this realme are drawen into divers and sundrye 
doubtfull wayes and wandering bypathes” and “know not which way to direct our studies.”349 
According to this less optimistic reading, the satirist’s reading may subtly liken him to the 
giddy subject of his satire, tainting him by association.350  
Donne portrays the satirist as likewise conflicted about his decision to accompany the 
motley humorist throughout the streets of London, overtly dramatizing the tension between 
the civic and soteriological orientation of the Christian poet.  At the same time that the 
speaker strives to embody the principles of the “grave divines,” viewing his satire as a 
charitable act of Christian love and his participation in society as his godly duty, he also 
implies that his engagement with corruption—even to castigate it—has the potential to 
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 Scodel claims that the satirist’s library “is as various and contradictory as the social world in which the 
‘motley humorist’ is absorbed” and that “as a writer of verse, the satiric speaker is himself related to (if not one 
of) these ‘giddy’ poets” (369).  A.F. Bellette more harshly accuses the speaker of Donne’s satire of blasphemy: 
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Bellette, “The Originality of Donne’s Satires” in UTQ, 44. no. 2 (1975), 130-140.  
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endanger his own salvation.  Hester correctly asserts that, in his first satire, Donne fleshes out 
the satirist’s public persona at more length than he does the private.351  The speaker 
participates in the humorist’s corrupt society under the auspices of his compassionate 
concern for his companion’s wellbeing, referring to his satire as a “charity” that will instruct 
the fop properly to avoid its evils.  To effect this instruction, however, the satirist must open 
himself to the sinful transgression of society.  
Donne constructs the speaker’s decision to accompany the humorist as morally risky.  
At best, Donne presents the speaker’s participation in the fop’s journey as naïve.  While the 
satirist’s attempt to teach his student discretion admittedly would be a worthy goal if the 
speaker succeeded in countering the flighty tendencies of the ever-fickle humorist, Donne 
presents this as an unlikely possibility.  Despite his repeated assertions that the fop should 
remain faithful in his journey out of doors, the satirist acknowledges the probability that he 
will be left as soon as a more attractive companion should appear. The speaker sets himself 
up for failure.  He demands a vow of faithfulness from the humorist while he affirms the 
fop’s character to be one of faithlessness:   
First sweare by thy best love in earnest  
(If thou which lov’st all, canst love any best)  
Thou wilt not leave mee in the middle street 
Though some more spruce companion thou dost meet. (I, 13-16)   
 
The speaker parenthetically denounces the fop’s inconstant love, with the aim of increasing 
his discretion.  While his instruction of the fop aims to encourage his discretion by satirizing 
the types of vice he will meet in the streets, the speaker assumes that such instruction will 
affirm the fop’s love.  Before they leave, Donne’s speaker directs the fop to avoid judging the 
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 Then again, so does Hester.  Donne will balance out this assessment in Satire IV, which engages the private 
salvation of the satirist at more length. 
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quality of persons by the superficialities of apparel.352 He admonishes the humorist not to 
abandon him for a Captain (though he might shine like gold), for a Courtier (though he might 
smell good), or for a Justice (though he might have many well-dressed attendants).   
Although it is directed toward the humorist’s reformation, the speaker’s advice 
applies equally to the satirist.  He satirizes the humorist’s method of affirming the worthiness 
of his acquaintances in language that ironically recalls his previous description of his own 
society of books: 
  Oh monstrous, superstitious puritan,  
  Of refin’d manners, yet ceremonial man, … 
  That wilt consort none, until thou have knowne 
  What lands hee hath in hope, or of his owne. (I, 27-28, 33-34) 
 
The speaker’s insistence that the humorist “wilt consort none” reflects the speaker’s own 
ambivalence regarding the benefit of social engagement.  When Donne’s speaker admonishes 
the humorist to measure the worth of his companions with greater discretion, he implies that 
it is neither retirement from nor participation in society that is offensive, but rather, his 
companion’s lack of discrimination. Much like the satirist, who would indulge the works of 
grave divines as well as giddy and fantastic poets (or, equally bad, eschew all company), the 
humorist’s participation in society must be governed more strictly by moderation and reason.   
Donne may be asserting the ironic similarity between the humorist and the satirist here.  Like 
the fop who knows the true value of nothing, the speaker, who will limit his society to only 
“God and the Muses,” also struggles to discern his duty as a Christian poet.  Both must 
activate their own discretion in order to fulfill their Christian duties. 
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 Hester covers this satirical commonplace pretty thoroughly, treating the clothing of man as a sign of his fall 
from grace (22-24).  Choosing to concentrate upon the analogies of the satirist (marriage, apparel, and 
imprisonment—which I will not rehearse here), Hester does not engage the aim of the satirist’s instruction: that 
society itself is not the enemy, but that the fop’s indiscreet and fickle love of the wrong people is. 
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Immediately before their departure into the vice-ridden street, the speaker begins to 
animate his charity towards his companion.  The satirist emphasizes the necessity of the 
humorist’s reformation in a verse paragraph that functions as the moral center of the poem.  
Instructing the humorist to decipher the difference between vice and virtue, the speaker 
dramatizes the accommodation he has read about in his works of “grave Divines.”  The 
speaker enacts his poetic duty through his satire of the fop, whose reformation is portrayed 
suddenly in terms more urgent than the speaker’s discomfort at being abandoned. Earnestly 
admonishing the humorist before he agrees to accompany him into more corruption, the 
speaker claims to embody Christian charity: 
But since thou like a contrite penitent,  
Charitably warn’d of thy sinnes, dost repent  
These vanities, and giddinesses, loe  
I shut my chamber doore, and ‘Come, lets goe.’ (I, 49-52) 
 
The speaker’s concern for the humorist is no longer characterized exclusively by his concern 
of being abandoned; rather, through his imagery of the sacrament of reconciliation, he urges 
the humorist to consider the ramifications of such vanities upon his soul.  Using the language 
of holy confession, the satirist positions himself in the role of priest while the fop is 
presented as the sinful transgressor seeking forgiveness.  Donne emphasizes the humorist’s 
desire for reformation from his past “vanities, and giddinesses,” framing his penitence and 
repentance as vital acts in the Christian process of absolution.  Like Paul’s sharp rebuke of 
the Corinthians, the speaker’s admonition of the fop is portrayed as born out of Christian love 
and seeks to reform the penitent to virtue.  Donne confirms that the speaker’s satire of the 
humorist is “charitable” and, in order to do him even greater good, the speaker acquiesces to 
the humorist’s request to accompany him into the street.  
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The charity of the satirist does not come without a cost, however.  Juxtaposing his 
“charity” to the humorist against the preservation of the speaker’s soul, Donne opposes the 
public duty of the Christian satirist with the private piety of the speaker.  Immediately 
regretting his concession to the fop, the satirist hypothesizes about the injustices he will be 
made to suffer because of his companion’s fickle attention.  Although his malcontented 
scenarios largely portray the satirist’s attempt to reform the humorist as no more than 
annoyance and futility, the speaker briefly positions his engagement with the fop as 
dangerous to his own salvation.  The satirist speculates that while the humorist likely will be 
unfazed by his own social infidelity (an implication the poem later challenges), the satirist 
himself will be damned for accompanying him: he asks prayerfully, “But how shall I be 
pardon’d my offence / That thus have sinn’d against my conscience?” (I, 65-66).  By 
seemingly blithely engaging in the corruption of London, the satirist has sinned against 
God.353  To my knowledge, no scholarship has taken this statement as a legitimate display of 
the anxiety of the satirist, choosing to dismiss it as a simple precursor to the issues more fully 
developed in Donne’s religious poetry, as a rhetorical question, and as a mere pregnant pause 
in the staccato enjambment of the poem.354  Occurring at the threshold between isolation and 
society—situated between the satirist’s decision to go abroad but before he has abandoned 
wholly his retirement—the satirist’s question serves as a counterpoint to the poem’s 
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 The precise reason for the satirist’s decision to abandon his study to accompany the humorist is never 
explained in the poem, though modern criticism has put forth a few possibilities. My assertion, that the satirist 
acquiesces to the humorist’s request out of charity—specifically out of a concern for his well-being—takes 
issue with the common reading that he is merely naïve.  The satirist cannot be dismissed as merely gullible. 
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signaling a “‘fall’… that confirms [the speaker’s] understanding of the necessity of grace in the lives of men” 
(20); A.F. Bellette observes that the question “has the ring of some of those terrible unanswered questions in the 
Holy Sonnets, and is very obviously not answered here—the poem redoubles its energy and in the rapid and 
brilliant finale one might forget that it had been asked” (133). 
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emphasis on the public duty of the Christian poet.  Suddenly and urgently, the speaker turns 
inward.  
 The satirist’s prayer serves as a reminder that he risks his soul by accompanying the 
fop. Demonstrating for the reader his concern regarding his private, rather than public, 
relationship with God, the satirist attempts to recreate the privacy of his cell amid the chaos 
and hubbub of society.  In his spontaneous self-rebuke, the satirist portrays his charity to the 
humorist as potentially irreconcilable to his own salvation: 
  But sooner may a cheap whore, that hath beene  
Worne by many severall men in sinne, 
  As are black feathers, or musk colour hose, 
  Name her childs right father, ‘mongst all those; … 
  Then thou, when thou depart’st from mee, canst show 
  Whither, why, when, or with whom thou wouldst go. 
  But how shall I be pardon’d my offence 
  That thus have sinn’d against my conscience? (I, 53-56, 63-66) 
 
By turning to a private, meditative space, the satirist conceals his own interior relationship 
with God from the humorist.355  In effect, the speaker recreates the private and secretive 
space of his study in his conscience, a place inaccessible to the wandering eyes of the 
humorist or reader.  After acknowledging the humorist’s inevitable betrayal and the futility of 
his satiric impulse, the satirist retreats to a place of prayerful meditation, moving from his 
public concern for the humorist’s reformation to reflect upon his own standing with God.  
Although Donne will go on to develop the tension between the Christian poet’s public and 
private responsibilities more overtly in Satire IV—where the reader becomes privy to that 
speaker’s divine trance and innermost thoughts—here, the reader remains outside the scope 
of the speaker’s meditation.  Despite his attempt to recreate a space free from sinful 
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 Ronald Huebert’s study of early modern notions of privacy is an excellent source for puzzling out the 
curious definitions and implications of the term for Renaissance audiences.  Ronald Huebert, “Privacy: The 
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contamination,  the speaker proceeds directly into the society he intends to denounce, 
working to teach the fop discrimination at the expense of his own soul. 
Narrating his struggle to reform the fop’s perspective, the satirist repeatedly describes 
the humorist as debasing himself, signaled by his lowered head, the center of his reason:   
  …as fidlers stop low’st, at highest sound, 
 So to the most brave, stoops hee nigh’st the ground. 
  But to the grave man, he doth move no more.  
 
 Now leaps he upright, joggs me, and cryes, “Do’ you see 
  Yonder well favour’d youth?’ ‘Which?’ ‘Oh, ‘tis hee 
 That dances so divinely.’ ‘Oh,’ said I, 
 ‘Stand still, must you dance here for company?’ 
 Hee droopt, wee went.  
 
 … ‘Him whom I last left, all repute  
 For his device, in hansoming a sute, 
 To judge of lace, pinke, panes, print, cut, and plight, 
 Of all the Court, to have the best conceit.’ 
 ‘Our dull comedians want him, let him goe. 
 But Oh, God strengthen thee, why stoop’st thou so?’.  
(I, 78-81, 83-87, 95-100) 
 
This series of satiric situations demonstrates the stubborn ignorance of the humorist, who, 
despite all proper instruction, will not reform his indiscriminate and fickle ways.  More than 
simply satires of musicians, foreign travel, effeminate behavior, and the changing fashions of 
the court, these moments in the text signal the humorist’s willful disavowal of reason, offered 
to him in the form of the speaker’s satire.  As the satire progresses, the humorist is portrayed 
repeatedly in a stature that emphasizes his debasement to an almost sub-human level:  in 
response to social stimuli, the humorist stands upright or stoops and droops, demonstrating 
not only the failure of the satirist’s efforts to reform his companion’s giddy indiscretion, but 
also the humorist’s subsequent fall from grace. With the humorist’s stooping and drooping, 
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Donne refigures the fall of man in the fop’s journey through the streets. 356  Pleading for God 
to “strengthen” the humorist, Donne’s speaker affirms his companion’s descent into sin.  His 
spontaneous prayer marks his own frustration and despair regarding his companion’s 
stubborn desire to doom himself.  Replacing the role properly held by God alone with the 
sinful society of London gallants, the humorist risks his soul’s salvation.  Despite the 
speaker’s repeated admonition and satiric affirmations of its corruption and vice, the lure of 
sin proves too much for the humorist, who falls into the corruption that surrounds him.  The 
satirist’s charity fails.   
 The utter debasement of the humorist at the conclusion of the poem reinforces the 
poem’s  vexed relationship with both satire and solitude:  while the humorist ends the poem 
justly returned to the isolation of the satirist’s cell, Donne refuses to allow Satire I to be 
reduced to a mere encomium of solitude.   Even in the relative privacy of the speaker’s cell, 
Donne insists upon the importance of the speaker’s charitable duty to his companion.  
Having been beaten and thrown from a prostitute’s home by rivals for her affection, the 
humorist returns to the safety of the speaker’s company, where he is taken in by the satirist: 
At last his Love he in a window spies,  
And like light dew exhal’d, he flings from mee 
Violently ravish’d to his lechery. 
Many there were, he could command no more; 
  He quarrell’d, fought, bled; and turn’d out of dore 
  Directly came to mee hanging the head, 
  And constantly a while must keepe his bed. (106-112) 
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 I observed this ominous “descent” of the humorist before reading Hester’s similar observation.  He goes on 
to assert the various meanings of the satirist’s likening the fop to various animals presumably displayed around 
London at the time through traditional allegorical and emblematic interpretations of the animals (26-28).  In 
referring to the animal acts in and around London, Donne insists upon his own engagement in the society he 
would denounce, employing topicality to draw in his audience so that he might charitably satirize the type of the 
humorist. 
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Having violently shaken off the charitable satirist yet again, the humorist makes himself 
vulnerable to the physical abuse administered by his rivals, debasing himself through his 
sinful ignorance.  Finally returning to the speaker, “hanging the head,” the humorist is cared 
for with Christian kindness rather than rebuke.  Indeed, at the conclusion of the poem, charity 
overtakes satire.  While the speaker’s satire has failed to bring about the humorist’s 
reformation—nowhere does Donne assert that the humorist has repented his actions in the 
streets—the speaker fulfills his charitable duty to the humorist by opening his home to his 
inconstant companion.  Because of his indiscretions, he is laid flat, and “must keepe his bed,” 
isolated from the corruptions of the streets of London.  The satirist’s Christian duty shrinks 
from the community of posers and miscreants found in the London streets to include only the 
humorist.  The speaker’s charity thrives in the confines of the intimate relationship.  His duty 
is ultimately to only one. 
Despite the speaker’s failure as a satirist, the poem remains a success.  The satirist’s 
charity to the humorist at the poem’s conclusion offers the reader a virtuous though muted 
alternative to the corruption portrayed in the streets of London.  In the end, Donne presents 
his speaker’s charity as a powerful affirmation of the duty of the Christian poet towards his 
readers.  By ending the poem with the satirist and the humorist within the speaker’s cell, 
Donne demonstrates his Christian duty to his readers.  Indeed, Satire I attempts to refigure 
the relationship between the author and reader of satire through Donne’s portrayal of the 
satirist’s instruction.  Although the world of the poem finally dismisses satire as ineffective—
the satirist’s righteous instruction of the fop is overwhelmed by the temptations of the streets 
of London—the poem itself may succeed in teaching its audience discrimination. Ultimately, 
the goals of the satirist portrayed in the poem and the author of the poem are reconciled 
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through their charitable acts: the satirist’s Christian duty to his companion mirrors Donne’s 
responsibility to his reader as a Christian poet.   
 
“it enough shall bee / To wash the staines away” 
A similar pattern of participation and retreat emerges in Satire IV, but the poem is 
dominated by a pessimism that Donne’s earlier satire avoided.  The sense of urgency and 
sobriety that pervades Donne’s fourth satire wholly eschews the comedy of Satire I, replacing 
the speaker’s concern for his charitable duty with a cynicism that questions the ability of 
satire to participate in a society so degraded by the fall.  Donne develops more fully the 
contradiction between the satirist’s social and personal goals in Satire IV, where the tension 
between the satirist’s public and private duties reaches a breaking point.   
While throughout the satires Donne appears deeply ambivalent regarding the power 
of satire to reform the corruption of the soul, Satire IV represents a bleak argument for 
satire’s inability to cleanse society’s sinful nature.  Allegorizing the repeated failure of 
satire’s charity through the speaker’s ineffectual visits to the court, Donne limits the ability 
of satire to accomplish reform.  He acknowledges early in the poem that, in its going abroad, 
satire is tainted by the very sin it would denounce.  He argues that, once corrupted, satire will 
no longer be regarded by those it intends to save as a pure, godly endeavor motivated by 
charity; rather, the targets of its scorn will misinterpret satire, maligning it as libel, motivated 
by the poet’s self-interest.  To preserve its own godliness, satire is forced to retreat inward, to 
the privacy of the reader.  Donne, with “Macchabees modestie,” must content himself with 
the intimate audience of his coterie of understanders, hoping that some “wise” reader will 
“esteeme [his] writs Canonicall” (IV, 243-244) 
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Divided into roughly five parts, Satire IV presents two different temporal moments 
directed at two different audiences.  The frame of the story, illustrated as a confession of the 
satirist’s sin, is addressed to Donne’s audience of readers, while the narrative situation being 
depicted retrospectively offers a satire of the court directed to those who would inhabit the 
den of vice.  His motives for journeying to this “picture of vice” remain unclear in the poem, 
leading Donne’s satirist to fall by guilty association with what he ostensibly would condemn 
(IV, 72).  A courtier approaches, who, in conversing with the satirist, begins libeling officers 
in the court; the satirist, eager to rid himself of his unwanted interlocutor, cannot shake his 
new companion.  Finally, the courtier leaves, having asked for and received a crown from the 
satirist.  After this misadventure, the satirist retires, retreating to the isolation of his home, 
where he is visited with a satiric trance.  He awakens and returns to satirize the court again, 
only to retreat in defeat for a second time.  The speaker ends the narrative portion of the 
poem isolated, defeated by the corruption of the hellish court.   
Despite such a seemingly bleak ending, the concluding portion of the poem evaluates 
the satirist’s task as more than a mere waste. Having returned to his confessional frame, 
Donne’s speaker contents himself with the knowledge that satire is effective even if its scope 
is limited.  While his courtly society can be redeemed by God alone, the speaker’s satire, like 
his confession, is capable of cleansing his own soul, and, by hopeful extension, that of his 
reader. 
Departing from the narrative situations presented in his other satires, Satire IV is 
framed as a confession directed to his coterie of readers rather than his narrative audience.  
Donne portrays the speaker’s admission of his guilt as a personally redemptive exercise, but 
one that assumes the shared value system of his audience of coterie readers.  The satirist’s 
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bitter and even sarcastic repudiation of the court limits the effectiveness of his satire to those 
readers who would recognize their own anti-court bias in Donne’s railings against the court.  
The speaker’s statement of guilt attempts to balance the satirist’s concern for his own 
salvation, marked by the satirist’s acknowledgment that his admission can cleanse his own 
soul, with his concern for his audience of understanders who would recognize his sarcastic 
denunciation of the court as an admonition to avoid its contamination.  In other words, by 
constructing his satire as a satiric confession, Donne emphasizes the speaker’s responsibility 
and guilt.  Through his recollection of his experience in the court, Donne hopes to profit his 
readers by providing them a charitable epideictic “map” of his “sin of going” (IV, 11):   
Well; I may now receive and die; my sin  
Indeed is great, but I have been in 
 A purgatory, such as feared hell is 
  A recreation, and scant map of this. (IV, 1-4) 
 
Satire IV portrays the speaker’s confession as both a meditation and a conversation.  Donne’s 
satirist denounces the court as a vice-ridden hell, but does so with such sarcasm and irony 
that the entire statement may be taken as a sort of jest that casts Donne’s speaker in the same 
light as those he would denounce.    By recreating his own bitter experience in the court, 
demonstrating his own sinful dalliance there, Donne’s speaker perhaps hopes to instruct his 
readers to eschew the physical and moral dangers of the court, enacting a satiric charity 
similar to that of the poet of Satire I.  He publicizes the vice of the court in order to admonish 
his readers towards virtuous action.  In contrast to Satire I, however, the goal of Donne’s 
satirist is personal: he cautions his audience not through his satire of others, but through a 
narration of his own folly and experience.  As it functions as the speaker’s private confession 
meant to cleanse his soul, the satire works as a self-admonishing purgative.   
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While satire may be an effective method of instructing his readers to avoid the 
corrupted and corrupting court, Donne insists upon its limits.  By framing his satire as a 
confession privy to his readers alone, he sharply divides his audience into two groups:  those 
wise readers who will recognize Donne’s satire as godly work, and those morally bankrupt 
courtiers that people his narrative.  In contrast to Donne’s godly readers, who will read and 
ponder his satire of sin while they laugh at its targets, the audience in the poem will disregard 
his satiric task, associating his satire not with godliness or charity, but with malice and libel.  
It is this audience of courtiers that Donne’s speaker goes to court to satirize.  In going 
to court, however, the satirist is infected by the very sinfulness he would castigate.  
Ultimately, he is unable to separate himself from the vice he would denounce:  
 My minde, neither with prides itch, nor yet hath been 
 Poyson’d with love to see, or to be seene, 
 I had no suit there, no new suite to shew, 
 Yet went to Court;  But as Glaze which did goe 
 To’a Masse in jest, catch’d, was faine to disburse 
The hundred markes. So’ it pleas’d my destinie  
(Guilty’of my sin of going,) to think me  
As prone to’all ill, and good as forget-  
Full, as proud, as lustfull, and as much in debt, 
As vaine, as witlesse, and as false as they  
Which dwell at Court, for once going that way” (IV, 5-16)  
 
In the passage, Donne’s speaker likens himself to Glaze, who attended a prohibited Mass “in 
jest” and was caught and punished.357  In his poetry, Donne employs “jest” in two ways, both 
of which coexist in this particular allusion.  His less common use of the phrase occurs in his 
“Song (Sweetest love, I do not go),” where his use of “jest” presents the speaker’s departure 
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from his beloved as a mimicry of death. 358 In that lyric, he uses the term as a innocuous 
simulacrum of something potentially more sinister.   Far more commonly, Donne employs 
the term to denote the sardonic ridicule of either an individual target or type. 359  In short, 
Donne equates “jesting” with a form of Horation satire that would laugh at “worne maladies” 
(III, 4).360  In this particular instance, Donne uses the term to signal his speaker’s professed 
goal in journeying to the court: like Glaze, he attends the court in order to ridicule it.  And, 
like Glaze, Donne’s satirist becomes associated with its sin.  The speaker acknowledges his 
“sin of going” to court, a sin that Donne portrays to be as vague as it is damnable. He plainly 
refutes all conventional motivations for journeying to the court: he does not desire to go to 
court out of pride, lust, or vanity, nor is he engaged in courtly business that would necessitate 
his presence.361  
Despite his apparent lack of sinfulness, the speaker falls quickly into corruption:    
So’it pleas’d my destinie  
(Guilty’of my sin of going,) to think me  
As prone to’all ill, and good as forget-  
Full, as proud, as lustfull, and as much in debt, 
As vaine, as witlesse, and as false as they  
Which dwell at Court, for once going that way. (IV, 11-16)      
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By textually separating his guilt, the satirist tries to limit its effect upon his moral authority.  
But the satirist is unable to separate himself from the sin he would denounce, and he falls 
“for once going that way.”  In particular, the weak endings and repeated enjambments of 
these lines demonstrate the tortured nature of the speaker’s engagement in that which he 
despises.  Donne’s use of severe elisions and enjambed lines try to separate the speaker 
(“me”) from the besmirched reputation of those who inhabit the court, who are “As prone 
to’all ill.”  The painful enjambment of the phrase “good as forget-/full” mimics the descent of 
the speaker into sin, his memory of goodness quickly overwhelmed by the sin to follow in 
the next lines.  Once coupled with such sins, the satirist is hindered in his ability to urge the 
reformation of his targets, his moral authority impaired by his sinful association with vice.   
Having sullied his moral authority by journeying to court, the speaker is punished for 
his sin.  Donne portrays the courtier as the instrument of divine wrath, a scourge of God who 
takes the shape of the poetic opposite of the satirist.  Created by God as a fit antagonist with 
whom to instruct the speaker, the courtier allegorizes the dangers of the satiric occupation.  
The satirist’s criminal double, he embodies the misinterpretation of satire that would 
associate such pleas for reformation with the illegitimate speech-acts of gossip and libel. 
Conversely, Donne’s speaker represents the struggle of satire to retain its virtue by retreating 
inward.  At the beginning of their exchange, the two sides are clearly delineated and defined.  
Although the satirist portrays himself as the linguistic opposite of the courtier, as the 
exchange between two progresses, it becomes increasingly difficult to tell the two apart:  the 
satirist’s sarcasm starts to resemble the flattery and libel of the courtier, the difference 
between them corroded by the satirist’s engagement with the vice of the court.  Despite his 
sarcastic attempts to undermine and rid himself of his interlocutor, the speaker consistently 
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fails to separate himself physically or poetically from his libelous companion.   By erasing 
the linguistic distinction between the satirist and the courtier, Donne associates the public 
execution of satire with libelous gossip and treachery, and later, with brutal and self-
glorifying rebuke.   
In his initial satiric description of the courtier,  the satirist repeatedly tries to 
differentiate himself from the courtier, working to portray both his own legitimacy and the 
legitimacy of his art.  Presenting his own satire as beyond the jurisdiction of criminal 
defamation, Donne’s satirist insists, like he did in Satire II, that his “words none drawes / 
Within the vast reach of th’huge statute lawes” (II, 111-112).   Whereas the satirist describes 
himself as a conscientious though fallen man, concerned with the reformation of the court but 
unsure how to bring it about, he associates the courtier with monstrosity, duplicity, and 
criminality.   The satirist likens the courtier to a monster, a foreigner, a Jesuit in disguise, an 
agent provocateur, and a criminal.  Attempting to distinguish himself from the courtier who 
approaches, the satirist struggles to encapsulate his vice:  
 …Towards me did runne  
A thing more strange, then on Niles slime, the Sunne  
E’r bred; or all which into Noahs Arke came;  
A thing, which would have pos’d Adam to name; 
  Stranger then seaven Antiquaries studies, 
  Then Africks Monsters, Guianaes rarities. 
  Stranger then strangers. (IV, 17-23) 
 
The speaker works diligently to set himself apart from the courtier, compiling a portrait of 
the courtier from classical and early modern natural histories, biblical legend, chroniclers, 
Tudor proclamation, and even gossip.  At first, the speaker and courtier are portrayed as 
wholly different.  He initially portrays the courtier as a “thing” of monstrosity, created of 
Egyptian sludge or from Noah’s ark and a sinful “thing,” unclassifiable by the father of man; 
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later, he presents him as a yet undiscovered “monster” or “rarity” from an unexplored land; 
lastly, he defines the courtier as simply something other than himself, arguing that he is 
finally only “stranger than strangers,” more like a Dane than an Englishman.  By the end of 
the sequence, the satirist has narrowed the difference between himself and his unwanted 
companion: while he first describes him first as a monstrous “thing” unrecognizable as a 
man, the satirist soon recognizes the courtier as a “stranger.”  
Not able to distinguish himself physically from his companion, the speaker more 
specifically attempts to differentiate his satiric art from the compliment and flattery of the 
courtier.  He casts himself as the victim of his aggressive companion, unprepared for the 
assault of the courtier: “But Pedants motley tongue, souldiers bombast, / Montebankes 
drugtongue, nor the termes of law / Are strong enough preparatives, to draw / Me to beare 
this” (IV, 40-43).  While the speaker is unprepared, the courtier is portrayed as the aggressor, 
his linguistic dexterity positioned as a threat to the satirist.  The courtier’s tongue is capable 
of great flattery, subterfuge and even outright deceit: “his tongue, call’d complement … can 
win widdowes, pay scores, / Make men speake treason, cosen subtlest whores, / Out-flatter 
favorites, or outlie either / Jovius, or Surius, or both together”  (IV, 44-48).  Whereas the 
satirist is innocent—he describes himself as “seelily” willing to engage the courtier in 
conversation—the courtier is condemned as a deceitful flatterer, not to be trusted.   
Despite the satirist’s initial claims, Donne complicates the satirist’s distinction 
between himself and his parodic companion, presenting the differences between the courtly 
satirist and the courtier to be of degree rather than kind. The satiric banter between the 
humorist and his unwilling interlocutor muddies the distinction between the Horatian 
sarcasm of the speaker, who attempts to shake off his companion through his willful 
244 
 
misinterpretation, and the insipid conversation of the courtier, who simply refuses to leave.  
Despite their contradictions of purpose, their similarities are apparent as soon as they speak: 
their conversational material is derived from the same sources, their poetic cadences are 
largely identical, and both employ a willful ignorance or misinterpretation of the other in the 
pursuit of their own goals.  As Howard Erskine-Hill argues, both the courtier and the satirist 
utilize biblical mythology to mock the other: when the speaker ridicules the courtier for his 
self-praise, saying “If you’had liv’d, Sir, / Time enough to have been Interpreter / To Babells 
bricklayers, sure the Tower had stood” (IV, 63-66), the satirist reminds his audience of the 
courtier’s earlier claim that the “Apostles were  / Good pretty linguists” (58-59). 362   The 
voices of the satirist and the courtier even merge together at one point, literally blurring the 
distinction between the two: 
He knowes who’hath sold his land, and now doth beg 
A licence, old iron, bootes, shooes, and egge- 
Shels to transport; Shortly boyes shall not play 
At span-counter, or blow-point, but they pay 
Toll to some Courtier. (IV, 103-107)  
 
With no indication of a change of speaker, the voice of gossip, obsessed with the wealth and 
social condition of others, turns to satire, bitterly commenting upon the material corruption of 
society.  The similarity between the two soon becomes more pronounced, and more 
dangerous, as the conversation turns from such “triviall household trash” to the moral and 
political sins of the court (IV, 98). 
Although Hester asserts that the courtier “transforms the ‘termes’ of satire into 
libelous trash,” the distinction is much more nuanced than such a condemnation would 
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indicate.363 In response to the courtier’s statement that the speaker would benefit from a life 
at court—“If of court life you knew the good, / You would leave your lonenesse” (IV, 67-
68)—the satirist argues for the vice of his surroundings, condemning the Elizabethan court as 
a den of sin: 
 … I said, “Not alone 
My lonenesse is.  But Spartanes fashion, 
 To teach by painting drunkards, doth not tast 
Now; Aretines pictures have made few chast: 
No more can Princes courts, though there be few 
Better pictures of vice, teach me vertue.” (IV, 67-72) 
 
In the mouth of the courtier, however, the generalized satire of the Elizabethan court—the 
speaker singles out no member of the court, nor does he condemn a particular crime—
becomes actionable and even treasonous in its specificity: 
  He, like a priveleg’d spie, whom nothing can 
  Discredit, Libells now ‘gainst each great man. 
  He names a price for every office paid; 
  He saith, our warres thrive ill, because delai’d; 
That offices are entail’d, and that there are  
Perpetuities of them, lasting as farre   
As the last day; And that great officers, 
Doe with the Pirates share, and Dunkirkers. 
Who wasts in meat, in clothes, in horse, he notes; 
Who loves Whores, who boys, and who goats. (IV, 119-128) 
 
In the first passage, Donne’s speaker expressly directs his diatribe to the court, which he 
denounces as a den of sin. However, the satire is also self-directed.  Again, he narrows the 
difference between his own satire and the libel of the courtier, acknowledging that his own 
art, like that of the courtier, is consumed by and with vice.  Like the Spartans, who would 
show young men the slovenly deeds of drunken men to make them abhor sin, and “Aretine’s 
pictures” that promise to make “few chast” through their pornography, satire’s portraits of 
                                                 
363
 Hester, 82.   
246 
 
vice divorce it from its goal of reformation, replacing its concern for the moral health of its 
targets with salacious depictions of sin. 
Donne spotlights the similarities between satire and libel more than their differences.  
Although modern scholarship would assert the legitimacy of one and the criminality of the 
other, Donne’s poem actively and repeatedly blurs the moral and legal distinction between 
them.  Annabel Patterson has argued that, by ventriloquizing the more severe and salacious 
satire of the court through the mouth of the courtier, Donne is able to distance himself from 
the charge of libel and its accompanying punishment.364 By portraying his speaker as an 
unwilling audience of the courtier’s slanders, Donne is able to give voice to juicy gossip 
about members of  the court—because who would not want to hear “Who loves Whores, who 
boys, and who goats”—but also is able to construct his speaker’s disapproval of such 
defamation as an authorial safeguard.365  While I agree that it is likely Donne is indulging his 
audience’s desire for topicality through a satirical sleight of hand, Patterson’s reading hinges 
upon the satirist’s clear condemnation of the courtier’s libels, a condemnation that occurs in 
only muted form in the satire itself.   
Although Donne drastically shifts the tone of his satire immediately after the 
courtier’s satiric monologue—perhaps realizing that it is necessary to contradict the 
courtier’s message—the shift leaves unsatisfied the reader’s desire for condemnation.  From 
this moment onward, Satire IV replaces the Horation model of satire, characterized by the 
speaker’s witty repartee and sarcasm, with images of contamination and infection.  Indeed, 
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the satirist remains silent for the rest of the interaction with the courtier. 366  This imagery of 
contamination is commonly interpreted as Donne’s fear—allegorized through his speaker—
of prosecution.367  In this reading, the fear of prosecution comes from outside: as Hester 
asserts, “Just as Glaze, ‘catch’d, was faine to [suffer] the Statutes curse’ (9-10), so, the 
satirist realized, he might be implicated for complicity in the bore’s treasonous slime.”368   
While the satirist does fear the prosecution and imprisonment that threaten traitors and 
libelers of public officials, he fears more keenly his own moral complicity in the libelous 
conversation.   
Fearing his own complicity in the courtier’s libels, the satirist retreats inward to 
examine his own soul, comparing the courtier to Circe and himself to her prisoners in an 
image that supports both his condemnation of his companion and his admission of his own 
guilt.  He laments, “I more amas’d then Circes prisoners, when / They felt themselves turne 
beasts, felt my selfe then / Becoming Traytor” (IV, 129-131).  Most overtly, Donne’s 
metaphor casts the libelous courtier as a mythological force that would reduce the satirist to a 
criminal, as Circe reduced her prisoners to beasts.  Such a admonitory reading of the Circe 
myth was common, denouncing Circe as a witch, a whore, and a shrew, the men she 
bewitches as innocent victims of the enchantress.369 This reading of the satirist’s impotence 
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recalls the seemingly unstoppable insinuation of Spenser’s Sclaunder, whose defamatory 
railings “passing through the eares, would pierce the hart, / And wound the soule it selfe with 
griefe unkind … Her spitefull words did pricke, and wound the inner part” (IV, viii, 26.6-
7,9). 370   
But Donne’s use of the Circe myth in Satire IV also makes the satirist, like the men of 
Ulysses, an accomplice to his own degradation.  In Chapman’s Homer, as well as in many 
other early modern allegorical interpretations of the Circe myth, the author implies the 
potential justice of Circe’s transformation of her masculine visitors.  In his translation of The 
Odyssey, Chapman honors the mild rebuke implicit in the original, labeling the sailors of 
Ulysses “unwise” and as “Fooles” for journeying to Circe’s court; Mercury likewise rebukes 
Ulysses as “erring” before he gives him the moly that will protect him from Circe’s 
charms.371  In another adaptation, Circe’s prisoners are changed into beasts that represent 
their own vices and sinful proclivities: Natale Conti’s Mythologiae interprets the legend 
allegorically, arguing that Homer means the legend as an admonition for men to bridle their 
sinful passions.372  Still other commentators go further, extending the imprudence of the 
sailors that Homer implies to outright blame. In his book of emblems, Emblemata (1531), 
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Andreas Alciati uses the myth to condemn men who abdicate their rational masculinity to 
unfit women. Likewise, in Geoffrey Whitney’s A Choice of Emblems (1586), the author 
adapts the story from Ovid to demonstrate the prisoners’ desire to remain as beasts: “those 
foolishe sorte, whome wicked love dothe thrall, / Like brutishe beastes do passe their time, 
and have no sense at all. / And thoughe that wisdome woulde, they shoulde againe retire, / 
Yet, they had rather Circes serve, and burne in their desire.”373  Donne’s insistence upon the 
emerging and infectious guilt of his speaker complicates any easy distinction the reader 
might make between satire and libel, signaling Donne’s ambivalence regarding his chosen 
mode.   
Although the author is careful to portray the speaker as an unwilling accomplice, his 
speaker’s sense of shared guilt elides the artificial separation that would cast satire as 
legitimate rebuke and portray libel as criminal defamation. While Joshua Scodel has argued 
that “The satirist has reason to fear both prosecution and contamination” from his 
interlocutor, interpreting Donne’s metaphor of contamination to separate the two 
conversationalists, I would argue that Donne works within the system of prosecution and 
contamination to problematize any clear denunciation we as readers might make of libel.374  
In a letter to Henry Goodyer, dated April, 26th 1612,  Donne attempts to recuperate the 
morality of libel, attributing to such criminal defamation the goal of reformation more 
commonly attributed to more “legitimate” satire. Speaking harshly of the libels that sought to 
defame the deceased Salisbury, Donne marks the difference between the rebukes that aim 
towards amendment and those that cowardly defame the dead:  
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But I would all these (or better) had been made then, for they 
might then have wrought upon him; and they might have 
testified that the Authors had meant to mend him, but now they 
can have no honest pretense.  I dare say to you, where I am not 
easily misinterpreted, that they may be cases, where one may 
do his Countrey good service, by libelling … For, where a man 
is either too great, or his Vices too generall, … there is no way, 
but this extraordinary accusing, which we call Libelling.375   
 
Here, Donne credits the goal of reformation as the necessary distinction between legitimate 
rebuke and criminal defamation.  He marks the slipperiness of criminal speech in the same 
letter, commenting that some libels, such as those defaming dead emperors, through “ignoble 
and useless…escape the nature of libels, by being subscribed and avowed: which excuse 
would not have served the Star-chamber, where sealed Letters have been judged libels.”376  
On one hand, the fear his speaker expresses regarding the “Giant Statutes” that would “ope 
his jaw / To sucke” in the speaker overtly criminalizes the courtier’s speech, marking the 
distinction between the courtier’s defamation and the speaker’s.  On the other hand, Donne’s 
speaker cannot be characterized as resolutely condemning the libelous talk of the courtier: 
despite his “loathing,” he enables the courtier to defame men and officers of the court for a 
variety of offenses, whether true or untrue.  Neither Donne’s speaker nor the courtier can 
claim his speech as legitimate.  As the courtier slanders these men, the satirist is portrayed as 
a passive recipient of the courtier’s news.  He makes himself—at least in his own mind—the 
bearer of the courtier’s sin, sharing his guilt willingly.  Specifically, he portrays himself in 
sexual congress with the courtier, the slanders of the courtier transforming the satirist’s body 
from a pure entity to a sordid and diseased vessel of sin: “as burnt venom’d Leachers doe 
growe sound / By giving others their soares, I might growe / Guilty, and he free” (IV, 133-
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136).  In the end of their conversation, nothing is resolved.  Donne closes the episode not 
with denunciation, but with greater acquiescence: the conversation ends because the courtier 
leaves, not the speaker.   
 When the satirist returns to court after his retirement, he is presented with yet another 
type of  defamatory speech, what Hester has called “another perversion of man’s ‘gift of 
utterance.’” 377 For Donne, Glorius represents a type of self-satisfied and self-absorbed satire, 
a version of admonitory speech that has replaced the laudable goal of reformation with an 
ambitious self-interest that would rail at everything and everyone. Donne’s portrait of 
Glorius demonstrates that Glorius has distorted satire by divorcing it from its search for truth, 
twisting it into something reprehensible: 
  But here comes Glorius that will plague them both, 
  Who, in the other extreme, only doth 
  Call a rough carelessnesse, good fashion; 
  Whose cloak his spurres teare; whom he spits on 
  He cares not; His ill words doe no harme 
  To him; he rusheth in, as if “Arme, arme,” 
  He meant to crie; And though his face be’as ill 
  As theirs which in old hangings whip Christ, yet still 
  He strives to looke worse, he keepes all in awe; 
  Jeasts like a licenc’d foole, commands like law. (IV, 219-228) 
 
Donne constructs the two extremes of bad speech: flattery, portrayed by Donne’s parodic 
preacher-wooer, Macrine, and abuse, portrayed by Glorius.378 In contrast to Macrine’s 
adulation, Glorius would abuse everything indiscriminately, guided only by his selfish 
interests: Donne insists that “whom he spits on / He cares not; His ill words doe no harme / 
To him.”  Demeaning the gift of speech to mere spit, Glorius divorces the goal of reformation 
                                                 
377
 Hester, 88. 
 
378
 Scodel’s argument for the speaker’s recourse to the Aristotelian mean here is very insightful. See “‘None’s 
Slave,’” 375; for his argument of such extremity and mean in the rest of Donne’s poetry, see the first chapter of  
Excess and Mean in Early Modern English Literature (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002), 37-38. 
252 
 
from the exercise of railing, “His ill words” do not instill virtue, but “harme.”  By returning 
to the enjambment of the first portion of the poem in his asserton that his “words doe no 
harme / To him,” Donne suspends Glorius’s damnable self-absorption until the next line to 
highlight the difference between his self-serving satire and that of the speaker.  According to 
Hester, Glorius, “unlike Donne’s satirist,…is stirred only by personal ambition and greed.”379   
Donne’s portrait condemns Glorius for his selfish purposes, but also for his satiric 
indecorum.  Self-consciously fashioning himself as a composite of the rough-born, harsh-
spoken satyr figures popular at the time of Donne’s writing, Glorius takes the role of the 
scourge of the court, but he misuses satire, directing it indiscriminately at all members of the 
court.380  He converts righteous satire into mere abuse: caricaturing satire, he puts on the 
mask of “rough carelessnesse,” or disdainful rusticity, manufacturing himself as the popular 
satyr figure who ought to “goe rag’d and bare: / And show his rougher and his hairy side.”381  
Glorius misinterprets the ethics behind the satiric personae, however: as Thomas Lodge puts 
it, the satirist assumes the rustic identity for protection, so that men “might wiselye, under the 
abuse of …[the satyr’s] name, discover the follies of many of theyr folish fellow citisens.”382 
Of course, Glorius’s unpleasant demeanor does not come from a genuine concern for 
mankind, but from the idea that such disdain is “good fashion.”  His spurs that rip his 
affected cloak stand inappropriately ready to shred violently his opponent, signaling “the 
                                                 
379
 Hester, 88. 
 
380
 Glorius, like Shakespeare’s parodic malcontent Jacques, “will rail against all the first-born of Egypt” for lack 
of a better target. William Shakespeare, As You Like It, II, v. 63. 
 
381
 Joseph Hall, Virgidemiarum, in The Collected Poems of Joseph Hall, ed. A. Davenport (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 1949), ln. 76-77. 
 
382
 Thomas Lodge, Defense of Poetry (1579), I: 80. 
 
253 
 
‘course attire’ of his assaults.” 383 Donne portrays Glorius as a morally flawed version of a 
satirist, skulking around the court railing indiscriminately at anyone he desires to rail against.  
Glorius, like the courtier before him, represents the flawed public administration of satire, 
easily misdirected against goodness instead of vice, often motivated by self-interest or 
ambition rather than a concern for reformation.   
Again, however, the satirist is not able to completely distinguish his own art from the 
self-promotional and indiscriminate satire of Glorius.  Donne’s speaker returns to the court 
for no known reason.  Having railed to God against the unnaturalness of the court, the 
speaker suddenly appears in its midst, without explanation or clear agenda.  Indeed, 
positioning himself in the presence chamber, Donne’s satirist is more deeply entrenched in 
the court than even his previous inexplicable visit to the “picture of vice.”  He associates 
himself openly with the sinful inhabitants of the court, observing that “All whom the Mues, / 
Baloune, Tennis, Dyet, or the stewes / Had all the morning held, now … in flocks, are found 
/ In the Presence, and I, (God pardon mee.)” (IV, 175-179).  Donne’s speaker likens himself 
to those courtiers who amuse themselves with a variety of pleasures, from the more virtuous 
horse riding (Mues) and recreational athletics such as hand-ball (Baloune) and tennis, to the 
more sinful pleasures of whoring (Dyet and the stewes).  Like them, the speaker is found in 
the court.   The speaker acknowledges his “sin of going” again, asking God to pardon him his 
offense, but the speaker’s attraction to the court is too strong.  While he may not go to court 
with the express purpose of self-promotion, the speaker offers no virtuous explanation of his 
actions.   Left to surmise as to his motivation, Donne’s audience may see him very much like 
Glorius. 
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Attesting to the volatile relationship between the satirist and his audience, the courtier 
and Glorius represent the malignant interpretation of public satire as libel and as ambitious 
cruelty.  Throughout his career, Donne expresses a nervous anxiety about the possibility of 
misinterpretation, couching many of his satiric comments in terms of caution. Articulating 
his concern that his satire will be disregarded or maligned, Donne appears apprehensive 
about his political future, as Patterson asserts, but also about the godliness of his satiric 
occupation.  For example, in the letter to Goodyer quoted above, Donne balances his satiric 
authority with a statement that speaks to his anxiety:  “I dare say to you, where I am not 
easily misinterpreted…”  In a statement that could refer equally to Satire IV as well as 
Donne’s letter to Henry Goodyer, Annabel Patterson points out, “Donne’s language is more 
informative than, perhaps he knew. ‘I dare say,’ which momentarily invokes the satirist’s 
own audacity, is quickly counteracted by the now-characteristic note of caution, ‘where I am 
not easily misinterpreted.’”384 Donne attempts to ensure the correct interpretation of his 
satires by shrinking his audience to those who would understand the proper meaning and 
goals of his satire.      
Although it is tempting to read the satirist’s flight from court as a simple repudiation 
of society, Donne prevents his readers from reducing his satire to a mere encomium of the 
removed contemplative life.  Far from a solution to the corruption of the court, the speaker’s 
retreat is presented as an equally problematic moral choice, one that would sacrifice the 
courage and charity of satire for the speaker’s salvation.  Reeling from his encounter with the 
courtier, Donne’s speaker retreats from the corrupted and corrupting court to the retirement 
of his home, content to separate himself finally from his libelous companion.  Donne portrays 
his retreat to be one of flight from the claustrophobia of the sinful court: “I, (which did see / 
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All the court filled with more strange things then hee) / Ran from thence with such or more 
hast, then one / Who fears more actions, doth make from prison” (IV, 151-154).  Once he is 
released from the courtier, freed from the “prison” of the courtier’s libel, the satirist is able to 
see clearly the sin around him and fly the corruption that would stain his soul.  Separated 
from the court’s sinfulness, the satirist reprimands himself for visiting such an avatar of sin.  
Donne’s poem does not conclude with the speaker’s satiric self-rebuke, however.   The 
speaker is not allowed to rest in the easy isolation of his study; instead, Donne portrays the 
retirement of the speaker, like his visit to the court, as yet another instruction in his satiric art. 
Having realized the depth of his “sin of going” through his tortuous conversation with 
the courtier, the speaker abjures the court’s moral infection in favor of  the “wholesome 
solitariness” of isolation.  Once he has removed himself physically from the court, the 
speaker attempts to restore himself, struggling to balance properly his charity toward the 
members of the court and his scorn of their sins: 
  At home in wholesome solitariness 
 My precious soul began, the wretchedness 
Of suitors at Court to mourn, and a trance 
Like his, who dreamed he saw hell, did advance 
Itself on me, such men as he saw there, 
I saw at Court, and worse, and more; low fear 
Becomes the guilty, not the accuser; then 
Shall I, none’s slave, of high-born, or raised men 
Fear frowns? And, my mistress Truth, betray thee 
To th’ huffing braggart, puffed nobility? (IV, 155-164) 
Temporarily isolated from the corruption that infects the court, “in wholesome solitariness,” 
the speaker turns inward to examine and heal his own soul.  Having endured the satiric 
education of the court, the satirist is converted from his “sin of going,” but has yet to 
consider fully his own salvation.  Only in the quiet retirement of his home can the satirist 
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interrogate the state of his “precious” soul, which, except for a few parenthetical asides, has 
been largely absent from his journey to the court.   
However, the satirist’s full consideration of his “precious” soul ironically reaffirms 
his duty to the courtiers he has left behind.  The satirist’s meditation on the state of his 
salvation causes him to consider the members of the court.  Although they are now physically 
separated from the satirist, as he desired, the “wretchedness” of their souls causes the satirist 
to pity his former targets.  Having preserved his own soul, the satirist is capable of empathy; 
his charity is reinvigorated and re-centered.385  The satirist’s soul begins “to mourne” the 
sinfulness of the courtiers he had met, re-establishing his charity for the members of the 
court.   His pity of the courtiers is not sufficient, however.  Now separated from the moral 
corruption that pervades the court, the speaker must balance his charitable pity to the sinful 
courtiers with righteous anger at their sins.   
The speaker’s pity and his anger may be irreconcilable.  The Dantean trance that 
comes upon the speaker instructs him to counteract his pity with a righteous scorn that is 
grounded in his moral authority as a satirist.  In order to motivate his satiric instruction, the 
trance encourages the speaker to reinvigorate his satire with an anger that is interested 
perhaps less in reformation than in punishment.  As Dante is guided through the Inferno, 
encouraged by Virgil to scorn violently the sins of the damned, so Donne’s speaker is 
instructed to rebuke with anger the sins of the courtiers.386  In the world of the trance, there is 
little room for pity. 
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The trance visited upon the speaker revises his earlier experience in the court in order 
to correct his previous satiric impotence.  Constructed in a very similar manner to the 
speaker’s foray to the court, the trance elicits the same anxiety in the speaker as that of his 
encounter with the courtier.   First, Donne asserts the speaker as an unwilling participant in 
the trance: it “did advance itself” upon the speaker, a phrase that recalls his earlier portrayal 
of his aggressive companion, “towards me did run / A thing more strange” (17-18).  Next, the 
speaker increases the amount and severity of the sin inhabiting the court to create a hellish 
parody of the court that is ready to burst at the seams: “such men as he saw there / I saw at 
Court, and worse, and more” (IV, 159-160)   Correcting his satiric failure of his previous 
visit, where he was likened to the libelous conversation of the courtier, the trance, encourages 
the speaker to assert his righteous anger.  The trance initially encourages the speaker to direct 
such anger inward, acknowledging his former “sin of going” before the speaker can pluck the 
beams out of the courtiers’ eyes.  By first admonishing himself, the satirist is able to reassert 
and rectify his earlier satiric impotence: berating himself, he claims “low fear / Becomes the 
guilty, not the accuser.”   Raising himself past the heights of those he would correct, the 
satirist demonstrates his call to satire: “Shall I, none’s slave, of high-born, or raised men / 
Fear frowns?”  For the first time in the poem, the speaker unapologetically asserts his moral 
authority, constructing himself as an “accuser” of vice and reaffirming his loyalty to his 
“mistress truth” even in the face of misinterpretation.   Demonstrating his reinvigorated 
satiric authority, the speaker calls on God to witness the vice of the court, asking Him, “Thou 
which since yesterday hast beene / Almost about the whole world, hast thou seen, / O sun, in 
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all thy journey, vanity, / Such as swells the bladder of our Court?” (IV, 166-168).  
Dramatizing the speaker’s newfound satiric courage as a prayer for God to stand witness to 
the court’s sinfulness, Donne portrays his speaker’s satire as an expression of godly disdain.   
After Donne’s speaker rails to God, decrying the unnatural sinfulness of the court, he 
immediately and inexplicably appears back in the very corruption and sinfulness he had 
earlier admonished.  At once attracted to and repulsed by the court, the satirist has no clear 
reason for being in the presence chamber.  Once there, however, he realizes the futility of his 
task:  he can satirize the ladies as ships and men as pirates, he can mock Macrine, whose self-
conscious primping would make “Heraclitus laugh,” and denounce Glorius for his ambition 
and cruelty, but the satirist cannot change their behaviors, much less their souls (IV, 197). In 
fact, he cannot separate his own rebuke from the self-promotional railings of Glorius.  
Confronted with the knowledge that his satire, while godly, will always either be disregarded 
or maligned, Donne’s speaker leaves the court a second time, meditating upon his own satiric 
authority.   
Initially, Donne portrays the speaker’s final retreat from the corruption of the court as 
a defeat.  The speaker is resigned to his satiric impotence, “Tyr’d” from his satiric foray into 
the den of sin (IV, 229).  Described leaving the court, “pleas’d so / As men which from 
gaoles to’execution goe,” the speaker seeks the isolation of retirement, refiguring the 
contempus mundi of the first satire by withdrawing from the corrupt world into a coffin-like 
isolation (IV, 229-230).  Radiating pessimism, the speaker ridicules the impotence of satire, 
questioning why the great chamber is “hung / With the seaven deadly sins,” when such 
displays of vice do so little to bring about the reformation of their audience (IV, 231-232).387  
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Although resigned to satire’s inability to urge reformation, the satirist does not 
abandon his art. Confident in his moral imperative to satirize the court, he departs the court in 
a final satiric fury, privately proclaiming the moral bankruptcy of the “Ascaparts,” who are 
unfit for their job of guarding the Queen, caring for nothing besides their own rank and 
appetites (IV, 233-236).  The narrative of the poem closes on the satirist’s retreat from court, 
but, in contrast to his previous flight, he acknowledges the muted authority of his satiric task, 
affirming himself to be a “Spie” for mistress truth (IV, 237). He presents his satire with a 
more limited scope, transforming his once public stance to that of a detached and private 
satiric persona.  
Despite the speaker’s resignation in the narrative of the poem, Donne prevents his 
reader from dismissing his satire as wholly ineffective; rather, the conclusion of his satire 
returns his reader to the same ambivalence and irony that marked the speaker’s initial 
confession of his sins.  In the concluding lines of the poem, the speaker reconstructs the 
frame of his confession, his soul’s salvation assured by his satiric duty, his public duty as a 
Christian satirist re-envisioned as a commitment to his faithful reader(s).  He asserts: 
 …Preachers which are 
Seas of Wit and Arts, you can, then dare, 
Drowne the sinnes of this place, for, for mee 
Which am but a scarce brooke, it enough shall bee 
To wash the staines away; Though I yet  
With Macchabees modestie, the knowne merit 
Of my worke lessen: yet some wise man shall, 
I hope, esteeme my writs Canonicall. (IV, 237-244) 
 
Acknowledging that his satire will be misinterpreted by those outside his sphere of influence 
who are unfamiliar with his moral authority, Donne’s speaker retreats to an audience of wise 
and understanding readers, leaving the task of wide-ranging moral reformation in the hands 
of preachers, whose moral authority is well established by their godly lives.  While the 
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satirist admits that his audience is limited to those who know and accept his moral authority, 
he does not abandon his satiric task.  Instead, he shrinks his commitment to charity in the 
final moments of his poem, asserting that he will limit his satires to his intimate friends.  He 
posits that his satires will help those “wise men” and women who will read them, deeming 
his “writs canonical” for their fidelity to the truth (IV, 244). The speaker’s reference here to 
“Macchabees modesty” returns to the same ambiguity that riddled the satirist’s opening 
confession.  The last lines of II Maccabees (xv. 38), to which Donne apparently alludes, 
humbly petitions their readers: “If I haue done well and as the storie required, it is the thing 
that I desired: but if I haue spoken sclenderly & barely, I haue done that I coulde.”388  The 
corresponding humility of Donne’s speaker cannot be taken as equally genuine, however.  
While he affects the modesty of his biblical source, his protestation rings hollow next to his 
confidence in the “knowne merit” of his work and his hope that “some wise man” will agree 
with him. Restricting the audience of his satires is not a cure-all for Donne’s problems.   
Donne limits the audience of his satires to “wise” understanders in order to prevent 
misinterpretation.  By doing so, he restricts the ability of his satire to reform its audience.  In 
short, the godly and the good do not need satire. 
 
“I would have no such Readers as I can teach” 
 Conceiving of his audience as a group of likeminded individuals, Donne addresses 
“himself with stylistic boldness to a receptive audience of peers” but acknowledges that even 
such a restricted audience is not perfect.389  Donne reinforces his desire for a reciprocal 
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understanding with his audience in his prefatory remarks to his topical Metempsychosis:  "I 
would have no such Readers as I can teach."390  Collectively, Donne’s satires not only reflect 
his coterie’s writing styles and intellectual curiosities, they also define and restrict Donne’s 
audience: according to Harold Love, Donne considered the circulation of his poems within 
the coterie “as remaining in the private sphere.”391  By all accounts, the coterie environment 
appears to be intimate.  “In context,” Marotti argues, “these [satires] proclaimed not only the 
values and attitudes poet and readers shared, but also the primary audience’s personal 
knowledge of Donne’s experience and behavior.”392   
Even this like-minded community of Jonsonian understanders was not without 
anxiety, however.  Despite its claims to privacy, Donne’s verse was still published in a 
scribal medium; rather than relegate his poetry to the fire, he had it copied out and presented 
to a group of respected acquaintances, who were themselves empowered to copy it yet again 
and circulate it further afield.  In his letters and verse, Donne often expresses his unease with 
even this limited publication of his verse, lamenting in “The Triple Fool” that he must hear 
his love verse spoken aloud: 
 I am two fools, I know, 
 For loving, and for saying so 
 In whining poetry; 
 But where’s that wiseman, that would not be I, 
 If she would not deny? … 
 I thought, if I could draw my pains 
 Through rhyme’s vexation, I should them allay. 
 Grief brought to numbers cannot be so fierce, 
 For, he tames it, that fetters it in verse. 
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 But when I have done so, 
 Some man, his art and voice to show, 
 Doth set and sing my pain, 
 And, by delighting many, frees again 
 Grief, which verse did restrain. … 
 And I, which was two fools, do so grow three; 
 Who are a little wise, the best fools be. (1-1-5,8-16, 21-22) 393 
 
In this verse, Donne posits that the audience of his work is singular, limited to Donne 
himself.  He writes in order to “allay” his pains, taming and fettering his “grief” to the meter 
and rhyme of his poem.  Donne’s purpose is served in his process of invention and execution; 
the reading and re-reading of his verse is positioned as an unnecessary embarrassment.  
While the “public” release of his love poetry might cause Donne annoyance, the disclosure of 
his satires might cause Donne distress.  It is understandable that he would be cautious.  In a 
letter accompanying Donne’s poetic and prose paradoxes, he writes, “to my satyrs there 
belongs some feare and to some elegies, and these perhaps, shame…Therefore I am desirous 
to hyde them with out any over reconing of them or their maker.”394  Whether fearful of 
running afoul of the authorities or of his Creator, Donne endeavored to keep his poetry’s 
circulation restricted.    
Having embodied the lessons of his satiric meditations, Donne confines his satiric 
commentary to the privacy of letters directed to specific friends and acquaintances rather 
than a potentially unlimited public.  Restricting their audience to a singular reader selected by 
the author, Donne’s satires flourish. Removing himself from the world of the court, Donne 
continues to articulate anti-courtly satire—some of it even resembling the earlier libelous 
satire of the courtier—but reserves such volatile commentary for his private correspondence.   
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While the familiarity of the recipient and the relative privacy of letters presumably afforded 
Donne more freedom than manuscript poetry, he is still noticeably guarded about his 
participation in the court.395 He still puzzles out how precisely to satirize a corrupt and 
potentially corrupting court without becoming tainted by its infection.396   
In his letters to Henry Wotton, “Here’s no more newes, then vertue” and “Sir, more 
than kisses,” written contemporaneously to his fourth satire, Donne refigures and even 
repeats some of the same questions he engaged in Satire IV.  As in Satire IV, Donne satirizes 
the active life of court politics in “Here’s no more newes,” written to the country-dwelling 
Wotton.  In his letter, Donne acknowledges his reluctant participation in the corrupt society 
of courtiers, presenting the dangers of the court as relatively benign: 
  Here’s no more newes, then vertue:’I may as well 
  Tell you Cales, or St Michaels tale for newes, as tell 
  That vice doth here habitually dwell… 
 
  Then let us at these mimicke antiques jeast, 
  Whose deepest projects, and egregious gests 
  Are but dull Moralls of  game at Chests. 
    
But now ‘tis incongruity to smile, 
  Therefore I end; and bid farewell a while, 
  At Court; though From Court, were the better stile. (1-3, 22-27)397 
 
Donne begins his letter to his friend by pronouncing the lack of virtue at court to be so 
commonplace that the stale news of its vice need not be rehashed.  Donne’s verse letter is 
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riddled with contradiction, however, speaking to a conflicted mind struggling to reconcile 
himself to his environment.  His aversion to the courtly life notwithstanding, Donne admits 
that he still “haunts” the court (6); he insists, however, he does so only to sweeten his later 
retirement.  In the second half of his letter, Donne affirms the benefit of scorn and his own 
satiric task as a means of protection and entertainment, encouraging those of the court to 
regard each other with “Suspitious boldnesse” and for his retired friend to join him in his 
“jeast” of the superficial concerns of the courtly inhabitants (16, 22).  Donne contradicts 
himself again, positing in his letter’s conclusion that “tis incongruity to smile” at such sin.  In 
the end, Donne closes his letter apologizing for his mere presence at court, affirming his 
preference for the retired life by closing “At Court; though From Court, were the better 
stile.”   
In “Sir, more then kisses, letters mingle Soules,” Donne presents a darker version of 
the active life, one that promises its participants only the infection and corruption of vice.   In 
the first half of the letter, Donne muses on the differences between the country, the city and 
the court, ultimately denouncing each as unfit for habitation.  He dismisses them all: “so 
pride, lust, covetize, being severall / To these three places, yet all are in all” (31-32) 398  The 
differences between them do not pose a fit alternative to vice: in the country, “men become 
beasts,” in the city they are  “blockes,” and, in the “lewd court, devils” (27-28).  This letter 
demonstrates Donne rehearsing privately the same questions he posed in his fourth satire. He 
questions whether it is possible for a man to participate in the world but not be contaminated 
by it.  Conversely, he ponders whether the isolation of private life is preferable.  By the time 
he writes to Wotten, Donne has not yet reconciled the contradiction.   
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Marotti interprets the letter to be a blanket disavowal of public life.  He bases his 
argument on Donne’s condemnation of prodigality,  “Let no man say there, Virtues flintie 
wall / Shall locke vice in mee,’I’ll do none, but know all” (35-36).  Asserting that Donne 
“suggests that the man involved in the world lies to himself and to others if he claims that he 
can participate in an evil environment but remain innocent,” Marotti argues that Donne’s 
verse letter presents “the moral solution” as “stoical withdrawal.”399 To make his case, 
Marotti must overlook the moral work of Donne’s satire as well as contradictory evidence in 
the poem that would praise Wotton for his active engagement in the world: 
  … Sir, I’advise not you, I rather doe 
  Say o’er those lessons, which I learn’d of you: 
  Whom, free from German schisms, and lightnesse 
  Of France, and faire Italies faithlesnesse, 
  Having from these suck’d all they had of worth, 
  And brought home that faith, which you carried forth, 
  I thoroughly love. (63-69) 
 
Donne credits Wotton with what he had previously deemed impossible: the ability to refine 
the gross vice of public life to a substance of worth, engaging in the corrupt societies of 
Germany, France and Italy, taking the good and leaving the ill.   Wotton perfectly embodies 
Donne’s self-sufficient yet engaged snail:  “the snaile, which every where doth rome, / 
Carrying his owne house still, still is at home, / Follow (for he is easie pac’d) this snaile, / 
Bee thine owne Palace, or the world’s thy Gaole” (49-52).  By balancing the self-sufficiency 
of stoic detachment and the charity that comes with participating in the world, the snail is 
able to refine the best of both worlds.  In his letter to his friend, Donne enlarges the 
imprisonment of his satiric study onto the world: while in Satire I, his “standing wooden 
chest” contains him in his retirement, isolating him both physically and morally from the 
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contamination of the world, in “Sir, more than kisses,” Donne allows for the possibility of a 
pure, though detached, engagement with society.   Even though Donne speculates that the 
pedagogical goal of his letter is unnecessary, that his friend should receive Donne’s praise 
rather than his feeble advice, his compulsion to proselytize runs throughout the letter.  It is 
only in the very final moments of the letter that Donne redirects his advice from his self-
sufficient and snail-like companion to himself.  At the end of the sixteenth century, Donne’s 
satiric task continues to turn inward.  He hints that he writes not for others after all, but for 
himself.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
EPILOGUE 
By the time the bishops banned the printing and circulation of satire in 1599, Donne 
had abandoned the mode, confining his satiric spirit to the privacy of letters and 
correspondences with his friends.   He is joined in his rejection of satire’s goal of reformation 
by other verse satirists of the 1590s, namely Joseph Hall and John Marston, both of whom 
disavow their own satiric verse later in life. While they were writing satiric literature, 
however, their evaluations of the mode were not as rigid.   
Joseph Hall is more optimistic than Marston.  In his Virgidemiarum, he portrays a 
limited view of the power of satire to make society better.  While satire promises to “Check 
the mis-ordered world, and lawlesse times,” it also seems to imperil its executioner (24): 
  I first adventure, with fool-hardie might 
  To tread the steps of perilous despight: 
  I first adventure: follow me who list, 
  And be the second English Satyrist. 
  Envie waits on my backe, Truth on my side: 
  Envie will be my Page, and Truth my Guide. (1-6)400 
 
Portraying his satiric task as “fool-hardie” and his satire as “despight,” Hall questions the 
godliness of his art while also positioning himself as a target of the misdirected scorn and 
envy he would reform.  Despite this momentary pessimism, Hall closes his Virgidemiarum 
confident that satire may accomplish some good, asserting “the end of this paines was a 
Satyre, but the end of my Satyre a further good, which whether I attaine or no I know not, but 
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let me be plaine, with hope of profit.”401 Like Donne, Hall offers his satires as a singular 
experience of reformation, limited to the wise reader of his verse.  He relegates satire to the 
private and intimate experience of reading.  Even so, Hall expects to suffer some injury for 
attempting to reform his readers: he looks to be “set upon the racke of many mercilesse and 
peremptorie censure” by those who will judge his book “unlawfull … because a Satyre.”402  
 John Marston is much more cynical than Donne or Hall, dismissing satire as a vain 
and violent attempt to mitigate the moral problems of society.  Marston eventually concludes 
that satire is unable to reform the world’s overwhelming sins, resigning himself to his own 
satiric impotence:  
Now Satyre, cease to rub our gauled skinnes, 
  And to unmaske the worlds detested sinnes. 
  Thou shalt as soone draw Nilus river dry, 
  As cleanse the world from foule impietie. (157-160)403 
 
According to Marston, satire can only bruise and harden the skins of the scourged with its 
discovery and exposure of vice.  Much darker than that of the other verse satirists, Marston’s 
worldview presents the impiety of the world as entrenched and rampant, impossible to 
transform into virtue.  Encountering such a Herculean task, Marston turns railer, the veneer 
of reformation that once authorized his satire gone, replaced with vengeance.  In contrast to 
the charity and hope exercised by Donne and Hall in the face of corruption, Marston will 
enact his rage in the form of a fist: 
  Preache not the Stoickes patience to me, 
  I hate no man, but mens impeitie. 
My soul is vext, what power will’th desist? 
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Or dares to stop a sharpe fangd Satyrist? 
Who’le coole my rage? who’le stay my itching fist 
But I will plague and torture whom I list? (5-10).404  
 
Marston’s desire to inflict punishment upon his audience is greater than his desire to reform 
them.   Later in the same poem, he asserts, “O what dry braine melts not sharp mustard rime / 
To purge the snottery of our slimie time? … vengeance pricks me on” (70-73).  Marston is 
urged by vengeance rather then godliness, and it is his vengeance that must be satisfied.  It is 
this threat of vengeful destruction that poses the largest concern for the bishops. 
The bishops recognized that, having been divorced from its goal of reformation, satire 
had become a much more dangerous, amorphous form of malicious speech that had replaced 
its assertion of moral good with a zeal for criticism and destruction.  As Donne’s Satire IV 
prefigures, satire was associated with libel, its interest in society’s reformation replaced with 
an interest in defamation.  The bishops’ ban represents an exasperated attempt by the 
authorities to curtail the malicious speech that threatened power structures and scourged 
political and religious institutions.  If such unauthorized speech were to remain unchecked, 
the authority of the church, court and even parliament would be questioned, opening them to 
the charges of hypocrisy, false dealing, and even heresy.  Having transformed from godly 
rebuke to mere defamation, such “booke[s] of the nature of theise,” were put down.   
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